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It’s oh, but, aa ken well, ah, you me hinny burd, 
The bonny lass of Benwell, ah, you, ah.
She’s lang-legged and mother-like, ah, you hinny burd
See her raking up the dyke, ah, you, ah.
The Quayside for sailors, ah, you me hinny burd,
The Castle Garth for tailors, ah, you, ah.
The Gateshead Hills for millers, ah, you hinny burd, 
The North Shore for keelers, ah, you, ah.
There’s Sandgate for owld rags, ah, you, me hinny burd,
And Gallowgate for trolley bags; ah, you, ah.
There’s Denton and Kenton, ah you, hinny burd,
And canny Langbenton, ah, you, ah.
There’s Tynemouth and Cullercoats, ah, you me hinny burd,
And North Shields for sculler boats; ah, you, ah.
There’s Westoe lies in a neuk, ah, you hinny burd,
And South Shields the place for seut, ah, you, ah.
There’s Horton and Hollywell, ah, you me hinny burd
And bonny Seaton Delaval; ah, you ah.
Hartley Pans for sailors, ah, you hinny burd
And Bedlington for nailers, ah, you ah.
Traditional Tyneside song

1. Introduction
It’s like a jungle sometimes. It makes me wonder, 
How I keep from going under.1
Prelude
This book is a study of people’s social relationships and social behaviour 
in different neighbourhoods of one English conurbation, Tyneside. I 
define social behaviour in the classic biological sense, to mean things that 
one individual does that have consequences for another individual or 
individuals (Bourke, 2011; Hamilton, 1964). Thus, merely being present at 
the same place as another individual is not necessarily a social behaviour. 
Giving something to them, taking something from them, improving their 
environment or despoiling it are all social behaviours. Social behaviours 
can be further classified as prosocial, where the actor’s actions improve 
someone else’s situation, or antisocial, where they make it worse. For the 
most part, the book is based on comparative data from two particular 
neighbourhoods within the city of Newcastle upon Tyne, which I will call 
A and B. There is also some ancillary data from other parts of Tyneside. The 
book is based on several years of intermittent fieldwork by several people; 
I will say more about this later in the chapter. First it is worth saying 
something about how the long journey that has led to this book got started. 
In around 2007 or 2008, I had a chance conversation with my partner 
on the subject of household refuse. I lived in the North East of the city of 
1  The epigraphs to all of the chapters in this book are from ‘The Message’, by Grandmaster 
Flash and the Furious Five, written by Joel Edwards, Robin Barter and Robert Post 
(1983). 
© Daniel Nettle, CC BY http://dx.doi.org/10.11647/OBP.0084.01
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Newcastle upon Tyne, whereas she lived in the West End, in the house we 
now live in together. Newcastle, like many cities, asks its citizens to divide 
household waste into recyclable and non-recyclable categories, collected on 
different days. I was uncertain, as I recall, about the proper categorization 
of some kind of plastic. I wanted to behave well and sort correctly, and was 
therefore anxious to have the right information about what the rules were. 
She said something to the effect that she wouldn’t expend too much effort 
on getting things like this right, since her bin would be quite likely to be set 
fire to anyway before it could be collected. 
It turned out that her attitude was not without foundation. Various 
things did indeed get set ablaze in that part of Newcastle at that time, a 
problem that thankfully seems to have abated somewhat. Even when 
recycling bins did not burn, they would often be either kicked over or used 
improperly by someone else once on the street, resulting in a mixed load 
that the recycling lorry would refuse to take. Thus, she was absolutely 
correct in her assessment of the futility of expending much effort in the 
direction of conscientious recycling; such effort would end up being 
undermined by the action of others. Her lightly-made comment made a 
remarkable impression on me, for several reasons. 
First, over the years I have thought a fair amount about the age-
old question of whether people are basically good (helpful, prosocial, 
cooperative), or whether they are basically selfish. This question has 
a very clear answer: it depends. Humans have motivations to deliver 
social benefits to others, but these are not their only motivations, and 
the expression of these motivations is contingent and conditional. Most 
obviously, and as illustrated by the blazing bin example, the expression 
of prosocial motivations depends on expectations about what others 
in the population might (or might not) do. This means that if you want 
to understand when people will behave prosocially and when they will 
not, you need to know a lot about their ecology (what kinds of things are 
going on in the surrounding population?), and you also need to know a 
lot about human psychology (how exactly do the information-processing 
mechanisms that take cues from the local environment in order to adjust an 
individual’s social decisions work?). 
The second reason that her comment struck me was that our respective 
houses were in the same city and only around 3km apart, yet clearly the 
behaviour going on around them was utterly different. Rubbish bins 
would never be set fire to where I lived. It was—and I mean this as more 
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than a casual simile—like living in two different countries. Yet our two 
neighbourhoods shared the same language, ethnic heritage, national and 
local government, and judicial systems. In fact, the same council vehicles 
collected the refuse from the two places. This relates to the whole issue of 
the nature and scale of variation in human social behaviour, and in human 
culture more broadly. As social scientists, what should be our units of 
analysis: countries, cities, streets or individuals? How meaningful is it to 
talk about an English culture, when two samples of English people—two 
samples taken a 15-minute bicycle ride apart—give such different pictures? 
Third, my partner had clearly and without much thought calibrated 
her actions to her ecology. She had a similar long-term developmental 
history to mine, and her fundamental social attitudes were the same as 
my own. Yet her neighbourhood environment had clearly caused her 
decision-making to change. Anthropologists call the process by which an 
individual’s social behaviour is shaped by the surrounding population 
acculturation. However, many descriptions of acculturation envisage a 
slow, perhaps linguistically-mediated process lasting many years, typically 
happening to children as they grow into adults. My partner had moved 
to the neighbourhood already adult; what had happened to her seemed 
more like an immediate cognitive response to a certain kind of perceptual 
experience. This raises interesting questions about which experiences are 
important in acculturation, and the timescale over which they act. If I moved 
to the land where bins go up in flames, would my behaviour change? If so, 
which perceptual inputs would be most important in causing the change, 
and how quickly would it occur if I had them? And if the change occurred 
quickly, how quickly could it be reversed?
If one tributary stream of this book was a longstanding interest in 
prosocial and antisocial behaviour, the second tributary was an interest 
in socioeconomic deprivation and its consequences. I haven’t told you, 
though it may not surprise you to learn, that the neighbourhood where 
recycling was overshadowed by arson was one where most people were 
extremely poor, whereas the orderly neighbourhood was one where most 
people were affluent. If there were large differences between our respective 
neighbourhoods in terms of prosocial and antisocial behaviour, we might 
be dealing with another instance of the near-ubiquitous phenomenon of 
the social gradient. 
Social gradient is the term used by social scientists to describe any 
situation where the outcome we are interested in is patterned according 
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to socioeconomic position, so that more affluent or high-status social 
groups look different from less affluent or lower-status ones. I may be 
coloured by the particular topics I have conducted research on, but social 
gradients strike me as the overwhelmingly salient fact about contemporary 
developed societies. If a Martian researcher asked me for a quick summary 
of how these societies work, I would give the following one: things work 
out differently for the rich and the poor. Social gradients have been 
described for many variables in the UK: birth weight, age at parenthood, 
paternal behaviour, breastfeeding, smoking, body mass, depression, and 
orientation towards the future, to name but a few (Adams & White, 2009; 
Nettle, 2008, 2010a; Pill, Peters, & Robling, 1995; Stansfeld & Head, 1998). 
Perhaps the most fundamental social gradient is that of life itself: the poor 
in the UK can expect to be alive several fewer years than the rich, and they 
can expect to be healthy for many fewer years (Adler, Boyce, & Chesney, 
1994; Bajekal, 2005). Whether the gradient in the length of life is the cause 
or the consequence of all the other gradients is a delicate question. In my 
work, I have argued that there are often bidirectional relationships: poor 
people worry less about the long-term health consequences of smoking 
because they don’t think they will remain alive so long anyway, regardless 
of what they do, but this in turn exacerbates the already-existing gap in 
how long they will live (Nettle, 2010b; Pepper & Nettle, 2014). 
Social gradients connect in a number of ways to the issues about prosocial 
and antisocial behaviour that I have already discussed. Some of the social 
gradients that have been documented directly concern prosocial and 
antisocial behaviour: there are social gradients in crime, in violence, and in 
pro-environmental attitudes, for example (Dietz, Stern, & Guagnano, 1998; 
Kikuchi & Desmond, 2015; Sampson, Raudenbush, & Earls, 1997; Shaw, 
Tunstall, & Dorling, 2005). Moreover, social gradients lead us once again 
to the question of the scale of variation in human culture. Because of social 
gradients, the variation within contemporary societies is often more striking 
than the variation between them. For example, Figure 1.1 plots women’s 
average age at first pregnancy for a number of countries, and then for two 
different groups of English women of White British ancestry: those who live 
in the most affluent decile of English neighbourhoods, and those who live 
in the most deprived decile. As you can see, the English women from the 
affluent neighbourhoods look like the average women from Switzerland 
or New Zealand. The English women from the deprived neighbourhoods 
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behave like the average women of Guatemala or Kazakhstan. These groups 
of women often live just hundreds of metres apart, and yet we see that their 
lives are organized as differently from one another as Swiss women’s are 
from Kazakh women. This is immediately reminiscent of my short journey 
across Newcastle from the land of recycling to the land of burning bins. 
Figure 1.1  Mean ages at first birth for women from a number of countries, and for White 
British women living the most affluent decile of English neighbourhoods (E1), and the 
most deprived decile of English neighbourhoods (E10). Data are reproduced from Nettle 
(2011b) and Nettle (2010a). NZ: New Zealand. Image © Daniel Nettle, CC BY.
Another connection between social gradients and prosocial behaviour 
comes from the fact that social gradients are not completely reducible 
to individual characteristics. Social scientists distinguish between an 
individual’s personal socioeconomic position, as measured by things 
like his income, educational qualifications and employment status, and 
the deprivation of the area in which he lives, which relates to the average 
income, education and employment of people in the surrounding locality. 
It is quite hard to tease apart statistically which is more important in social 
gradients, personal socioeconomic position (e.g. being poor oneself) or 
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area deprivation (e.g. living in neighbourhood where many other people 
are poor). This is because the population of Britain is strongly assorted by 
income, so that most people living in neighbourhoods with many poor 
people are themselves poor. The best evidence suggests, though, that for 
many gradients, there is an effect of area-level deprivation above and 
beyond the effects of individual socioeconomic position (Ludwig et al., 
2012; Pickett & Pearl, 2001; Sampson, Morenoff, & Gannon-Rowley, 2002). 
That is, there are consequences for one’s health and behaviour of living 
surrounded by poor people, above and beyond the consequences of being 
poor oneself. This must imply that our experience of what others in the 
immediately surrounding environment are doing is important for our 
own outcomes. This again links us back to social behaviour; indeed to the 
very definition of social behaviour as things people do that have effects on 
others. 
My twin concerns with social behaviour and with socioeconomic 
deprivation were allied to a desire to get out of the office more. I had been 
doing epidemiological work for several years, and what this amounted to in 
practice was sitting in front of a computer. Although the scientific payoffs 
for desk work are often considerable, its capacity to expand personal 
horizons is limited: there is nothing quite like the messy improvisation 
of a primary empirical project for changing the way you think about the 
world. I thus decided—after considerable inspiration and advice from my 
friend Tom Dickins of Middlesex University—to undertake a systematic 
field study of two contrasting neighbourhoods within Newcastle, one 
very deprived and the other more affluent. The study aimed to be both 
ethnographic and ethnological. It would be ethnographic since it aimed to 
document, in detail, what life was like in the two study neighbourhoods. It 
would be ethnological, since I wanted to systematically compare the two, 
and try to explain why they might differ in the ways they did. I dubbed 
the project the Tyneside Neighbourhoods Project, partly as an homage to 
David Sloan Wilson and Dan O’Brien’s Binghamton Neighborhood Project 
in upstate New York (Wilson, O’Brien, & Sesma, 2009). The Tyneside 
Neighbourhoods Project ended up gathering data about many things, such 
as health behaviour, psychological wellbeing, and plans for the future. 
However, there was a core running through it that specifically concerned 
social relationships, social behaviour, and the cognition that underlies 
them. It is this core that forms the subject matter of this book. 
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About this book
I should say something at this point about what this book represents 
and how it is presented. The Tyneside Neighbourhoods Project started 
out as one study, but went on to spawn a series of linked follow-up 
investigations in the same sites. I carried out and wrote up the first study 
myself, but after that, I was fortunate enough to be able to recruit a series 
of wonderful collaborators. The ones whose work is discussed here were 
Agathe Colléony, Rebecca Coyne, Kari Britt Schroeder, Jessica Hill, Ruth 
Jobling and Gillian Pepper. Later parts of the project were executed and 
in many instances conceived by one or more of them, aided in some cases 
by undergraduate students from Newcastle University. I also collaborated 
on related work with Maria Cockerill of North Tyneside Council, and with 
Stephanie Clutterbuck and Jean Adams, though that work does not feature 
so directly here. All this led to a series of over ten papers in academic 
journals, each authored by a different combination of collaborators and 
each with a slightly different research question, but all based on fieldwork 
in Tyneside neighbourhoods. 
I faced a difficult dilemma in the authorship of this book. The work 
presented here is not mine alone. Should I then co-author the book with all 
of my collaborators? Write it as an edited volume, with each chapter having 
a different author list? In the end I decided to author it by myself. My 
reasons for doing so relate to the function of the book. There is something 
interesting in having so many related datasets, using different methods, 
from the same places. It is like crossing and re-crossing a landscape from 
different angles, learning more about it each time. Now that the individual 
datasets are all published, I want to look at them in toto and reflect on the 
story they tell. This means looking at the whole body of the data from a 
little further back than is possible within a single academic paper. 
Given that the function of the book is to stand back and take an 
overview, it seemed necessary to author it alone. An overview is necessarily 
someone’s view. Any of my collaborators might have come up with quite 
different overviews from my own, and it would be hard to corral those 
into a single coherent story. It would either end up as a book designed by 
a committee, or with my collaborators having to put their names to things 
they wouldn’t have expressed in the same way. Thus, I have written the 
book myself but on the basis of studies that were in many cases led by my 
collaborators. I will attempt to apportion credit (or, I suppose, blame) for 
the original studies by naming the key investigators and citing the original 
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papers at appropriate points. Conversely, my collaborators are absolved 
from all the failings of the book; all opinions, errors, omissions and idiocies 
that appear in these pages rather than those of the peer-reviewed papers 
are mine alone. 
There are some other things to say about the way this book is written. 
In my view, the main virtue of the project is the amount of quantitative 
data we were able to collect (see chapter 2 for more details). I have thus 
not been shy of presenting data in quite a lot of detail, especially visually 
(and for those wanting to delve deeper still, the raw data are available via 
Open Science Framework at https://osf.io/ys7g6).2 On the other hand, given 
that the objective is an overall synthesis, readability is paramount. There is 
nothing more inimical to easy reading than a lot of results from statistical 
modelling. I have therefore decided not to present any details of inferential 
statistics in this book. If I claim a difference or association is statistically 
significant, then this is backed up out of sight by appropriate statistical 
tests, usually to be found in the relevant published paper. 
On a related note, the main text is very light on references to the previous 
literature, and quite heavy on my own interpretations and musings. I have 
eschewed an extensive literature review section in favour of mentioning 
key academic influences as they come up. Again, this relates to the different 
function of the book from the papers. Each of the published papers has 
a more thorough, better-referenced introduction, and a more measured 
and technical discussion. Here, I want to emphasize the story of doing the 
research as it happened, and I don’t want to get caught up in relatively 
esoteric points of difference between academic theories or traditions. I thus 
apologize to those scholars whose work I have been informed by but do not 
here cite explicitly, and also for the vast areas of social science literature of 
which I provide no adequate review in this book, even though it might be 
relevant. You can’t be nimble at the same time as being exhaustive, and so 
I have aimed for nimbleness.
In the remainder of this chapter, the next section will introduce the study 
city, Newcastle upon Tyne. The section after that says a little more about the 
academic concerns that shaped the project. As I have said, I don’t want to 
review these at length, but it is important to give some explanation for why 
the project ended up taking the form that it did. In the final section, I outline 
the broad hypotheses that we had in mind as we set out on the research.
2  An archived version of the dataset, preserving the data in the form it was at the time of 
publication, is available at http://dx.doi.org/10.17605/OSF.IO/W9Z2P
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The city context: Newcastle upon Tyne
Newcastle upon Tyne is the central city in the Tyneside conurbation, a major 
urban area of Northern England that occupies the banks of the river Tyne. 
The total population of Tyneside is around 900,000, making it the seventh 
largest population centre in the United Kingdom. Newcastle is an ancient 
city: the eponymous new castle was built in 1080 as part of the attempts of 
the Normans to secure—and harry—the North of England, but the city has 
been continuously inhabited since the Roman settlement of Pons Aelius 
begun in around AD120. Tyneside is a port. By the Middle Ages it was a 
major exporter of wool, and, increasingly and importantly, coal. Coal is 
found abundantly within and around the city, and coal was already being 
exported from Tyneside as early as 1250. By 1644, when Parliamentarian 
forces blockaded Newcastle during the English civil war, London’s annual 
coal supply fell from 450,000 tons to 3000. 
Coal mining, as well as providing large-scale employment directly, 
drove industrialization of Tyneside, which during the nineteenth became a 
major centre for railway engineering, shipbuilding, armaments, and other 
manufacturing. The city expanded to the West, East and North, and its 
population swelled with immigrants from Ireland, Scotland, and other parts 
of England. Adjoining villages were incorporated into the city through the 
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, as thousands of terraced homes 
were built in them for miners and other workers. They became the working-
class neighbourhoods of Tyneside. (For a historical ethnography of life in 
one such neighbourhood in the early twentieth century, see Williamson 
[1982].) 
The post-1945 period saw the beginning of economic decline and 
deindustrialisation on Tyneside. The last coal mine within the city closed 
in 1954; the larger mines in the surrounding area several decades later. The 
major heavy industries, notably shipbuilding, also declined through the 1970s 
and 1980s. Thus, the principal sources of employment that communities had 
grown up around employed many fewer people or disappeared. New sources 
of employment developed, notably in services, government-sector jobs and 
in education, and many parts of the city have regained and surpassed their 
former prosperity. However, this growth has been spatially uneven. As a result, 
architecturally and historically fairly similar neighbourhoods in different parts 
of the city have taken very divergent trajectories. This can be seen clearly by 
mapping the Index of Multiple Deprivation, the UK government’s preferred 
measure of social deprivation, for Newcastle’s constituent census tracts (Figure 
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1.2). As the map shows, the city contains many areas that are in the 50th-100th 
percentile when all of England’s census tracts are ranked from most to least 
deprived (that is, they are in the less deprived—or most affluent—half), but at the 
same time, also contains many tracts that are amongst the 10% most deprived. 
In fact, though the map does not show it, Tyneside has a number of tracts in 
England’s 1% most deprived. In particular, there are concentrations of extreme 
deprivation—the large nuclei of dark shading—along the riverside to both the 
West and East of the city centre. These were areas particularly tied to riverside 
heavy industries that no longer exist. By contrast, the area to the North East 
of the city centre, away from the river, although only a few kilometres distant 
from areas of extreme deprivation, is uniformly below median deprivation. 
The two main study sites for the Tyneside Neighbourhoods Project were one 
(Neighbourhood A) in the North East of the city, and one (Neighbourhood B) 
in the West End. I will deal with the choice of these two sites and their specific 
characteristics in more detail in chapter 2. 
Figure 1.2  A deprivation sketch map of Newcastle upon Tyne. The map is based on the 2010 
English Indices of Deprivation. © Jason Zampol, CC BY.
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A very large housing-cost gulf developed between the North East of the city 
and the areas along the riverside. The deprived nuclei were characterized 
by a long-term pattern of underemployment, economic insecurity and 
physical dilapidation. This was accompanied by demographic loss; in the 
West End, for example, the population has declined by around one third 
over the last few decades (Robinson, 2005). The deprived areas developed 
negative reputations locally, fuelling a vicious cycle of further outmigration 
by those with economic options, increasing concentration of economic 
disadvantage, and a general sense of decline. In the words of one authority 
on the city’s development:
[The West End’s] reputation is legendary […]. One small, telling example 
of this reputation that I have experienced is of officials going to a meeting 
in the West End trying to avoid taking their own cars. Another example, 
illustrating the impacts of the image, is that people in the West End say 
that employers and others discriminate against them by association, simply 
because of their address or postcode […]. Discrimination and the area’s 
reputation encourage those who can do so to leave. Indeed, it has been 
disconcerting for those running regeneration projects to find that if people 
are helped to get jobs they are inclined to move out. It doesn’t help that 
the image seems to be starkly and graphically emphasised by the visual 
reality. Nowadays, there are parts of the West End that look appalling, with 
boarded up and burnt out houses, cleared sites, barbed wire and shuttered 
shops (Robinson, 2005). 
The problems of deindustrialisation were further exacerbated by mortgage 
lenders applying no-lending policies to the deprived parts of the city. This 
further cut the already low value of housing, and restricted the pool of 
potential residents further still. It was essentially a signal of no confidence 
in these communities continuing to exist at all. 
The deprived parts of the city have been the site of many different 
urban regeneration initiatives funded by local and national government 
(non-exhaustive list for the West End; 1960s: Urban Aid; 1970s: Benwell 
Community Development Programme; 1980s: Tyneside Enterprise 
Zone; 1990s: West End City Challenge, North Benwell New Beginnings, 
Scotswood Regeneration, Reviving the Heart of the West End, New Deal 
for Newcastle West). The most recent initiatives in the West End stem from 
the 1999 Going for Growth plan, and have involved large-scale demolition 
of housing, with a view to creating communities afresh, attracting people 
not currently willing to live there. The fieldwork described in this book 
was carried out in the period after much of the large-scale demolition 
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envisaged by Going for Growth had been carried out, but before much of the 
new housing had been built. The West End made for an eerie sight through 
this period. In parts of Benwell, streets with street lighting were still there, 
but they had no houses on them. The former neighbourhood of Scotswood 
was a huge fallow field, with rocks blocking the ways in and, tall, angular 
CCTV-camera towers poking through the long, poppy-filled grass. Even 
the streets had been taken up. The Scotswood site is now (2015) being filled 
with the first houses of the new neighbourhood messianically named The 
Rise. Elsewhere, new housing is complete and already being occupied. 
Neighbourhood B of this study consists of streets in the West End 
that were not demolished, and were not due to be. They were still fully 
functional and the houses largely inhabited. However, it should be borne 
in mind that the fieldwork was carried out at a particular moment in time: 
a moment when people in Neighbourhood B had endured many years of 
uncertainty about the future of the whole area, had seen many areas around 
them destroyed, and had not as yet seen much new put into the empty 
spaces that surrounded them. It is impossible to say, though interesting to 
ask, how different our results would have been had our study been done 
five years later, just as it is interesting to wonder what they would have 
been like if it had been done fifty or seventy years earlier, when the West 
End was still poor, but the basis of its economic life was very different. 
Motivations for the Tyneside Neighbourhoods Project
The idea of studying in detail the social life of one or more urban 
neighbourhoods is by no means a new one. The project fits in some respects 
rather closely into the empirical tradition known as community studies in 
sociology (for a review of this area, see Crow & Allan, 1994). Community 
studies have often focused on working-class neighbourhoods, including on 
Tyneside in some cases, and often compared multiple sites in either the 
same or different cities (see e.g. Byrne, 1989). The present project shared the 
goals of some classic community studies, in that we wished to systematically 
describe, in our study neighbourhoods, the informal social relationships 
and interactions that make up so much of everyday life. (Strictly speaking, 
it would be better to call it a location study rather than a community study, 
since the study units were defined geographically and we cannot assume 
a priori that they necessarily function as communities.) However, my 
background is not in sociology, and I admit I was poorly acquainted with 
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the community studies tradition of research at the time of setting out—so 
much so that some of the similarities of the Tyneside Neighbourhoods 
Project to the studies in that tradition represent lucky convergence rather 
than inheritance. The idea of studying different neighbourhoods within the 
same city nonetheless attracted me, because it seemed to relate to several 
broader theoretical issues that cut right across the social and behavioural 
sciences. The first of these is one I have already touched upon: the issue of 
scale of variation in human social behaviour. 
Through the 2000s, a series of studies had shown quantitatively 
that measures of social behaviour varied across cultures (Henrich et al., 
2005; Henrich, Ensminger, McElreath, & Barr, 2010; Herrmann, Thöni, 
& Gächter, 2008). ‘Cultures’ here almost always meant either countries 
or ethnic groups, and the measures were either surveys or the monetary 
dilemmas known as economic games that we will discuss in more detail 
in chapter 2. These studies were important in showing that you could not 
make simple generalizations about whether humans were or were not 
cooperative; you needed to specify which humans you were talking about. 
In a way, though, these studies were not the most striking demonstration 
possible of the extraordinary flexibility of human behaviour. The kinds of 
groups compared in this body of research differed in so many ways—their 
natural environment, their mode of subsistence, their level of economic 
development, their monetary and political systems, their languages—that 
you really ought to expect them to differ on measures of social behaviour. It 
is surprising that they did not differ even more. The proportion of variation 
explained by country or ethnic group in these studies was fairly modest: 
though the group differences were statistically significant, there was 
always much more variation within groups than between (Bell, Richerson, 
& McElreath, 2009; Henrich et al., 2012). The ethnic group has long been a 
privileged level of analysis in anthropological thought, and there is lively 
discussion in the literature on the extent to which this is justified (Henrich 
et al., 2012; Lamba & Mace, 2011, Morin 2015). To sort out the relative 
magnitudes of within-society and between-society variation requires what 
is called a multi-level study, where you have data from many individuals 
from many social groups from many societies. We weren’t going to be able 
to do that by conducting an ethnographic study within one city. However, 
we would be able to quantify between-neighbourhood differences and 
compare their magnitude to those seen between ethnic groups in cross-
cultural studies using similar methodologies. 
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Another reason that a neighbourhood study was attractive relates to 
the distinction in social science between macro and micro studies. Macro 
studies are of the kind we have already discussed: they look at group 
averages in outcome across broad entities like countries or regions, often 
relating the variation in those averages to variation in some group-level 
predictor variable, either historical or contemporaneous. These studies are 
important because they reveal consequential differences between human 
social groups. One of the striking results of macro studies in the field of 
social behaviour has been to show that cultural differences can be rather 
stable over the long term. For example, there are marked differences 
between different parts of the USA in terms of the use of interpersonal 
violence. People in some areas are more prone than people in others to 
use violence to defend personal reputation, the so-called culture of honour 
(Nisbett, 1993). The prevalence of culture-of-honour violence in a county 
today, at least within the Southern states, can be traced right back to that 
county’s pattern of lawlessness and violence in the eighteenth century 
(Grosjean, 2014). These historical differences still show an influence when 
you control for current economic factors, and although the homogenizing 
influences of contemporary US life have lessened them over time, they have 
not yet abolished them completely. This suggests that once certain cultural 
patterns are set in, they become self-sustaining, and can persist over many 
generations of individuals, and much change in the current ecology. Such 
a conclusion sits well with a view of humans as ‘cultural beings’, the view 
traditional in much of anthropology. Under this view, people help or harm 
each other in particular ways because they are acculturated in societies 
that have historical traditions of helping or marking each other in those 
ways. These cultural traditions have their own inertia and dynamics that 
decouple them at least to some extent from subsequent changes in the 
ecology. (I am not claiming, by the way, that all macro studies necessarily 
lead us to view humans as cultural beings, only that some macro studies 
produce data easily interpreted from this perspective.) 
At the opposite extreme from macro studies are micro studies. Here, 
the units of analysis are individual people, and researchers explore, often 
experimentally, the immediate causal factors that underlie their decisions. In 
the field of social behaviour, for example, there has been a lot of experimental 
work looking at what kinds of contexts produce cooperative behaviour and 
what kinds do not. Some of this work is done in the laboratory. In one 
famous set of studies, people were formed up into artificial social groups in 
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which they were invited to contribute to a common pool resource that would 
benefit them all (Fehr & Gachter, 2000). In one experimental condition, the 
players had no possible way of sanctioning other group members who 
did not contribute. In this condition, predictably, contributions declined 
over time and the common pool resource ended up poorly funded. The 
experimenters changed the rules so that people had a way of sanctioning 
non-contributors. With this change in place, contributions to the common 
pool resource increased immediately, and remained high over time. In fact, 
people did not even need to directly experience being sanctioned to change 
their contributions; they saw that the possible consequences were different, 
and recalibrated their behaviour accordingly. 
Other micro studies of social behaviour have been done in the field. 
Perhaps the most impressive example is experiments by Keizer, Lindenberg 
and Steg (2008). In city streets in the Netherlands, the researchers introduced, 
on some days, subtle cues of disorder into the environment. These cues 
included graffiti, or bicycles locked to a fence in violation of a rule. They 
showed that on days when disorder cues were present, people were much 
more likely to drop litter themselves, take a prohibited shortcut, or even 
pocket someone else’s €5, than on days when those cues were absent. The 
effects were large. The difference between denizens of the Dutch cities on 
a day when there is graffiti in the environment those same Dutch citizens 
on a day when there is no graffiti is at least as big as the largest between-
population differences in social behaviour that have been observed in 
macro studies. 
The strength of micro studies is that they provide insight into causal 
processes underlying individual behavioural decisions. Perhaps the most 
striking generalization arising from micro studies of social behaviour, and 
exemplified by Keizer et al.’s results, is that people’s social behaviour is 
enormously influenced by immediate context. You can really change what 
people do by even a small manipulation of their environment, and you 
can do this in real time. This sits well with the view of humans as ‘agentic 
beings’ that is characteristic of economics amongst other disciplines. Under 
this view, people are able to respond strategically to the incentives and 
opportunities of their local context: change the environment, and people’s 
behaviour will follow suit. There is an interesting tension between thinking 
of humans as cultural beings and thinking of them as agentic beings: on 
the one hand, the long-term stability of macro patterns, suggesting social 
culture has its own independent transmission and inertia; on the other 
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hand, the strategic flexibility of individual people, suggesting that social 
behaviour is an immediate strategic response to current context. 
In truth humans are beings that are both cultural and agentic, and one of 
the most interesting challenges in the behavioural sciences is constructing 
detailed explanations of particular behaviours that do justice to both 
components. Individuals are indeed flexible and strategic, as the micro-
experiments demonstrate. They certainly don’t have a fixed, inherited 
cultural formula that they follow slavishly regardless of current context. 
On the other hand, there really are—at least sometimes—long-term 
cultural traditions (Morin 2015). These exist because people in populations 
influence one another. The behavioural output from one person forms 
part of the environmental input to which his neighbours may respond, 
creating the potential for a cycle of transmission. Under certain conditions, 
the aggregate behaviour can end up stable over long periods of time, even 
though all the individual people are capable of behaving flexibly and 
strategically.
The idea of a neighbourhoods project appealed because it was at a meso-
scale, offering some of the opportunities of a macro study and some of those 
of a micro study. It shared with macro studies the possibility of identifying 
group-level average differences; particular neighbourhoods have 
reputations for particular social cultures, and these can last for many years. 
On the other hand, neighbourhoods are small enough and similar enough 
to one another that you can drill down deeply into exactly what individual 
perceptions or experiences are driving any neighbourhood differences in 
behaviour. It might even be possible in one or two instances to use the 
experimental method, deliberately manipulating the experiences or cues 
that people receive, to catch the workings of the decision-making processes 
underlying people’s prosocial and antisocial acts, and thus potentially 
understanding the proximate determinants of a neighbourhood’s social 
traditions. The meso-scale thus seemed a fruitful terrain on which to try to 
reconcile the cultural and agentic aspects of variation in social behaviour. 
The Tyneside Neighbourhoods Project thus aimed to examine within-
society variation, to work at the meso-scale, and to explore the roles of 
both individual decision-making and cultural transmission in maintaining 
patterns of behaviour. It had another aspiration, which was to use multiple 
quantitative methods, with equal emphasis on the multiple and on the 
quantitative. The reasons for this aspiration, and the methods it led us to 
develop, will be laid out in chapter 2. 
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Competing narratives:  
Kropotkin versus the Mountain People
One of the reasons it seemed interesting to study social behaviour in 
an affluent and a deprived community is that there were two venerable 
traditions of thought available to us that led to exactly opposite expectations 
about what patterns we should see. These traditions are too diffuse to be 
called hypotheses; they are really alternative framing narratives about 
deprivation and social life that scholars and commentators are recurrently 
drawn to. I shall call them, for reasons that will become clear below, the 
Kropotkin narrative and the Mountain People narrative. 
Piotr Kropotkin, the great nineteenth-century polymath and anarchist 
thinker, spent long periods travelling in Siberia and Manchuria. He 
observed the terrible harshness of the environment, and the consequent 
precariousness of life for the animals and plants. What impressed him, 
though, was how individuals cooperated as a strategy for survival. Whether 
it was the hunting packs of carnivores, the breeding colonies and flocks of 
birds, or the family groups of small mammals, Kropotkin argued that the 
way individuals coped with environmental difficulties was by developing 
mutually-beneficial social relationships. Kropotkin argued from the outset 
that this observation should be as applicable for understanding human 
societies as it was for animal ones. 
An accurate reading of Kropotkin’s book Mutual Aid (1902) would not be 
that cooperative relationships emerge only in harsh environments. Rather, 
Kropotkin saw cooperative relationships as a ubiquitous component of 
how individuals manage to survive under all circumstances. However, 
harsh environments did allow you to see the importance of mutual aid 
particularly clearly. For this reason, his name has become perennially 
attached to the idea that harsh environments foster prosociality (Smaldino, 
Schank, & McElreath, 2013). Within a contemporary developed country 
like Britain, ‘harsher’ can be roughly equated to ‘more socioeconomically 
deprived’.
For our study, then, if we began with the Kropotkin narrative in mind, 
we would expect that it would be in our deprived study site where informal 
prosocial behaviours would be most strongly expressed. Individual 
financial resources are scarcer in such communities. The financial returns 
on labour tend to be much lower, even where formal employment is 
available, and consequently people’s ability to purchase market solutions 
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to their problems is generally weak. They have to find ways of coping with 
this difficult constellation of circumstances, and under the Kropotkinian 
view, they will do this by turning to, and investing in, informal prosocial 
relationships within their neighbourhoods. Their social relationships will 
be particularly strong, and they will use their social networks for mounting 
cooperative solutions to their economic difficulties. 
You can certainly find empirical evidence easily read into framework 
of the Kropotkin narrative. Young and Willmott’s famous community 
study Family and Kinship in East London (1957)  depicted a working-class 
life of numerous social bonds beyond the household, neighbourliness, 
mutual aid and communal solidarity. Subsequent community studies of 
other working-class areas reinforced this basic view. More recently, in a 
series of psychological studies, Paul K. Piff and colleagues have found 
that young Americans of lower socioeconomic position tend to be more 
generous towards others, and more prosocially oriented, than their higher-
socioeconomic-status peers (Côté, Piff, & Willer, 2013; Piff, Kraus, Côté, 
Cheng, & Keltner, 2010; Piff, 2014). This seems to be largely driven by their 
being more empathetic and compassionate, and more strongly endorsing 
egalitarian principles: we are all in this together.
However, the authority of some of this evidence is contested. Young and 
Willmott have been heavily criticized for relying on rather narrow, at times 
impressionistic, sources of data, and hence, perhaps, seeing what it suited 
them to see (Crow & Allan, 1994; Day, 2006). Follow-up studies in the very 
same localities saw much more conflict and isolation (Cornwell, 1984; 
Holme, 1985). Reliance on participants’ public accounts had produced a 
much more positive view of social life than the disturbing concerns people 
would raise when asked in private (Cornwell, 1984). This led to widespread 
scholarly questioning of the romantic Young-and-Wilmott depiction, as 
well as of the methods that generated it. The barbed comment that the 
community study is the sociologist’s substitute for the novel is widely 
reproduced (Crow & Allan, 1994 p. xii; Day, 2006 p. 29), and seems to have 
these portrayals of working-class life in mind. Note that the critiques of 
Young and Willmott do not necessarily apply to the more recent work of 
Piff and colleagues, whose methods are very different. Nonetheless, they 
do remind us that we should enter the enquiry with appropriate scepticism 
about the Kropotkin narrative as it applies to urban deprivation. 
In the opposite corner from the Kropotkin narrative is the narrative 
I will associate with Colin Turnbull’s ethnographic monograph The 
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Mountain People (Turnbull, 1972). The Mountain People was written 
following fieldwork amongst the Ik people of Northern Uganda carried 
out at a time in the 1960s when drought had led to very severe famine. 
Turnbull describes a situation where all prosocial norms had basically 
collapsed; people were, in Turnbull’s words ‘unfriendly, uncharitable, 
inhospitable and generally mean’ (p. 32). People were so desperate they 
could focus only on trying to survive themselves. The elderly died first; 
children were left to fend for themselves and died second; husbands 
fed themselves at the expense of their wives and vice versa; the dying 
were abandoned or stolen from. People actively avoided creating social 
relationships, because of the obligations they create and the obvious 
difficulties of having to deal with desperate individuals. Turnbull argued 
that under these circumstances, there was nothing in Ik villages that could 
be described as social structure, and no norms or rules of conduct that 
could be thought of as social. All that went on was the struggle of each 
person to survive: the Ik ‘place the individual good above all else and 
almost demand that each get away with as much as he can’ (p. 101). The 
pervasive interpersonal attitudes were mistrust and fear, and the closest 
of neighbours were mistrusted and feared the most (p. 134). 
In invoking The Mountain People to give a name to a narrative, it is 
important to be clear about what I am and am not implying. Firstly, I am not 
implying that Turnbull’s ethnography was in fact a veridical representation 
of Ik social life at that time. The evidential basis of this work, too, has been 
criticized (Beidelman, 1973). Indeed, Bernd Heine reported a couple of 
decades later that some of the Ik were interested in the possibility of taking 
legal action against Turnbull for his misrepresentation of them (Heine, 
1985). Second, I am not invoking or endorsing Turnbull’s view in the book 
that Ik society was irreparably broken and it would be better if it died out 
(p. 285). His proposal that the Ik should be broken up into small groups, 
forcibly relocated, and integrated into other communities round the rest of 
the country (pp. 283-84), is shockingly autocratic to modern sensibilities, 
though it is oddly reminiscent of occasional think-tank proposals for what 
to do with deprived inner-city areas in the North of England. Finally, I 
am not proposing too literal a similarity between the situation of the Ik 
and that of deprived parts of Newcastle today. Some similarity there is, 
since the shadow of hunger is not unknown in the West End of Newcastle. 
An emergency-assistance food bank opened there in 2013. According to 
its website, on the day before it closed for the Christmas break at the end 
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of 2014, it provided food parcels to 1057 people. In September 2015, in an 
incident that could have come straight out of the pages of The Mountain 
People, it was broken into and all the food stored in it stolen. Nonetheless, 
the dissimilarities between the two contexts are obviously profound. 
What I wish to extract from The Mountain People is a central intuition. This 
intuition is that deprivation undermines prosociality, because people are so 
preoccupied by just getting by that cooperating with others is something 
they can ill afford to think about. Note how the logic of the Mountain People 
narrative is an inversion of Kropotkin’s. In the Kropotkinian world, having 
good social relationships is so fundamental to survival that only bourgeois 
decadence would allow it to be forgotten; when things get tough, that is 
when you will see prosociality most clearly. By contrast, in the world of the 
Mountain People, the foremost and obligatory thing you need to do is to 
get by yourself. Investing in social relationships is something you will want 
to do once the more basic individual wants have been secured, like one of 
the higher-level needs in Maslow’s famous needs hierarchy. When times 
are hard, prosociality will be driven from the landscape. As Turnbull put it: 
It seems that, far from being basic human qualities, [prosocial tendencies] are 
superficial luxuries we can afford in times of plenty […]. Given the situation 
in which the Ik found themselves […] man has not time for such luxuries, 
and a much more basic man appears, using much more basic survival tactics 
(Turnbull, 1972 p. 32). 
For the present case, if we begin our enquiries with the Mountain 
People narrative in our minds, we will expect that in Neighbourhood B, 
where relative poverty and economic insecurity are widespread, people 
will be much more focused on individual subsistence, and hence prosocial 
behaviour will be less in evidence than in Neighbourhood A. You can find 
empirical support for this expectation, too. Haushofer (2013) marshalled 
an impressive amount of evidence from a dataset called the World Values 
Survey, comprising responses from over one hundred thousand respondents 
in 43 countries. He showed that within each country, there was a social 
gradient in trust, and in a measure of prosociality. (The prosociality measure 
asked about helping family members rather than people in general.) Trust 
and prosociality were highest in the richest decile of income, a little lower 
in the ninth decile, lower still in the eighth, and so on, with the poorest 
decile reporting themselves the least trusting and the least inclined to help. 
The gradients were strikingly steep and smooth. Interestingly, Haushofer 
found that the between-country differences in trust and prosociality were 
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largely extensions of the individual-level patterns. That is, poorer countries 
were on average less trusting and less prosocial than richer ones, just as 
poorer individuals within a country were on average less trusting and less 
prosocial than richer ones. 
Which narrative do we choose, the Kropotkin or the Mountain People? 
It is not necessarily an either/or choice. It is simplistic to reduce prosociality 
to a single axis and predict that there will be either ‘more’ or ‘less’ of it in one 
neighbourhood than another. A more nuanced expectation would be that 
prosocial behaviour will be present in both of our study neighbourhoods, 
but will take different forms, and perhaps encounter different obstacles. 
The two narratives are therefore only that: framing devices we can keep in 
our minds as we begin to examine, in chapters 3 and 4, what the datasets 
actually tell us. 

2. Study sites and methods
I tried to get away, but I couldn’t get far, 
‘Cos a man with a tow-truck repossessed my car. 
This chapter describes the main study sites, discusses how the methods 
were chosen and developed, and provides an overview of the datasets that 
were generated in the course of the Tyneside Neighbourhoods Project.
The study neighbourhoods
I chose Neighbourhoods A and B as the main study sites after some 
archival research and a number of informal visits. Very extensive social 
and economic data are available for census areas within the UK. The most 
convenient size of census tract, the Lower Super Output Area, is a little 
small for a neighbourhood study, and in Newcastle, the neighbourhoods as 
recognized by local people tend to be cut in pieces by Lower Super Output 
Area boundaries. Thus, I decided that each of the study neighbourhoods 
would consist of two adjoining Lower Super Output Areas that together 
roughly corresponded to a neighbourhood as recognized and named by 
residents. All census and other third-party statistics given for the study 
neighbourhoods given in this book have been created by taking a summation 
or population-weighted average of the figures for the constituent Lower 
Super Output Areas. The two Lower Super Output Areas making up each 
study neighbourhood are pretty similar to each other on most indices. 
The search strategy was to find two neighbourhoods that were as far as 
possible similar in every respect except the level of deprivation. Of course, 
deprivation changes a lot of things: the state of the properties, the shops 
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present, the types of food available and many other things are different 
in deprived and in affluent neighbourhoods. Thus, the neighbourhoods 
would inevitably differ in myriad ways. The search was thus not for an 
exact match, but rather for two studies where everything that could be 
similar given contrasting economic fortunes was similar, and the differences 
were as far as possible related to socioeconomic deprivation, rather than 
extraneous factors. 
I selected a site in the North East of the city for Neighbourhood A, and 
in the West End for Neighbourhood B. The sites selected were satisfactory 
in a number of ways. They were about the same distance (3km) from the 
city centre. Each consisted of a recognizable main street with a supermarket 
or two and a selection of smaller shops and food outlets. The main street 
ran North-South in one case, and East-West in the other. Leaving the main 
street in both perpendicular directions were residential streets; these led 
to networks of other residential streets and then to the neighbourhood 
boundaries. Both neighbourhoods were generally low-rise and contained 
a great deal of housing around or slightly more than one hundred years 
old, much of it terraced. Beyond this there were some differences, such 
as a greater number of large detached houses in Neighbourhood A, and a 
greater number of smaller post-1945 houses and flats in Neighbourhood 
B, although there were some of these in Neighbourhood A too. In neither 
neighbourhood were the residents mainly students. Students are a very 
particular population, high in individual socioeconomic status, but with no 
long-term ties or investment in the community, and comparing a student 
to a non-student population would be misleading. On the whole, it was 
possible to imagine without too much a stretch that if economic fortunes 
improved, Neighbourhood B would start to look rather like Neighbourhood 
A does now, and, if the economy collapsed, Neighbourhood A would start 
to look somewhat like B does now. 
The neighbourhood statistics backed up how good the match was (Table 
1.1). The population sizes were about the same. The population structure 
differed in predictable ways (proportionately fewer men and more children 
in Neighbourhood B), but the differences were slight. The median age was 
only slightly higher in Neighbourhood A. You will notice that the number 
of households is rather larger in Neighbourhood B. This is because in 
Neighbourhood B, half of households with children contain only a lone 
adult, whereas in Neighbourhood A, the great majority of households with 
children (88%) contain two adults (Nettle, 2011a). This is itself an interesting 
pattern to which we will return. 
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Table 1.1  Key statistics for the two study neighbourhoods. Data are reproduced from 
Nettle (2011a), and the ultimate sources are the 2001 census and 2004 indices of multiple 
deprivation. 
Neighbourhood A Neighbourhood B
Total population 3098 3223
Males 1502 (48.5%) 1508 (46.8%)
Under-16s 708 (22.9%) 810 (25.1%)
Median age 37 34.5
Households 1250 1589
Percentage population born in UK 92 92
Index of Multiple Deprivation 8.74 76.43
Index of Multiple Deprivation percentile 79th 1st 
Particularly important for the conception of the study was the fact that the 
ethnic composition of the two sites was very similar, with both study sites 
containing, at the 2001 census, 92% people born in the UK. Thus, whatever 
else the study was doing, it would not predominantly be comparing the 
behaviour of different ethnic groups, or immigrants to non-immigrants. An 
important caveat is in order here, which is that there has been considerable 
immigration into Neighbourhood B in the years since the 2001 census. 
The data from the 2011 census, which were not available at the beginning 
of the study, have now been released, and the percentage UK-born for 
Neighbourhood B is now closer to 70% (Hill, Jobling, Pollet, & Nettle, 2014). 
Thus, it remains the case that we are comparing two predominantly British-
born white communities, but the difference in the number of immigrants 
should be noted. 
If the upper rows of Table 1.1 show statistics that are similar across 
the two neighbourhoods, the lower rows show the opposite. The Index 
of Multiple Deprivation is a composite statistic on an arbitrary scale, so 
values of 9 and 76 will not mean much out of context. The percentages are 
more informative: these show that if all of England’s 34,000-odd Lower 
Super Output Areas were laid out from the most to least deprived, the 
areas making up Neighbourhood A would be found around position 
27,000. The areas making up Neighbourhood B would lie in the first few 
hundred. In the Tyneside context, Neighbourhood A is about as affluent 
as it gets whilst still remaining within the city, whilst Neighbourhood B is 
typical of the concentrations of deprivation in the West End and Eastern 
riverside of the city. 
A more dramatic way of seeing the difference comes from the UK 
government’s Neighbourhood Statistics website. The idea of this site is 
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that residents or potential house buyers can enter a postcode and obtain a 
dashboard of useful statistics about the area around that particular street. 
Central to these is a handy visual aid: the meter of deprivation. As Figure 
2.1 shows, the meter of deprivation looks pretty healthy for a postcode 
in the middle of Neighbourhood A, but it is maxed out for a postcode in 
Neighbourhood B. Quite what the creators of this web site were planning 
to do for neighbourhood regeneration, or whether they had thought about 
the possible adverse consequences, I am not sure. 
Figure 2.1  The meter of deprivation for an address in Neighbourhood A (left) and one 
in Neighbourhood B (right). Image from http://www.neighbourhood.statistics.gov.uk, 
subject to the terms of the Open Government Licence.
It is important to be clear about what the design of the Tyneside 
Neighbourhoods Project does and does not allow us to claim. It looks 
rather like a quasi-experimental design: two sites that are the same, except 
that fate has assigned one of them to socioeconomic deprivation. Thus, any 
differences in behaviour that we see between them tell us what the causal 
consequences of deprivation are, clean of other confounding variables. This 
seems to me an advance on traditional one-site ethnographies, in that at least 
there is one explicit and systematic comparison. My original conception of 
the Tyneside Neighbourhoods Projects was indeed as a quasi-experimental 
comparison along these lines. However, in truth the project does not allow 
such strong or such general claims.
The reason concerns a basic principle of research design: replication. 
If we want to conclude something about variation at level X, we need 
multiple replications of entities at level X. What this means in this case is 
that to say something general about the consequences of neighbourhood 
deprivation, we would need multiple pairs of matched neighbourhoods, 
one in each pair deprived and the other one not deprived. Without such 
replication, any differences we observe between the two neighbourhoods 
are interesting but do not necessarily generalize to other affluent-deprived 
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comparisons. They might not be due to deprivation at all, but to some other 
idiosyncratic feature of one of the sites I happen to have chosen. It might 
be that what we see in Neighbourhood B is very specifically to do with the 
uncertainty created by the threat of large-scale demolition, or the historical 
legacy of heavy industry, or any other specific feature of Neighbourhood 
B, rather than an epitome of what deprivation always does. Getting more 
participants in Neighbourhoods A and B to take part does nothing to alleviate 
this problem. That gives us more replication within our neighbourhoods, 
but does not increase our generalizability at the neighbourhood level at all. 
Partly for this reason, a critique of community studies and ethnographies in 
general is that they are not cumulative: we learn something about another 
location, but we don’t progress toward theory or knowledge of a more 
general character (Crow & Allan, 1994 p. 195).
I acknowledge this limitation, but do not feel it undermines the value 
of the data presented here. By studying Neighbourhood B in contrast to 
Neighbourhood A, we will uncover patterns, generate ideas, and form 
hypotheses. The same patterns can subsequently be looked for, and the 
hypotheses tested, across a broader range of places. Some things will turn 
out to be similar elsewhere, and some will not, but that is an empirically 
tractable question. Related to this point is our commitment to developing 
repeatable quantitative measures that could be applied elsewhere to 
allow for direct comparability, a commitment I discuss in the next 
section. Moreover, this is not just a study of neighbourhoods, but also a 
study of humans living in those neighbourhoods. Quite a lot of the data 
to be presented in this book actually tests hypotheses at the level of the 
individual person rather than the neighbourhood, since the studies were 
concerned with understanding the individual-level processes whose 
emergent consequence was the neighbourhood-level difference. We had 
plenty of replication at the individual level, since our samples of people 
were typically quite large. 
Development of methods: General considerations
We now had two study sites. What were we going to do in them? There 
was no off-the-shelf set of standard methodologies. In this section, I discuss 
some of the general considerations that went into the methods; in the final 
section of the chapter, I discuss in more detail the individual datasets that 
we ended up collecting. 
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Qualitative and quantitative methods
The reporting of the results of ethnographic research in anthropology 
does not tend to be very quantitative. Community studies in sociology 
are somewhat more quantitative, but patchily so. By contrast, I felt from 
early on that in the Tyneside Neighbourhoods Project that I wanted to 
quantify everything. The neglect of quantification in studies of social life 
is something of a curiosity, since researchers gather a large amount of data 
in the course of them, and there are many simple ways that they could use 
quantification more widely than they typically do. I can only attribute it 
to a widespread but unhelpful view that there are two different classes of 
methods, quantitative and qualitative. 
If you accept the premise that there are two classes of methods, 
qualitative and quantitative, then it is easy to see how you end up 
preferring quantitative methods if you have clearly specified a priori 
hypotheses to test between, but qualitative methods if you want to learn 
about the experiences of a particular group of people in a rich and open-
ended way. However, this argument rests on a false premise, which is that 
quantitative and qualitative methods are mutually exclusive classes. In 
fact, all methods in the social and behavioural sciences are qualitative. This 
is because they all involve decisions about what to ask, what to record, 
how to represent and encode the data, and what the typology of outcomes 
is. These are fundamentally qualitative decisions, regardless of whether or 
not you go on to count the occurrences you have decided are significant. 
So, to the extent there is a choice of methods, it is between qualitative data 
that are represented numerically, and qualitative data that are excerpted or 
summarized verbally or visually. 
Faced with this choice, it is my view that you can get more from the 
data, and allow the data to speak more, if you attempt to quantify the 
entities or occurrences you are interested in. It is true that any particular 
quantification you do loses some of the information in the underlying data. 
However, so does any verbal summary, thematic analysis, or representative 
quotation. Using numbers versus not using numbers does not make any 
difference to this. Non-quantitative analyses are generally less transparent 
in terms of what encoding and editing processes have gone on than 
quantitative analyses are. With a well-presented quantitative analysis, 
filtering of the data has occurred, but at least the reader has some hope of 
understanding what kind of filtering it was. As for open-endedness, the 
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important issue is not whether you quantify or not, but whether you can 
return to the underlying raw data and re-encode them differently if you 
have some new insight, idea or question. My personal experience has been 
that through trying to get substantial-sized samples and pull out numbers 
from them, I have often seen things that I did not expect and even ran 
counter to my phenomenological impressions. I don’t know if the same 
would have happened if I had not forced myself through the imperfect but 
self-improving discipline of quantification. 
Quantification of results, if coupled to explicitly described data-
collection methods, has the potential to enhance the generalizability of 
social research and make the knowledge it produces more cumulative. 
Instead of merely noting that things are different in our study site than that 
of another study, we can take the same measures, compare the data, and 
test statistically where the similarities and differences lie. Quantification is 
also potentially useful for the legitimation of ethnography. Ethnographers 
make generalizations of record about the behaviour and experiences of 
particular groups of people at particular times. Sometimes, quite properly, 
those generalizations are contested. We have already met two cases of 
this in chapter 1: Young and Willmott (1957) and Turnbull (1972). Such 
contestations can quickly descend into one person’s anecdote against 
another’s, and that means we need to know the basis of each party’s claims. 
Quantification, in tandem with adequate description of sampling methods, 
can help here. Yes, you saw X happen, but how many observation bouts did 
you make in which X could have happened, and during how many of them 
did it actually happen? Quantification does not of course guarantee that all 
the generalizations we make will be fair or uncontroversial. I have come to 
appreciate through this project how every measure has multiple possible 
interpretations, and often raises as many questions as it answers. At least 
with quantification, though, we know how the generalizations were arrived 
at, and that can be the starting point for a dialogue between views. 
Thus, I decided early on that though the Tyneside Neighbourhoods 
Project was ineluctably a qualitative endeavour, nothing was to be 
admissible as evidence unless a number could be put on it. It was an essay 
in quantitative ethnography, and the methods for quantitative ethnography 
(or as I would prefer it, the quantitative methods for ethnography), are still 
fragmentary (Efferson, Takezawa, & McElreath, 2007). Thus, we were going 
to have to invent, borrow and adapt a range of assays, sampling strategies 
and coding schemes, to which I will turn shortly. 
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Direct observation and self-report
Alongside the commitment to quantification sat a commitment to multiple 
methods. In particular, a prominent role would be assigned to direct 
observation of behaviour (also known as systematic social observation). 
Direct, systematic observation of behaviour is strangely little used in 
contemporary social science, although there was more done back in the 
1950s than there is now. As Payne and Payne (2004 p. 157) drily put it: 
‘People coming new to social research are often surprised to learn that 
social scientists […] do not use observation very much as a method’. This is 
all the more puzzling since anthropology, for example, prides itself on its 
detailed characterization of human life at relatively small and fine scales. 
Direct behavioural observation avoids recruitment bias (people who choose 
to participate being atypical of the population from which they are drawn), 
avoids demand characteristics (people behaving differently because they 
know they are taking part in a study), is faithful to life because it is part of 
life, and allows for almost limitless detail in what is recorded. Ethnographers 
do, of course, do a great deal of informal social observation. They just don’t 
tend to systemize it or turn it into structured quantitative data. The neglect 
of direct behavioural observation is not restricted to anthropology; it is 
underused in psychology too (Baumeister, Vohs, & Funder, 2007; Furr, 
2009), and there is been a suggestion that sociologists should use it more to 
understand neighbourhood effects (Sampson et al., 2002). 
There are some weak reasons for the under-use of direct behavioural 
observation, and some more defensible ones. The weakest reasons 
are pragmatic: direct observation is time-intensive—for data capture, 
transcription and processing—and often just harder work than other 
methods, whereas researchers want usable data quickly and cheaply. The 
strong conformity-preserving features of the academic system mean that 
once direct observation is rare, it tends to remain rare. Researchers want 
their studies to look like the other studies they read in the literature, and 
peer reviewers enforce this. This conformity has good aspects, such as 
increasing the possibility of replication and cumulation, but bad aspects, 
such as imposing a rare-type disadvantage on methodological innovations 
that would be genuinely useful. 
The most defensible reason for the neglect of direct behavioural 
observation is that observation tells us little or nothing about the cognition 
or goals of the people involved. Max Weber gave the example of seeing a 
man chopping wood: from observing him, we cannot necessarily tell if he 
is doing wage labour, stocking his hearth, or just enjoying some exercise. 
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To gain insight into this, you need to ask him; hence the centrality of 
questionnaires and interviews in social science. This is a good point but 
incomplete as it stands. To understand a man’s chopping of wood, it may 
not be sufficient to observe that he chops it, but it is necessary. He might not 
actually chop wood, even when he claims he does. There can be important 
and systematic gaps between what people do and what they say they 
do. Thus, even if our research interest is in the subjective meaning of the 
wood-chopping, we should use multiple methods, including a naturalistic 
observation component. Without this component, our picture of people’s 
lives is incomplete in a fundamental way. In a prefatory passage, Young and 
Willmott (1957 p. xxxi) warn the reader that ‘for the most part, we can only 
report what people say they do, which is not necessarily the same as what 
they actually do’. Yet what people actually do would seem to be a fairly 
central aspect of the enquiry. Thus, I determined early on that we would 
gather as many different kinds of data as we could, but that recording what 
people actually do in Neighbourhoods A and B would form a central plank 
of the research. Some of the most interesting insights came at the moments 
where the self-report and behavioural data pointed in opposite directions, 
as we shall see. 
My desire to give direct behavioural observation a central role was no 
doubt influenced by the fact that I also do research in animal behaviour, 
where for obvious reasons direct observation looms much larger. However, 
there was also a social science influence, coming from the urban studies 
of people like William H. Whyte. (William H. Whyte is not to be confused 
with his unrelated contemporary William Foote Whyte, also a social 
researcher. William Foote wrote a famous ethnography called Street 
Corner Society, which would have been a fine title for William H.’s book 
City: Rediscovering the Center. However, William Foote’s methodological 
approach was actually quite different.) William H. Whyte spent much of 
his career doing direct behavioural observation of how people actually 
used city environments, such as sidewalks and plazas, particularly in New 
York. Whyte’s work stands today, despite his—for my taste—insufficient 
quantification of the very interesting data he and his collaborators gathered. 
In City: Rediscovering the Center, Whyte notes that there were already many 
studies on how people use cities prior to his. He says:
Some of the studies were illuminating. Taken together they suffered one 
deficiency: the research was vicarious; it was once or twice removed from 
the ultimate reality being studied. That reality was people in everyday 
situations. That is what we studied. (Whyte, 2009 p. 5). 
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I feel the same about the contemporary use of questionnaires, surveys, 
and interviews as social science methods of choice. To the extent that 
these are taken as assays of people’s behaviour, they are vicarious, once 
or twice removed from the reality they purport to represent. Thus, it is 
essential to also study directly the ultimate reality of people behaving in 
everyday situations. 
Economic games
Economic games were also part of the plan from early on. Economic games 
came into prominence particularly in the 1990s and 2000s. They are, in 
essence, standardized financial decisions. They are always incentivized 
with real money. Economic games gave economists a way to find out how 
people actually allocate a scarce resource in a social context, rather than 
relying on a priori assumptions about how an economic agent ought to do 
so. For example, in the classic Ultimatum Game, one player can propose 
a split of the stake (say £10) between himself and another player. If the 
second player accepts the proposed division, they both go away with their 
share, whereas if the second player rejects it, they both leave with nothing. 
The players are anonymous from one another and will not interact again. In 
a world of actors motivated only to maximize their financial gain from the 
interaction, the first player ought to offer the second player the minimum 
possible amount from the £10: 1 penny if the money can be broken down 
that small. The second player ought to accept this, as 1 penny is more 
than nothing. Thus, we should observe splits favouring the first player as 
extreme as £9.99 to £0.01. 
In fact, this is not the result we typically observe at all. Second players 
reject low offers, even though they hurt themselves as well as the other 
player by doing so. First players don’t make offers as low as they should—
they tend to offer quite a lot. This may be in part due to their understanding 
that low offers may well get rejected, and they will lose everything. 
However, they tend to offer more than is necessary to maximize their 
expected return given how second players actually behave. In other words, 
rather than maximizing the monetary return from the interaction like 
economic automata, the players behave like people actually do in social 
situations, with pride, spite, conscience, and so on. (I will not make a cheap 
aside about this being a major discovery for economists.) 
The first wave of findings from economic games tended to be interpreted 
in pan-human terms. The game results were held up as showing how 
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humans behave, which was often at variance with the way simple economic 
models suggested they ought to behave. This was of course rather a naïve 
conclusion, since usually each study was done on a single population of 
university undergraduates in a Western country; whether the patterns of 
behaviour would generalize to other people was not known. The second 
wave of economic game findings led to more nuance; they revealed that 
how people behave in economic games depends. Macro studies revealed 
differences in average behaviour between different populations (Henrich 
et al., 2005; Herrmann et al., 2008), whilst micro studies revealed that 
small changes to the ways the games were set up led to quite different 
outcomes (Bardsley, 2007; Cronk & Wasielewski, 2008; Haley & Fessler, 
2005). Economic games thus clearly had potential as assays of prosocial and 
antisocial motivations in our project, both for investigating neighbourhood 
differences and probing the decision-making processes that might underlie 
such differences. We ended up carrying out two different rounds of economic 
games, the first led by myself and Agathe Colléony, and the second by 
Kari Britt Schroeder. In each case, the questions we wanted to ask led us 
to develop new variant games, as well as new protocols for administering 
them that would allow people to play them with their neighbours and in 
their homes. 
A major issue with economic games concerns their external validity. 
This has led to increasing discussion in the last few years (Bardsley, 
2007; Burton-Chellew & West, 2013; Winking & Mizer, 2013). Do people 
really understand exactly what the contingencies of the game are? Would 
they behave in the same way if they did not know they were taking part 
in an experiment? Does a person’s behaviour within the game bear any 
relationship to how they behave in everyday life? Given that we were 
going to use multiple methods, we would have the possibility of relating 
patterns of game play to other social measures, both at the individual and 
neighbourhood level. Both correspondences and non-correspondences 
would be interesting. 
Correlational and experimental approaches
Social science is traditionally a correlational business, though people are 
increasingly interested in the potential for doing experiments. Correlational 
research means that you measure the pre-existing variation in something, 
say income or neighbourhood deprivation, and you see how it relates to 
variation in something else, say health. The Tyneside Neighbourhoods 
34  Tyneside Neighbourhoods
Project was basically a correlational study, with neighbourhood as the 
initial predictor variable, and a whole host of other variables as secondary 
or mediating predictors. As I hinted in chapter 1, though, one of the key 
potential advantages of working at the meso-scale is that it raises the 
possibility of doing at least some experimental work. 
It is important to be clear what experimental means here. Economic 
games are sometimes described as experimental, but this is a misnomer, 
since there is not necessarily experimental manipulation of any independent 
variable. The most famous results showing different economic game 
results in different cultural groups, for example, are purely correlational. 
When I say experimental work, I mean randomly assigning participants 
to a treatment that might produce a difference in a measured outcome—
what in medicine and public policy is called a randomised control trial. 
The experiment in this sense is science’s blue-chip method for providing 
insights about causality rather than just association. We did make a little 
progress in developing experimental approaches of this kind. We carried 
out two large-scale experiments and a few smaller ones. The design of 
each of these experiments was quite complex, and will make sense only 
once I have presented the bulk of the correlational data. I will therefore say 
nothing more about these experimental studies until it is time to look at 
their results, in chapter 4, and in chapter 6. 
Ethical considerations
All empirical research raises ethical considerations, and the Tyneside 
Neighbourhoods Project was particularly ethically challenging. There 
were really two clusters of ethical issues: the first concerned the ethics of 
participation, and the second, the ethics of representation. The ethics of 
participation encompasses questions about what it was like to take part 
in the research: could any of the things we asked people to do cause them 
distress or harm, lead them to regret their participation, or make them feel 
aggrieved? These were, by and large, the easier issues to address. All of our 
research was scrutinized and approved by the Faculty of Medical Sciences 
ethics committee at Newcastle University. For observational studies, we 
only observed people in public settings where they could reasonably 
expect their behaviour to be observable anyway, and we never made any 
attempt to identify individuals. We were ready to be completely open about 
what we were doing if challenged, which we never were. For other kinds 
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of studies, participants gave their written informed consent to participate, 
were fully debriefed, and of course were represented anonymously in all 
of our data. 
We aimed to not deceive people. For example, when gave a financial 
dilemma about how to divide £10 between self and an anonymous third 
party, the money was always real, and we really find an anonymous 
third party and give her whatever was due. We did admittedly flirt with 
the boundaries of deceit at times. Dropping your keys on purpose to see 
if someone will pick them up for you is a kind of misrepresentation. We 
satisfied ourselves that the interaction was fleeting and the burden very 
small. In Kari Britt Schroeder’s experiment described in chapter 4, we 
wanted to manipulate the social information that people had about what 
their neighbours thought, but we did not want to do this by making up false 
information. We found a solution whereby we gave them real information 
from real neighbours, but manipulated which neighbours they saw the 
information from. This achieved our experimental requirements whilst 
stopping short of deceit, though it could rather fairly be described as being 
economical with the truth. 
The issues of ethics of representation concern the possible negative 
consequences for participants and their communities of the way we 
portrayed them in our publications and presentations. If the issues 
around the ethics of participation were soluble, those around the ethics of 
representation were much more of a concern to me, and remain so. Rather 
than discussing these any further at this point, I will return to them at the 
end of chapter 7, once we have seen the data. It is partly a concern with the 
ethics of representation that has led me to anonymize Neighbourhoods A 
and B. Anyone prepared to do some digging would be able to work out 
more or less where they are, but their specific identities are not put in the 
centre of the spotlight. 
In the interests of full disclosure I should also say something about 
funding. I began the project with no funding beyond the fact that Newcastle 
University pays my salary. Students and other helpers mainly gave their 
labour voluntarily or as part of their programme of study. North Tyneside 
Council provided benefits in kind in the conduct of the School Survey 
described below. At later points, we were able to draw on resources from 
Newcastle University’s funding of Gillian Pepper’s PhD, and especially 
from a fellowship grant from the US National Science Foundation to Kari 
Britt Schroeder. The funders played no role in decisions about what to do 
or how to publish the results. 
36  Tyneside Neighbourhoods
Description of datasets
Subsequent chapters of the book are organized thematically; each chapter 
draws on several different datasets, and each dataset is referred to in several 
different chapters. In the remainder of this chapter, then, I briefly describe 
each of the main datasets that we produced (as mentioned, leaving aside 
for now the two experimental datasets to be discussed in chapters 4 and 6). 
I will not repeat information such as sample size and method of collection 
when presenting results in future chapters; to find such information, the 
reader should return to this section. The citations shown as footnotes to 
the headings introducing each dataset refer to the published sources where 
the methods for that dataset are fully described. The raw data are freely 
available via an Open Science Framework project (Nettle, 2015) that can be 
found at https://osf.io/ys7g6.1
Observational Dataset 12
The first and largest dataset involved direct behavioural observation on 
the streets of each neighbourhood. It was gathered, by me, between April 
19th and July 8th 2010. The idea was to record everything happening on the 
streets for one whole spring/summer day, 9am to 9pm. Clearly, it would be 
impossible and undesirable to get all of the data on a single day. Instead, 
I divided the day into 24 half-hour segments (9:00–9:30, 9:30–10:00, etc.). 
I then chose a time segment pseudo-randomly (i.e. starting neither at the 
beginning of the day and working forwards, nor at the end and working 
backwards), went to one neighbourhood and recorded for that time 
segment. The next weekday I went to the other neighbourhood and recorded 
at the same time. Sometimes a weekend intervened, but the median delay 
between observing a time segment in the first neighbourhood and in the 
second was one day, and the maximum was four days. The order of the two 
neighbourhoods was counter-balanced across time segments. This process 
continued until all time segments had been filled in. All five weekdays were 
represented at least three times in both neighbourhoods. The observation 
period was outside the school holidays.
1  An archived version of the dataset, preserving the data in the form it was at the time of 
publication, is available at http://dx.doi.org/10.17605/OSF.IO/W9Z2P
2  Nettle, Colléony, & Cockerill, 2011; Nettle, 2011a, 2011c.
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The first ten minutes of each segment were spent walking a transect up 
one side of the main street and down the other, the starting end varying 
randomly. The remaining twenty minutes were spent taking a random walk 
around the residential streets. I wore an unobtrusive digital voice recorder 
to capture the data to be transcribed later. With practice I developed an 
efficient numerical code for doing this; there was not a single instance 
where I felt that anyone noticed my sotto voce muttering. 
My focus was on people—what they were doing and what kind of social 
groups they were doing it in—though I did capture some other information. 
For each social group that came into my sight and was not inside a building, 
I recorded the number of men, women, children, and babies. I recorded 
whether any of the individuals were smoking, drinking an alcoholic drink, 
or running. Social groups were defined on the basis of interaction or 
common movement; this was rarely difficult. A person on their own was 
classified as a social group of one. Individuals re-encountered within the 
same time segment were not recorded again. I additionally noted instances 
of some miscellaneous categories: babies crying, open front doors, people 
with walking sticks or wheelchairs, the dropping of litter, police patrols, 
and things on fire. The transcribed dataset contained data on 4123 social 
groups in Neighbourhood A, and 3773 in Neighbourhood B. In terms of 
people-observations, this equated to 5884 in Neighbourhood A and 6757 in 
Neighbourhood B. 
Observational Dataset 23
Observational Dataset 2 was gathered by Jessica Hill with the assistance of 
Ruth Jobling in the summer of 2013. Rather than sampling every minute of 
the day as in Observational Dataset 1, they sampled the first 30 minutes of 
every hour between 9am and 6pm inclusive (that is, 9–9:30, 10–10:30, etc.). 
They were able to complete this in two weeks, on some occasions gathering 
the data from the two neighbourhoods simultaneously on the same day, on 
others completing the time segment in the second neighbourhood the day 
after the first. Again, their sampling occurred during weekdays outside the 
school holidays. 
Jessica and Ruth largely used the same protocol as in Observational Dataset 
1. They observed a total of 3665 people across the two neighbourhoods. 
3  Hill, Jobling, et al., 2014.
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Their innovation was to code ‘new’ interactions. A ‘new’ interaction was 
defined as when an individual or group engaged in conversation with 
another individual or group they had not previously been interacting with. 
This could be anything from a fleeting greeting to stopping in the street to 
talk to someone. Jessica was interested in social ties, and this behavioural 
measure would give us some insight into the extent to which people in each 
neighbourhood knew others nearby well enough to talk to them. I am not 
sure whether Jessica was aware of this at the time, but her focus on new 
interactions relates closely to a dataset in Young and Willmott (1957 p. 84) 
where a resident recorded how many people that she knew she bumped 
into on the streets of Bethnal Green as she went about her daily business. 
Young and Willmott too saw this as an index of the density of social ties in 
the neighbourhood beyond the household. The findings from Observational 
Dataset 2 will be discussed in chapter 3 in particular. 
Street Ages Dataset4
As a result of gathering Observational Dataset 1, we became interested in 
knowing which adults were using the streets, and in particular how this 
related to their age. To investigate this, Rebecca Coyne (in July and August 
2010) and later Agathe Colléony (in April 2011) walked transects through 
the main streets of each neighbourhood, recording the sex and estimating 
the age of every person they passed. Unlike Observational Datasets 1 and 2, 
the Street Ages Dataset was gathered during the school holidays. Rebecca 
and Agathe each made six visits to each neighbourhood, alternating 
neighbourhoods and balancing approximate times of day. Rebecca coded 
for 15 minutes each time and Agathe for 30 minutes, giving a combined 
sample size of 2533 age-ratings. There were no significant differences in the 
distributions of ages in Rebecca and Agathe’s data, and they were pooled 
for analysis. 
Rebecca and Agathe’s data only tell us about their judgements of age; we 
do not know the actual ages of the people that they saw. Previous research 
has indicated that visual judgements of age are fairly accurate (George & 
Hole, 1995). We knew from the 2001 census data what the ‘true’ distribution 
of chronological ages had looked like just a few years earlier, and so the 
null hypothesis was that their judged distribution of ages would be the 
same. Any systematic departure from the census distribution in one or both 
4  Nettle, Coyne, & Colléony, 2012.
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neighbourhoods would be telling. It might suggest neighbourhood-specific 
biases among those who, of all the people living there, used the streets. 
Social Survey 15
Social Survey 1 was the first major self-report assay we used in 
Neighbourhoods A and B. It also provided the vehicle for the first economic 
game, which will be described below. Its focus was on social relationships 
and prosocial behaviour. Social Survey 1 was largely implemented by Agathe 
Colléony. During the spring of 2011, we chose names and addresses in each 
neighbourhood from the electoral register, and sent a survey with a cover 
letter asking the addressed recipient if they would be so kind as to fill the 
survey out. A stamped return envelope was enclosed, and the respondent 
would also receive £10 for their trouble. 124 people returned surveys; 74 
from Neighbourhood A and 50 from Neighbourhood B. This was after we 
had boosted the sampling in Neighbourhood B, since return rates were only 
21.7% in Neighbourhood B as compared to 43.5% in Neighbourhood A. 
The survey contained a number of demographic and attitudinal 
questions. Central to it was a measure of neighbourhood social capital. 
The concept of social capital is used somewhat variably in the literature 
(Halpern, 2005). Originally, it referred to resources that are embedded in 
the individual’s social network; that is, having other people who know 
you, are well disposed to you, and are able to help you get things done. It 
is often used rather more loosely to denote positive feelings about social 
relationships or high trust within some group. 
Our six key items to measure neighbourhood social capital included 
four questions on 7-point ratings scales: how much did the respondent trust 
other people in the neighbourhood, how much did they feel people in the 
neighbourhood looked out for one another, how well did they know their 
neighbours, and to what extent did they feel they had good friends living 
locally. The remaining two items were crude social network measures. First, 
we asked respondents to list all of the people they had contacted for social 
reasons within the last two weeks. They could use anonymizing initials for 
this, since we weren’t interested in the names, but rather in how many of 
them there were. Second, we asked respondents to list all the people they 
could turn to if they had a problem. Human social networks are hierarchically 
5  Nettle et al., 2011.
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nested; every person is at the centre of several concentric circles, with the 
total number of people increasing as you move from the centre outwards, 
and emotional closeness and interaction intensity decreasing (Hill & 
Dunbar, 2003). Our two network measures were designed respectively to 
provide a rough measure of the size of the sympathy group, as the inner 
circle of frequently interacting friends and relatives is usually known, and 
the support clique, the smaller core of people one would rely on for the most 
serious needs. Previous studies have found that sympathy groups tend to 
number 10–12 individuals, and support cliques around 5 (Dunbar & Spoors, 
1995). The means in our Social Survey 1 were correspondingly 11.65 and 6.23. 
Both measures had a right-skewed distribution, with some sympathy groups 
as large as 35 and support cliques as large as 32, but most much smaller. This 
is typical of previous studies. To a greater extent than some previous studies, 
we found women tended to have larger sympathy groups and support 
cliques than men (means for sympathy groups 13.90 vs. 9.01; for support 
cliques 6.84 vs. 5.16). Our six social capital items were rather heterogeneous 
in meaning, but, usefully, they were all substantially correlated with one 
another. This allowed us to combine them into a single index of social capital. 
The index had a Cronbach’s α statistic of 0.81, which means that all six items 
correlated well with each other. Higher scores on this index equate to having 
a larger sympathy group and support clique, and to giving higher ratings 
of trust, indicating that people look out for each other, that the respondent 
knows neighbours, and that she has good friends living locally. 
The first economic game was an integral part of Social Survey 1, but 
we did not want to draw attention to it as a measure of the study. This 
was because of the concerns that have been repeatedly raised about the 
effects of knowing that one is participating in a cooperation experiment 
on economic game behaviour (Bardsley, 2007). We therefore made our 
game relatively surreptitious. The respondent was told at the end of the 
questionnaire that she had finished and had earned £10 as a thank-you. 
A separate payment form then asked the respondent to provide the name 
and address to which she would like the money delivered. However, it also 
gave her the option of transferring some or all of the £10 to someone else 
rather than receiving it herself. This was in effect a version of the Dictator 
Game, the well-studied economic game in which an actor decides how a 
sum of money should be divided between himself and another individual, 
with that other individual having no say in the matter and no comeback. 
The Dictator Game is the simplest possible index of prosocial motivation: 
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how much money will you keep for yourself, and how much will you 
transfer to the other party? We will return to exactly what the versions of 
the Dictator Game we used were, and the motivation for them, in chapter 
3. Once payment forms were received in the post, we hand-delivered the 
money, in cash, to the relevant addresses within one week. 
Social Survey 26
Social Survey 2 was envisaged and designed by Kari Britt Schroeder. She 
implemented it with assistance from Gillian Pepper and, to a much lesser 
extent, myself during 2012 and early 2013. Again, names and addresses 
were randomly chosen from the electoral register and the survey was 
delivered by mail with a return envelope. Care was taken not to resample 
individuals from Social Survey 1 and (for reasons to do with the associated 
economic game) not to choose immediate neighbours. It proved challenging 
to get a sufficient sample in Neighbourhood B given the constraints, and 
we extended the boundary of Neighbourhood B a few streets beyond its 
original limit. The extension area was similar to the original area on the 
relevant measures, such as the Index of Multiple Deprivation. The final 
sample size was 260, well balanced across the two neighbourhoods (A: 133; 
B: 127). Another 168 participants took part in an experimental add-on, to be 
described in chapter 4.
Whereas the focus of Social Survey 1 was on positive social resources and 
prosociality, the focus of Social Survey 2 was on the negative side of social 
interactions: breaking rules and harming others. The survey asked about a 
number of things, again including trust. This time we distinguished between 
trusting people in general and trusting people you know well. This had the 
potential to differentiate parochial social resources (‘there is a small group of 
people I know well on whom I can rely’) from more generalized trust (‘I know 
that when I need something, anyone will help me out’). These could pattern 
differently across the two neighbourhoods. In addition, Kari investigated 
perceived norms of social behaviour. We will examine in more detail exactly 
how she did this in chapter 4. Kari’s particular interest in perceived norms 
was in how they would relate to decisions in the economic game associated 
with Social Survey 2, to which I now turn. 
6  Schroeder, Pepper, & Nettle, 2014.
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The economic game associated with Social Survey 2 was a lot more 
complex than a Dictator Game. It thus could not be surreptitious, and a 
substantial fraction of the survey consisted of the questions involved in 
it. Given the focus on antisocial behaviour and its determinants, the game 
allowed some people the opportunity to behave antisocially, and others to 
the opportunity to administer justice by punishing that antisocial behaviour 
if they wished. The game had three roles, which will be explained in chapter 
4. One third of the surveys sent out assigned their readers the role of player 
1, the next third that of player 2, and the rest player 3. Specific triads were 
formed at random from surveys returned at around the same time from 
each neighbourhood; no respondent knew who the other members of 
their triad were. As before, all monies arising were delivered in cash to the 
respondents’ addresses within one week. 
Police Crime Dataset7
As we were interested in the topic of crime and antisocial behaviour, Agathe 
obtained data on all incidents reported to Northumbria Police between 
December 2010 and March 2011 falling within the study neighbourhoods 
(this information can be freely found via www.police.uk). As well as 
tabulating the number of incidents overall, she was able to break them 
down into different categories of crime or antisocial behaviour, as we will 
see in chapter 4. 
Assorted assays of prosociality8
During 2011, we also undertook a number of other field assays of prosocial 
behaviour. The first of these used the lost letter paradigm, a classical 
unobtrusive measure of passer-by willingness to do an anonymous 
kindness. A stamped, addressed letter is left on the pavement in the general 
vicinity of a postal box. The measure is simply the proportion of letters 
that ever find their way to their recipient. The probability of return has 
been shown to vary, and to depend on a number of micro factors, such 
as the implied characteristics of the recipient, as well as macro factors, 
such as the community where the letter is left (Levine, Martinez, Brase, & 
7  Nettle et al., 2011.
8 Nettle et al., 2011.
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Sorenson, 1994; Milgram, Mann, & Harter, 1965). We left 22 letters in each 
neighbourhood on rain-free mornings over the course of several months.
In addition to the lost letter, we employed three other helping assays 
from classic social psychological literature (Levine et al., 1994): dropped 
object, asking directions, and making change. In dropped object, 24 
volunteer field assistants walked along the street and, seemingly 
inadvertently, dropped a small object such as keys, a glove or a pen around 
10m in front of a pedestrian approaching in the other direction. We scored 
whether or not the target person helped by drawing attention to or picking 
up the object. The same volunteer field assistant then dropped the same 
object in the other neighbourhood. There were a total of 60 drops in each 
neighbourhood. Characteristics of both dropper and target, such as age 
and sex, were recorded. Asking directions and making change were very 
similar paradigms, except that the volunteer field assistants (the same ones 
as for dropped object) asked either for directions to a nearby hospital (there 
was a suitable one close to both neighbourhoods) or to make change from 
a large-denomination coin. Trials were scored as minimal or no help versus 
substantial help. There were 30 trials in each neighbourhood for each assay. 
Field assays of social behavioural such as these have been extensively 
used in the past. Lost letter and making change are becoming obsolete due 
to changes in technology (what do you need a 10p coin for anymore?). Even 
asking for directions seems a little unnatural when most young people 
carry smartphones. Nonetheless, we were able to obtain datasets using all 
of these, and they will be discussed in chapter 3. 
School Survey9
The final dataset is the only one that was not gathered in Neighbourhoods 
A and B, and also the only one where we heard from young people. In 2009, 
Maria Cockerill and I surveyed 1046 school students aged 9–15 from various 
parts of Tyneside other than Neighbourhoods A and B. They were from 
eight different schools, and their residential addresses could be assigned to 
eight different neighbourhoods, for each of which we obtained an Index of 
Multiple Deprivation. The School Survey proved useful in a number of ways. 
It provided some data from very deprived neighbourhoods of Tyneside 
other than Neighbourhood B (along the Eastern riverside); it provided some 
9  Nettle & Cockerill, 2010.
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data from an affluent area of Tyneside other than Neighbourhood A (in 
the East of the conurbation); and it provided data from some intermediate 
neighbourhoods too, rather than just having the two extremes as in Social 
Surveys 1 and 2. Thus, it helped to generalize beyond the main two study 
neighbourhoods and across the spectrum of deprivation. Moreover, by 
surveying children at different ages, we could get some ideas about how the 
characteristic attitudes and feelings of deprived neighbourhoods develop 
through childhood. I say some ideas rather than any stronger inference, 
because this was not a truly longitudinal study; rather, we surveyed cross-
sections of Tyneside children at several different ages. Nonetheless, it did 
allow us to identify which patterns were apparent in which age groups. 
The School Survey was a comprehensive questionnaire whose original 
aims were to do with the psychological consequences of deprivation and 
the factors related to early childbearing. It contained questions about the 
respondents’ ideal age of parenthood and anticipated life expectancy. It 
also contained measures of the neighbourhood’s perceived safety and the 
respondent’s perceived support from their family. Finally, it asked about 
trust, linking it the social capital work in Social Surveys 1 and 2. 
I have now described all of the main datasets that made up the Tyneside 
Neighbourhoods Project. With this preliminary work done, we can turn to 
the substantive findings. These are laid out in chapters 3–6. Chapters 3 and 
4 respectively examine prosocial and antisocial behaviour amongst adults. 
Chapter 5 explores how neighbourhood differences vary with age. Chapter 
6 focuses on questions of psychological mechanism, asking how variation 
in experience might lead to variation in attitudes and hence to variation in 
social behaviour. Chapter 7 concludes with my overall reflections on what 
we learned. 
3. Mutual aid
Don’t push me ‘cos I’m close to the edge; 
I’m trying not to lose my head...
Introduction
This chapter deals with prosocial behaviour; that is, behaviour that helps 
someone else. The beneficiary can be specific, as when one aids a friend in 
need, or more diffuse, as when one cleans up the street, benefitting anyone 
who happens to use it. The behaviour is prosocial in either case. Note that 
a behaviour being prosocial does not mean self-interest must be absent. 
Many of the things people do together involve both parties benefitting, 
and these would still be classed as prosocial. Even where one party does 
not obviously benefit in the short term, she may in the longer run. For 
example, donating money to a community organization appears on the 
face of it to be completely altruistic, but the donor may obtain long-term 
favours or reputational benefits by doing so. We will not be concerned 
here with whether prosocial behaviour can always be shown to be a form 
of enlightened self-interest, but rather with whether and why patterns of 
prosocial behaviour differ across the two neighbourhoods. 
There are many kinds of prosocial interactions woven into the life of 
any community. Indeed, community is sometimes defined in terms of 
social interactions beyond the scope of the household but short of the 
scope of formal or governmental institutions. Prosocial interactions beyond 
the household relate closely to the notion of social capital: resources 
and investments embedded or distributed in a social network. You may 
recall from chapter 1 that we have two broad and opposing narratives 
about deprivation and prosociality available to us. The Kropotkinian 
narrative leads us to expect greater prosociality in Neighbourhood B, and 
the Mountain People narrative leads us to expect greater prosociality in 
Neighbourhood A. The bulk of this chapter is devoted to examining our 
various datasets in the light of these opposing sets of expectations. 
© Daniel Nettle, CC BY http://dx.doi.org/10.11647/OBP.0084.03
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Round one: Social interactions in the streets
We should be able to learn a lot about people’s social behaviours by seeing 
how they associate on the streets. First, then, let us examine the patterns in 
Observational Dataset 1. The simplest question we can ask is: how many 
people are on the street? The upper plots of Figure 3.1 show the data by 
time of day, separately for the main and residential streets. As you can 
see, the two main streets follow roughly the same pattern across the day, 
though main street A is busier than B: people come out into the main street 
during commercial hours to do what they need to do in the shops and 
banks; by evening, the main streets have become empty of people. The 
more interesting difference is in the residential streets. In Neighbourhood 
A, there is a steady flow of pedestrians in the residential streets through the 
day, but after 17:00, it drops off precipitately. People have gone into their 
houses. In Neighbourhood B by contrast, they continued to be outside their 
houses in considerable numbers until I stopped recording data at 21:00. In 
fact, the residential streets of Neighbourhood B are busier in the evening 
than at any point during the day. 
Part of the relative excess of people on the residential streets of B in the 
evening is attributable to the greater prevalence of children ‘playing out’, a 
phenomenon to which we return in chapter 5. But the focus of this chapter is 
on adult social behaviour, so let us ignore children for now. The lower panels 
of Figure 3.1 plot the same data, but for adults only. We see a similar pattern; 
after around 18:00, there are essentially no adults on the residential streets of 
A, whereas they continue to be on the residential streets of B in considerable 
numbers until the end of recording at 21:00. (Recall that these data were 
gathered in the summer when dusk is considerably later than 21:00.) 
Not only are the adults in Neighbourhood A inside their houses in the 
evening; they have closed their doors. Figure 3.2 plots the number of front 
doors open by time of day in the residential streets of each neighbourhood. 
As is clear, the residents of B, as well as being more likely to be outside, 
are much more likely to have their front doors open. The meaning of this 
is hard to determine; their houses are smaller on average, for one thing. 
However, the door being open at least allows for the possibility of social 
interaction, and it does suggest that people are not secluding themselves, 
embattled, from the danger of encounter with their neighbours. I have 
had occasion to wander into houses with open doors in Neighbourhood 
B, in search of someone to give money to, including on occasions when the 
resident turned out to be elsewhere despite the door being open.
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Figure 3.1  Total numbers of people (upper plots) and adults (lower plots) by time of day 
and neighbourhood in Observational Dataset 1. Image © Daniel Nettle, CC BY.
Figure 3.2  The number of open front doors by time of day and neighbourhood in 
Observational Dataset 1. Image © Daniel Nettle, CC BY.
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So adults are more likely to be on the street in Neighbourhood B, 
especially in the evenings. What are they doing there? One thing they 
are doing that you do not see in Neighbourhood A is street drinking. The 
rising cost of drinking in pubs, coupled with people’s relatively straitened 
means, has largely destroyed that traditional working-class institution 
in Neighbourhood B. However, alcoholic beverages are inexpensive in 
shops, where they are bought for off-the-premises consumption. People 
consume beer in particular in impromptu gatherings in gardens, parks, 
and street corners. It is not uncommon to see sofas and dining chairs 
dragged outside to facilitate these gatherings, and it is my impression that 
they typically involve residents of multiple households. In Observational 
Dataset 1, I observed 38 instances of street drinking in Neighbourhood 
B as against 1 in Neighbourhood A; these involved a mean of 3.21 
people (standard deviation 1.89). Most people on the residential streets 
of Neighbourhood B were not involved in street drinking. Nonetheless, 
there was plenty of social interaction going on, as the street drinking 
parties demonstrate.
These evening gatherings exemplify a more general pattern in 
Observational Dataset 1: adults are less likely to be alone in Neighbourhood 
B than A. Figure 3.3 shows the mean number of adults in a social group by 
time of day and neighbourhood. Groups consisting wholly of children are 
excluded. As you can see, the mean is fairly close to 1 at all times. Adults 
are always moderately likely to be alone (or at least, the lone adult) as they 
go about their neighbourhoods. However, there is a clear neighbourhood 
difference; adult group sizes are consistently larger in Neighbourhood 
B, and this is driven by adults in B, at all times of day, being rather more 
likely to be with another adult. 
It is very unlikely that this pattern simply reflects adults going outside 
with the people they live with. As you may recall from chapter 2, in 
Neighbourhood B, there are many more households headed by a lone 
adult than is true in Neighbourhood A. Thus, if people go out of the house 
with the people they live with, we should expect to see smaller adult 
group sizes in B than A. The fact that we observed exactly the opposite 
suggests strongly that adults in B are more heavily involved than those 
in A in day-to-day social interaction with other local adults who are not 
members of their households. 
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Figure 3.3  Mean number of adults in each social group by neighbourhood and time of 
day in Observational Dataset 1. Groups consisting solely of children are excluded. Error 
bars represent one standard error. Image © Daniel Nettle, CC BY.
We can drill down further into what kinds of associations are driving the 
differences. Figure 3.4 shows the relative prevalence of men alone, women 
alone, male-female couples, and other types of group across the two 
neighbourhoods in Observational Dataset 1. The other groups of interest 
are multi-male groups (several men but no women), multi-female groups 
(several women but no men), and mixed groups (more than two adults, both 
sexes present). As the figure shows, adults of both sexes are less likely to be 
on their own in Neighbourhood B, though the neighbourhood difference 
is much stronger for women than men. The reduction in aloneness is made 
up for by a relative increase in same-sex associations for both sexes, and 
also in more mixed-sex groups of more than two, in Neighbourhood B. 
Only some of this is driven by the street drinking groups. There are also, for 
example, many more groups consisting of several females and their young 
children out and about in Neighbourhood B (93 such groups observed in 
B against 21 in A). Male-female couples are about equally prevalent in the 
two neighbourhoods, though this in itself is something of a surprise, since 
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there are many more lone-female-headed households in Neighbourhood 
B than A. We might thus have expected fewer opposite-sex couples on the 
street, but this is not so. 
Figure 3.4  The proportions of adult social groups that are of various compositions by 
neighbourhood in Observational Dataset 1. Image © Daniel Nettle, CC BY.
Observational Dataset 2 provided similar information to Observational 
Dataset 1, albeit gathered three years later. Jessica and Ruth confirmed 
many of the same patterns I had seen (see Hill, Jobling, et al., 2014 for a 
detailed analysis). Adult group sizes were significantly larger in B than 
A. This was again driven by adults of both sexes being significantly less 
likely to be on their own. Indeed, in Observational Dataset 2, the odds of an 
adult being with another adult were twice as high in B than A. The novel 
addition of Observational Dataset 2 was Jessica and Ruth’s examination of 
‘new’ social interactions. To recall, these were defined as instances when 
an individual or group in the street engaged in conversation with another 
individual or group they had not previously been interacting or moving 
with. ‘New’ interactions give us a metric of how often someone in the 
neighbourhood bumps into someone else they know well enough to want to 
say hello. Jessica and Ruth observed 62 ‘new’ interactions in A and 120 in B 
during their period of sampling. Correcting for the different total numbers 
of people observed, the odds of an adult engaging in a ‘new’ interaction in 
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B were 2.3 times higher than in A. The difference was particularly marked 
in the early evening (as we approach the time of street socializing in B), 
when they saw 37 ‘new’ interactions in B and just 6 in A (Figure 3.5). 
Figure 3.5  The probability an observed adult engages in a ‘new’ interaction, by neighbourhood 
and time period of the day, from Observational Dataset 2. Image © Daniel Nettle, CC BY.
The patterns in Observational Datasets 1 and 2 bring to mind Kropotkin—
and Young and Willmott’s (1957) depiction of working-class Bethnal 
Green—much more than they bring to mind the Mountain People 
narrative. In the deprived Neighbourhood B, it seems, adults seek out 
other adults and interact socially with them. They are more likely to 
go around the neighbourhood with someone else, especially in the 
case of women; their front doors are more likely to be open; there are 
more informal social gatherings on the street; and they stop and greet 
each other more as they move around. We do not know what social 
interactions are going on inside the houses in either neighbourhood, or 
being transacted via phones and email. This is a big limitation. However, 
the difference in life on the streets is fairly marked, and it would not be 
totally unreasonable to assume that it is roughly representative of the 
difference in social interactions of other kinds too. We have no sense from 
the observational findings of what the quality of social relationships is, or 
what kinds of prosocial services are provided through them. Nonetheless, 
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it seems that Neighbourhood B is the more social place, where interaction 
between adults is much more pervasive.
Round two: Self-reported social capital
Social Survey 1 asked people six key questions about social networks and 
social capital (to recall, these concerned trust within the neighbourhood, 
knowing neighbours, having good friends living locally, people in the 
neighbourhood looking out for one another, social contacts, and support 
cliques). Given the results of the previous section, the clear expectation is 
that residents of B will report that they know their neighbours better and 
have more good friends living locally than residents of A. All those open 
doors and street greetings might mean than they trust their neighbours 
more in B than A, and feel more strongly that people look out for one 
another. When asked about social contacts and social support, residents of 
B might well produce a greater number of contacts than those of A, though 
this prediction is less clear than the previous ones, because these last two 
survey questions do not exclusively concern social interactions within the 
neighbourhood. Residents of A might have large social networks and engage 
in extensive social interaction, just geographically elsewhere. Nonetheless, 
the result that would be most consilient with the observational data, as well 
as easiest to make sense of in a Kropotkinian kind of way, would be higher 
social capital in B than A by all measures. 
The results are exactly the opposite. There are substantial neighbourhood 
differences on all the social capital measures, but social capital is in all cases 
higher in A than B (Figure 3.6). If we take the right-hand two pairs of bars 
in Figure 3.6 first, we see that respondents from B have smaller numbers 
of people in their sympathy groups and support cliques than respondents 
from A. There is no necessary contradiction between this and the results 
we have already seen showing more spontaneous social interaction in B. 
Perhaps people in B concentrate on fewer, deeper relationships, whilst 
people in A have more numerous but less intense social contacts. The first 
four pairs of bars, though, present a paradox: although the observational 
data shows that there is demonstrably less interaction between neighbours 
in A, respondents there trust each other more, feel they know each other 
better, feel that they have better friends locally, and feel more strongly that 
people in their neighbourhood look out for one another.
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Figure 3.6  Means and standard errors for the six social capital measures in the Social 
Survey 1 dataset. The dotted horizontal line represents the maximum possible rating 
for the first four questions, which were scored on a 1–7 scale. The last two questions 
involved the respondent enumerating people they had contacted or could turn to. Image 
© Daniel Nettle, CC BY.
Before turning to the question of how to reconcile these findings with 
those from the direct observational data, we will just check that they are 
reproducible in other datasets. In Social Survey 2 (which, remember, was 
a different and larger set of respondents), Kari also had questions about 
trust. Trust is a key marker of social capital, and in Social Survey 1, the trust 
response was highly correlated with the responses to the other social capital 
questions. In Social Survey 2, Kari distinguished between social trust, 
which is trust of people you do not know well, and personal trust, which is 
trust of people you do know well. Both were measured on a 10–point scale. 
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The results were much the same as those from Social Survey 1, in that there 
was significantly lower trust in B than A. Interestingly, this applied to both 
types of trust. For social trust, the mean in A was 5.00 (standard deviation 
1.86), compared to 3.53 (standard deviation 2.05) in B. For personal trust, the 
mean in A was 8.61 (standard deviation 1.24), compared to 7.97 (standard 
deviation 1.88) in B. Thus, in Neighbourhood B, the pattern of relatively low 
trust encompassed not just strangers, but also people the respondent knew 
well. This is a potentially important observation, to which I will return.
The self-report data, then, all point in the same direction. In the 
deprived Neighbourhood B, people trust each other less, feel they know 
each other insufficiently, and generally report feeling that they have less 
capital embedded in their social networks than people from A. These 
findings are consistent with the large-scale patterns detected by Haushofer 
(2013), and they point much more toward the Mountain People narrative 
and away from Kropotkin. Moreover, the neighbourhood differences are 
large. One way to illustrate this is to compare the data from Social Survey 1 
to the World Values Survey data from other populations. The World Values 
Survey uses its questions about trust to compute a country-level trust index; 
this index is on a scale where 0 represents total distrust, 200 total trust, and 
100 an equal balance of trust and distrust. With a little kneading, I can use 
our data to produce the same index for Neighbourhoods A and B as if they 
too were countries. 
Figure 3.7 compares Neighbourhoods A and B to a selection of World 
Values Survey countries. Neighbourhood A scores a little less than 100. This 
puts it somewhat below the remarkably trusting Scandinavian countries, 
but slightly above many of the major industrial economies such as Germany 
and the USA. Its score is very similar to Canada’s. Neighbourhood B, by 
contrast, scores about 28. This puts it in the company of populations in the 
developing world; ahead of Kenya, about equal to Zimbabwe, but some 
distance below Burkina Faso and Colombia. This seems like a difference big 
enough to concern us—a difference that is socially and not just statistically 
significant. 
So far, we have one set of measures lining up on the side of each of 
our two narratives: direct behavioural observation for Kropotkin and self-
report surveys for the Mountain People. Perhaps the third type of measure, 
economic games, will help adjudicate between them. 
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Figure 3.7  World Values Survey Trust Index for a number of countries, and for 
Neighbourhoods A and B. Country data is from http://www.jdsurvey.net/jds/jdsurvey 
Maps.jsp?Idioma=I&SeccionTexto=0404&NOID=104 (January 2015), and indices for 
A and B have been constructed using data from Social Survey 1. Image © Daniel 
Nettle, CC BY.
Round three: Dictator Games
The economic games for studying prosociality that we implemented in 
Neighbourhoods A and B were attached to Social Survey 1. The respondents 
had been told that they would be recompensed £10 for their trouble. At the 
end of the survey, they found a form asking them to specify how that £10 
would be given out. They could choose some amount to be delivered in 
cash to their own address, with the remainder to be delivered to someone 
else (see below on exactly who the someone else was). We were thus 
implementing a version of the Dictator Game. Because of concerns about 
demand characteristics (people making particular decisions because they 
know they are taking part in a study of prosociality for which the researcher 
has certain expectations), we tried to make our game surreptitious. That is, 
the participants were not told that this decision about the disposition of 
the £10 payment was itself part of the study. We do not know the extent 
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to which they figured out that it was, and whether this differed between 
neighbourhoods. 
The Dictator Game is perhaps best thought of as a measure of the 
participant’s motivation to make a social investment with a monetary 
resource, rather than keeping it for private use. In general terms, then, 
we could make predictions about neighbourhood differences either way. 
The Kropotkinian view, the direct behavioural observation results, and 
previous studies on socioeconomic variation in generosity (Piff et al., 2010) 
clearly suggest that transfers to the other party would be higher in B than 
A. The Mountain People hypothesis, and the data on social capital and 
trust, points firmly in the opposite direction. 
In fact, we implemented three subtly different versions of the Dictator 
Game, each with a separate group of participants. In the first version, 
the standard condition, the instructions allowed the respondent to specify 
an amount in pounds, including zero, to be delivered to a randomly-
chosen name and address in their neighbourhood. The balance would be 
delivered to the respondent’s own house. We stressed that the respondent 
would remain anonymous whatever decision she made, and that she 
would also not know the identity of any beneficiary. Thus, this situation 
equates fairly closely to a laboratory Dictator Game as usually performed. 
In the second version, the friend condition, we allowed the respondent 
to nominate the recipient, with the condition that the person must be 
someone in the neighbourhood. In addition, we explained that we 
would double any amount transferred. The motivation for this non-
standard version of the Dictator Game was the hypothesis that people 
in Neighbourhood B might be less inclined to help someone in general, 
but more inclined to make a social investment in a particular individual 
they were close to (that is, their cooperation might be more parochial, 
centred on people they knew well). Allowing the respondent to nominate 
the recipient had the potential to reveal the existence of close prosocial 
ties within the neighbourhood. Moreover, the doubling of the stake made 
cooperation relatively attractive: the respondent could nominate a friend 
over the road and transfer £10, which would be turned into £20. The two 
could then meet up and split the money evenly and the respondent would 
have lost nothing. This would work fine as long as he or she had a trusted 
partner suitable for the endeavour living nearby. We predicted we might 
see greater transfers in Neighbourhood B than Neighbourhood A in this 
second condition, even if no differences (or the opposite difference) could 
be seen in the first, standard condition Dictator Game. 
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In the final version, the charity condition, any money transferred would 
again be doubled, but the recipient a locally-based charity (specified by 
us) that was well-known in both neighbourhoods. Thus, this condition 
featured doubling like the second condition, but without the respondent 
being able to choose the recipient.
The results are shown in Figure 3.8. In Neighbourhood A, the results for 
the standard and friend conditions are much the same as those observed in 
many studies of developed Western populations; many but not all people 
transfer something, and the mean transfer is of the order of 40–50% of the 
stake. (Rather surprisingly, transfers were no higher in the friend than the 
standard condition.) The charity condition produced greater generosity still. 
Figure 3.8  Mean transfers in the three conditions of the Dictator Game across the two 
neighbourhoods. Error bars represent one standard error. Image © Daniel Nettle, CC BY.
Neighbourhood B looked quite different; transfers were dramatically lower 
across the board. In fact, in Neighbourhood B, almost nobody transferred 
anything in the standard or friend conditions (2 people out of 33, against 21 
out of 45 for Neighbourhood A). The results were particularly striking for 
two reasons. The first is that (to our disappointment) it did not matter which 
version of the Dictator Game we looked at; the neighbourhood difference 
was always in the same direction. People in B were just less likely to make 
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transfers regardless of which condition they were in. Second, the differences 
were large. To put them into context, a famous cross-cultural study 
including societies on different continents and at radically different stages 
in economic development showed what they characterized as dramatic 
variation in, inter alia, Dictator Game behaviour (Henrich et al., 2010). We 
can overlay the results from our standard condition on theirs (Figure 3.9). 
As you can see, the difference we observed across neighbourhoods within 
this single city was much more dramatic than the largest they documented 
by comparing people from rural Missouri and from small-scale societies in 
Papua New Guinea or East Africa.
Figure 3.9  Mean Dictator Game transfer for the two study neighbourhoods and ten 
societies from Henrich et al.’s (2010) cross-cultural study. Image © Daniel Nettle, CC BY.
There are some important technical differences between the studies. 
Henrich et al. (2010) adjusted the stake to local resource values. We did not 
do this and, ideally, the stake would have been larger in A than B to make 
its relative value more comparable. However, the general consensus in the 
behavioural economic literature is that decisions in games such as these 
are relatively impervious to variation in the size of the stake (Carpenter, 
Verhoogen, & Burks, 2005; Forsythe, Horowitz, Savin, & Sefton, 1994). 
On the other hand, in many ways, our study was much better controlled 
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than that of Henrich et al. (2010), since we were able to deliver exactly the 
same instructions, in the same language and the same way, in our two 
sites. Thus, the magnitude of the difference does seem noteworthy, and 
its direction decidedly unfavourable to Kropotkin and reminiscent of the 
Mountain People. 
The neighbourhood difference in Dictator Game transfers was tightly 
bound up with the neighbourhood difference in self-reported social capital. 
That is, people in B tend to have lower social capital than those in A; people 
with lower social capital transferred less in the Dictator Game; and this 
explains a sizable portion of the neighbourhood difference in Dictator 
Game transfers. It makes sense that people with lower social capital would 
transfer less. Presumably we are willing to invest resources in our social 
network to the extent that we feel we have a potentially fruitful social 
network to invest in; the poorer we feel it is, the more we will want to keep 
our resources to ourselves. 
Close to the edge
This section is devoted to trying to make some theoretical sense of the data 
presented so far. Behavioural observation shows people interacting more in 
the streets, socializing more, being alone less often, showing signs of knowing 
one another, and having their front doors open more in Neighbourhood B 
than A. On the other hand, people in Neighbourhood B say they feel that 
they don’t know their neighbours as well, they don’t trust them as much, 
and they don’t feel they have such supportive social networks. Moreover, 
when you give them, through the Dictator Game, a chance to make a social 
investment, they are much less keen to do it, even when they can choose the 
beneficiary. How can we make sense of this pattern?
I am going to assume that each type of measure has some value. That 
is, I am not going to dismiss one kind of measure (e.g. self-report) as just 
less reliable than another (e.g. direct observation), and therefore claim that 
one gives us the ‘true’ picture and the other, junk. Rather, I will assume 
that all kinds of measures are giving us real information about something, 
but that something might not be the same in each case. A corollary of this 
is that both of the Kropotkin and Mountain People narratives are probably 
capturing something about real life. 
To make sense of the data, I would like to build on a number of 
propositions, some of which I can evidence later and some of which I cannot, 
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though they are plausible. The first of these is that people in Neighbourhood 
B tend to be, in a sense I will explain shortly, closer to the edge than those in 
Neighbourhood A. What do I mean by close to the edge? There are various 
domains of life where, as things get increasingly unfavourable, it becomes 
worthwhile to do things that would, the rest of the time, be extremely 
unwise. This prediction is set out with particular clarity in so-called risk-
sensitive foraging models in animal behaviour (Stephens, 1981). An animal 
with sufficient energy reserves should prefer a food patch that provides 
a small sure yield over one that sometimes provides a bonanza and often 
provides nothing. However, when that animal’s reserves get so low that 
it is close to the edge of starvation, only a bonanza would be enough to 
get it back up to safety. It should thus go to the often-bad-but-occasional-
bonanza patch; it will probably get nothing and starve, but it is so close 
to the edge that it will certainly starve anyway if it goes to the safe patch. 
So, a gamble that might normally be a really bad idea becomes attractive 
when you are close to the edge. Importantly for our purposes, the models 
suggest that there is a point close to the edge of starvation where the 
individual’s behaviour should flip, from strongly preferring the safe option 
to strongly preferring the gamble. (The theoretical predictions from risk-
sensitive foraging models are clear. However, it is not clear that animals’ 
behaviour actually conforms to these predictions, though people have tried 
hard to find evidence that they do [Kacelnik & Bateson, 1996; Kacelnik & El 
Mouden, 2013]. That however is a story for another day.) 
We can generalize the idea of people’s behaviour flipping when they 
are close to the edge (Nettle, 2009). It is not just starvation that might 
cause such a flip, but financial crisis or any other form of existential threat. 
For example, it is normally a really bad idea to take things from your 
neighbours, as they will probably provide you with more benefits over the 
long run through friendship than the short-term resource you might get 
away with (and, needless to say, you will lose their friendship if you take 
things from them). However, as you get close to the edge of financial crisis, 
you begin to need money just to get to the end of the week. You no longer 
have the luxury of considering the benefits that might accrue over many 
years; you will not be able to have many years unless you can overcome 
your immediate shortfall. So, your behaviour might flip and you might do 
something impulsive like robbing your neighbours. We can think of many 
domains where this principle might apply: financial risk-taking, betraying 
friendships, breaking social norms and rules, using coercion or deceit. As 
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you get close to the edge, there may come a point where you suddenly start 
to have a reason for doing these things. 
I am not saying that deprivation provides uniformly greater incentives 
for committing desperate or risky acts. If limited finances mean that you 
can’t get yourself out of trouble or move away to another town, then it 
might be all the more important, most of the time, not to be deceitful, selfish, 
or risk-prone. However, deprivation might move people into a space where 
they are hovering so close to an edge that they oscillate stochastically 
between a state of necessary prudence and a state where they feel they 
have to do desperate things urgently just to get through their immediate 
crisis. This is the edge principle: if you live your life close the edge, your 
behaviour is likely to be more variable than if you live your life far from 
the edge. 
Let us see how this might work. In a very deprived context, most people 
most of the time are hard at work just getting by and have to be very 
careful in doing so, since their means are limited and prospects uncertain. 
However, life shocks (financial, health, personal) are constantly happening. 
People far from the edge can absorb these shocks with no radical changes to 
their behaviour, since they have enough of a financial and emotional buffer 
to do so. For people already under great strain, a life shock might be enough 
to push them to the edge, and thus their behaviour will suddenly become 
very different from what it was last week. As if to illustrate this point, on 
June 26th 2014, the Newcastle Evening Chronicle reported the case of a pair 
of men who stormed into one of the bookmaker’s shops on the main street 
of Neighbourhood B and threatened staff with metal bars, making off with 
several hundred pounds. They were instantly caught by police, and turned 
out to be locals. ‘I can’t believe I did it. I go in that bookies all the time’, one 
of them commented, adding: ‘I did it to pay for my dad’s funeral’. Such 
striking temporal variability in behaviour would be unlikely to happen in a 
population where everyone was far from the edge to begin with. 
The more variable something is, the more information you require to 
predict it and therefore make appropriate decisions about it (Frankenhuis 
& Panchanathan, 2011). If the people in your neighbourhood are—at least 
some of them, at least some of the time—close to the edge, then it makes 
sense that even if you had a lot of interaction with them, you might not 
feel that you had enough interaction to say you knew what they were going 
to do next. By contrast, if the people in your neighbourhood were always 
far from the edge, then even if you had only very limited and infrequent 
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interaction with them, it might well be enough—enough to say you knew 
them, enough to feel you could turn to them, enough to trust them—simply 
because there was so little variability in their behaviour over time. 
Now let us apply these principles to the interpretation of our data. First, 
as the behavioural observation suggests, it is likely that the residents of B 
do rely more on their neighbourhood social networks than the residents 
of A to accomplish the things they need. After all, they have less money 
on average and poorer access to the technologies and institutions that 
money and professional status can give access to. Yet at the same time as 
they possibly rely more on their social networks, the surveys show that 
they feel the inadequacy of these bonds all the more keenly. The stakes 
are probably higher in that they really need those bonds to work, yet the 
predictability of their social ties is lower because of the greater behavioural 
variability discussed above. The greater investment in informal socializing 
in Neighbourhood B might be considered an attempt to reduce uncertainty, 
by gathering more data on how other people are currently disposed. Even 
with this extra data, though, people’s subjective experience is of greater 
mistrust and social anxiety; the extra data people have about the behaviour 
of others is not enough to outweigh the extra variability in that behaviour. 
This view makes a novel testable prediction: interpersonal relationships in 
Neighbourhood B should show greater temporal variability than those in 
A; at times people will be close, but they will also have occasional, dramatic 
fallings out. By contrast, relationships in A should show a flatter line over 
time. I haven’t directly tested this hypothesis. In Observational Dataset 1, 
I coded the occurrence of clear altercations going on in the street. I saw 3 
in Neighbourhood B and none in A. The numbers are too small to warrant 
much of a conclusion, especially given that people in A may choose to 
conduct their altercations in the privacy of their homes. 
What I have said so far in this section appears sufficient to explain 
the gulf between behaviour and self-report. It also explains why trust 
would be lower in Neighbourhood B, even trust of people well-known 
to the respondent, since trust is to a very considerable extent a metric 
of our belief in the predictability of others’ behaviour. How though can 
we explain the Dictator Game results? The Dictator Game is an assay of 
motivation to make an avoidable social investment. (It is avoidable since 
by transferring zero, in our implementation of the Dictator Game at any 
rate, you can avoid the need for any third party to become involved in the 
strange business at all.) The attractiveness of making an avoidable social 
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investment will depend a lot on your perception of the predictability and 
reliability of the social actors with whom that investment would be made. 
If predictability and reliability are low, there is a risk inherent in the social 
investment that you do not run if you just keep all the money to yourself. 
This might explain the unwillingness of respondents in B to make transfers. 
It is not that their transfers were small, but rather that they did not want to 
get another person involved at all. Interestingly, in the charity condition, 
where the other party was not a person in the same neighbourhood, but a 
well-known and presumably reliable regional organization, the proportion 
of Neighbourhood B respondents making a transfer dramatically increased. 
We may also have explained the diametric difference between our 
findings and those of Piff and colleagues (Piff et al., 2010). To recall, they 
found that people of lower socioeconomic position were relatively more 
generous using assays like the Dictator Game. However, they measured 
prosociality in general settings, not prosociality specifically directed 
towards other people who are experiencing deprivation. In most of their 
studies, the participants were individuals who had made it as far as 
university. This means that the participants’ backgrounds were probably 
a lot less deprived than those of our Neighbourhood B participants. More 
importantly, it means that the targets of the participants’ social investments 
were not people close to the edge. They were implied to be others from the 
university community. Thus, the participants in those studies were facing 
a very different social allocation decision compared to ours: whether to 
invest in a generally middle-class social group, regardless of their own 
social background. It is perhaps not surprising that those from humbler 
backgrounds wanted to invest more in that social group, but this is a 
different question from whether the residents of Neighbourhood B want to 
invest in the other residents of their neighbourhood. 
The return of the lost letter, and other encounters
The conclusion of the foregoing section was that people in Neighbourhood 
B are more uncertain about what others in their neighbourhood will do, 
which makes them feel anxious and negative about social relationships 
even in the face of abundant interaction. It also means that if they have a 
choice between opening up an additional, avoidable social relationship and 
not doing so, they more often veer towards not doing so; hence why so few 
wanted to involve a third party by making any transfer at all in the Dictator 
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Game. If this view is roughly right, then it is a great lesson in the value 
of multiple methods. If we had just had the Dictator Game, or only the 
observational data, then we would have come to very different and much 
less nuanced generalizations about prosociality in the two neighbourhoods. 
There were still other measures of prosociality that we gathered, in the 
form of small, naturalistic field assays: dropping lost letters, asking people 
for directions, asking people for change, and dropping objects like pens 
and keys in the street. I like these simple measures because they are more 
naturalistic than the economic games, and closer to the flow of behaviour 
on the streets than the surveys are. The results (presented in detail in Nettle 
et al., 2011) were quite illuminating in view of the foregoing discussion. For 
the lost letters, there was a huge neighbourhood difference: they pretty much 
all came home from neighbourhood A, with very few from Neighbourhood 
B. On the other hand, in the cases of asking directions, making change, or 
dropping an object, there were no discernible neighbourhood differences, 
despite considerable care taken to perform the assay in a standardized way. 
There could be banal explanations for this pattern, such as the fact that 
lost letters may disappear amongst the litter that is a depressing feature of 
the streets of B. Equally, though, they could relate to the patterns we have 
already discussed. With the lost letter, passers-by have to decide whether 
to become momentarily involved in the affairs of some person unknown, 
by picking up their letter and posting it. What if it turns out to contain 
something illegal, controversial, or nefarious? You are now implicated 
because you handled it. If you feel that others around you are close to the 
edge, and might therefore be sending all kinds of strange letters, it might 
be better to walk on by without anyone noticing. By contrast, in asking 
directions and making change, you can’t walk on by: you have already 
been accosted, and thus you have no real choice but to follow the social 
interaction to some kind of ending. And once you are part of the social 
interaction, you might as well be helpful, because whatever state your 
interlocutor is in, they are going to prefer helpfulness. This interpretation 
does not, admittedly, explain the lack of neighbourhood difference for 
the dropped object, which would appear to be more like the lost letter in 
that the participant can plausibly walk on by without initiating any social 
interaction. But it does suggest why the lost letter patterns with the Dictator 
Game, whilst asking for directions and making change do not. 
4. Crime and punishment
Broken glass, everywhere. 
People pissing on the stairs; you know they just don’t care.
Introduction
Where the previous chapter was about helping one another, this chapter is 
about the harms we can do. That is, we are concerned in this chapter with 
neighbourhood patterns of antisocial acts, acts that are to the detriment of 
another person or group. Prosocial and antisocial behaviour are logically 
distinct but nonetheless connected. It is not logically necessary that when 
people are less inclined to help each other, they will be more inclined to do 
each other harm, but in practice this often seems to be true. We have two 
sets of reasons for expecting there to be a greater prevalence of antisocial 
behaviour in Neighbourhood B than A. 
First, there is the edge principle discussed in the previous chapter. I 
claimed that people in Neighbourhood B tend on average, as a consequence 
of deprivation, to be closer to the existential edge than those in A, and hence 
to be more likely to be pushed to the edge itself. When you are on the edge, 
risky options for solving your immediate problem start to look attractive, 
because their payoff is often immediate, and their best possible payoff is 
often enormously advantageous to the actor (though since they are risky, 
their best possible payoff is not their most likely payoff). The kinds of risky 
options that might present themselves to people in difficulty in a modern 
city include lying, robbery, stealing from individuals, or coercing others 
to change their behaviour. These are all antisocial acts. Indeed, to act 
© Daniel Nettle, CC BY http://dx.doi.org/10.11647/OBP.0084.04
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antisocially can be considered as putting a higher valuation on the short-
term maximal payoff of the act than on the possible negative consequences, 
some of which might be subtle (loss of reputation or friendship, for 
example), and many of which are deferred in time. 
The second reason for expecting greater antisocial behaviour in 
B is empirical. Previous research has established very clearly that 
neighbourhoods where social capital is low are also those where crime 
tends to be high, and crime is the archetypal antisocial behaviour (Sampson 
et al., 1997). Crucially, social capital in these studies is measured in much 
the way we measured it in Social Survey 1, via self-report surveys. Given 
the neighbourhood difference in self-reported social capital reviewed in 
chapter 3, the clear prediction should be that antisocial behaviour in all its 
forms will be more prevalent in B than A. This is also what the Mountain 
People narrative leads us to expect. 
The spreading of disorder and the maintenance  
of antisocial behaviour
This chapter is about more than just whether there is neighbourhood 
difference in antisocial behaviour; that would be relatively quick to 
demonstrate. It is about using our neighbourhood study to try to 
understand the forces though which patterns of antisocial behaviour are 
maintained and transmitted. For what is absolutely clear is that antisocial 
behaviour is a transmissible condition. I mentioned Keizer, Lindenberg and 
Steg’s experiments in chapter 1. Those experiments showed that antisocial 
rule-breaking behaviours can be increased in a field setting by sowing the 
environment with small cues that other people are already being antisocial, 
such as graffiti or litter (Keizer et al., 2008). This ‘spreading of disorder’ 
principle is a powerful one. It lies behind the ‘broken windows’ theory 
of crime, which asserts that allowing relatively small antisocial acts to 
remain visible in the environment leads to increases in much more serious 
crime. The outputs of the small antisocial acts—the broken windows and 
graffitied walls—come to serve as informational inputs to other potential 
perpetrators, whose behaviour in turn serves as the input to others, and so 
on in an escalating cycle. 
What interests me most about the spreading of disorder principle is its 
potential to make antisocial behaviour inflationary and self-perpetuating. 
Let us say that there is a small initial difference between two neighbourhoods; 
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maybe there is one desperate person who goes around despoiling the 
public street in one of them but not the other. His acts serve as inputs 
to other decision-makers, who then are more prepared to commit small 
antisocial acts of their own; those in turn infect people contemplating more 
serious destruction, and before we know it one neighbourhood is obviously 
disordered—and has a high crime rate—and the other not. Even if we now 
remove the person who was the initial source of the disorder, the difference 
may persist. The experiences of the people in the two neighbourhoods have 
become different enough to lead them to choose different behaviours, and 
those different behaviours in turn feed into the experiences of their peers. 
Thus, the result could be a kind of pluralistic ignorance, where even if 
everyone in the neighbourhood has a preference not to behave antisocially, 
they all make the inductive bet—because of the overwhelming evidence 
around them—that other inhabitants are antisocial, and so they may as well 
follow suit. Thus, a small initial difference in neighbourhood conditions 
could lead to a rather large difference in outcomes, one with the potential 
to perpetuate itself indefinitely without counteracting forces. 
There may be counteracting forces, of course. They can come from 
prosocial behaviour, explaining the intimate link between absence of 
prosociality and presence of antisociality. Where people are prosocially 
inclined, they will be willing to invest in small acts of order restoration, like 
clearing up litter even if they did not cause it, or repairing a window that 
they did not break, and they will be seen doing so. Thus, visible prosocial 
acts can neutralize or reverse the self-reinforcing cycle (Keizer, Lindenberg, 
& Steg, 2013). Another way that prosocial behaviour can be a brake on the 
spreading of disorder is through third-party sanctioning. Third parties 
will often intervene, at cost to themselves, where they see antisocial acts 
occur. This can take various forms, the simplest of which is the social 
embarrassment of the perpetrator, but it provides some kind of deterrent. 
Third-party sanctioning can be thought of as a kind of prosociality, since it 
provides a specific benefit to the victim of the act and, through deterrence, 
a more diffuse benefit to the community. Where social capital is higher, 
people are more willing to sanction, and this is an important brake on the 
spreading of disorder. 
In light of the foregoing discussion, we can therefore make several 
predictions concerning antisocial behaviour in Neighbourhoods A and B. 
First, there will be more of it in B, and it will span both minor acts such as 
littering and more serious criminal acts; according to the ‘broken windows’ 
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theory of crime, minor and more serious types of antisocial behaviour 
should go together. Second, the spreading of disorder principle says that 
increased antisocial behaviour in B should be substantially mediated by 
a perception that other people in the neighbourhood are being antisocial; 
take this perception away, and the neighbourhood difference should be 
much smaller. Finally, given the lower social capital, we should expect less 
willingness to prosocially sanction wrongdoers in B. This should heighten 
the difference in antisocial behaviour. We will now scrutinize the data 
from the Tyneside Neighbourhoods Project to examine whether these 
predictions are supported. 
Littering and crime reports
The simplest place to start is littering in Observational Dataset 1. I coded a 
number of things that could be considered markers of antisocial behaviour. 
There was littering (dropping refuse to the ground) and its mirror image, bin 
(disposing of refuse in a designated on-street refuse container). A category 
of damaging recorded anyone apparently trying to break with hands or 
stones, or set fire to, the street furniture, a vehicle, or a building. Finally, 
spitting could perhaps be considered a kind of antisocial behaviour, since it 
is presumably convenient to the spitter but would be considered by many 
to negatively affect the hygiene of the environment. 
Figure 4.1  Frequency of markers of antisocial behaviour by neighbourhood, from 
Observational Dataset 1. Bin is strictly speaking a marker of prosocial rather than 
antisocial behaviour, and it is the only marker to pattern in the opposite direction. Image 
© Daniel Nettle, CC BY.
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As Figure 4.1 shows, there were large neighbourhood differences in all of 
the markers of antisocial behaviour, though the absolute numbers of acts 
observed were small in some cases. I saw littering six times as often in B 
than A; about every 31 minutes of observation, as opposed to every 3 hours. 
Relatedly, I never saw anyone put anything into a bin in B, though I saw it 
4 times in A, and street bins are widely available in both neighbourhoods. 
These figures refer to acts of dropping litter. I am sure that a survey of 
litter already on the ground would reveal a huge neighbourhood difference 
too. Acts of damaging were fortunately rare, but stacked up 4-1 for 
Neighbourhood B. Finally, spitting was over four times as frequent in B as 
A. Note that the total number of people observed was reasonably similar 
in the two neighbourhoods, so these differences are not just a product of 
different opportunities for observation.
That tells us a lot about minor antisocial acts; is there a neighbourhood 
difference in crime too? Agathe’s police dataset recorded all incidents 
notified to the police over the period December 2010 to March 2011, 585 
incidents in all. There were 385 in B to 200 in A, a ratio of 1.93. Figure 4.2 
categorizes these by type of incident, showing also the ratio of the number 
of incidents in B to the number in A. 
Figure 4.2  Crime rates by type and neighbourhood from the Police Crime Dataset. The 
figures on the Neighbourhood B bars give the ratio of the number of incidents of the 
type in B to the number in A. Antisocial denotes minor incidents of public nuisance. 
Image © Daniel Nettle, CC BY.
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The only category of crime for which Neighbourhood B does not show an 
elevated rate is vehicle crime. This is unsurprising since there are fewer 
and less valuable vehicles in B. Other categories show at least 70% more 
incidents in B than A. This includes a greater incidence of what the police 
describe as antisocial behaviour, a category that refers to disputes, littering, 
and graffiti, among others. This is consistent with the evidence from 
Observational Dataset 1. Of particular note in Figure 4.2 are two things: 
burglaries are much more common in B than A, even though the monetary 
value of the households is surely much lower. Naively, you might predict 
that A would be the more attractive place for burglars to ply their trade. 
Secondly, the biggest neighbourhood difference of all is in violence. Crime 
overall is slightly less than twice as common in B than A; violence is nearly 
six times as common. The pattern we observed in Neighbourhood B is 
apparently typical of extremely deprived neighbourhoods: an excess of 
crime overall, and a particularly large excess of violent crime (Krivo & 
Peterson, 1996).
These findings relate to several claims I have already made. I claimed 
that people in Neighbourhood B are more likely to be close to the edge 
than those in A. The fact that there are many more burglaries and robberies 
in B than A reinforces this point. Most burglaries are performed close to 
the perpetrator’s home (Bernasco & Nieuwbeerta, 2005). Thus, most of 
these crimes are probably committed by people from in and around the 
neighbourhood. As well as being very risky, they are probably not very 
lucrative. These are acts of people who are close to the edge. We have 
already seen the example of the men who robbed their own bookmaker in 
chapter 3. To take another example, an off-licence close to Neighbourhood 
B was robbed on May 8th, 2011 by a man with a large knife. He made off 
with two packets of cigarettes and a bar of chocolate, a total value of less 
than £20. He was arrested outside the shop. Only to a person at or over the 
edge could the possibility of £20 worth of chocolate and cigarettes outweigh 
the reasonably large chance of a prison term. 
The finding that violence is so much more common in B relates to the 
claim I made in chapter 3 about social relationships in B being more volatile 
over time than those in A. We don’t have much detail about these violent 
incidents or why they happened. However, we know that most violence 
happens between people who know each other, and so at the very least 
we can say that its greater prevalence indicates that social relationships 
in B more often take the most extreme swing possible to the negative. 
Even if this is rare in absolute terms, it is much more likely to happen in 
Neighbourhood B than A. 
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The Theft Game
The observational and police datasets are useful for telling us what people 
do, but they give us no real window onto why they do them. That is, they 
provide no way of investigating the cognitive processes underlying the 
decision to behave antisocially, since they do not furnish the opportunity 
to asking the litterers or criminals anything. Thus, a different method was 
required. We needed to recruit participants from Neighbourhoods A and B, 
offer them the opportunity to behave antisocially, and explore the cognitive 
and situational determinants of their decisions. Economic games were 
going to be the way to do this. 
This part of the project was Kari Britt Schroeder’s work. I described 
in chapter 1 the economic game she designed that was attached to Social 
Survey 2. Briefly, players were formed into mutually anonymous triads. 
There was an initial allocation of £10 to each player. Player 1 could decide to 
‘steal’ up to £10 from player 2, thus increasing his earnings to a maximum 
of £20. The unfortunate player 2 could not do anything about this. Player 
3, however, could decide to sanction player 1 for his behaviour, by paying 
£2 to reduce player 1’s take-home amount by £6. At the time player 3 was 
filling in her survey, she did not yet know what player 1 had decided to do, 
so what we obtained from player 3 was a series of choices: if player 1 takes 
£0, would you fine him? If player 1 takes £1, would you fine him? etc. Thus, 
we ended up, for each triad, with a look-up table of what to do in terms of 
final payouts for every possible player 1 decision about how much to steal. 
The player 1 decisions are an assay of willingness to commit antisocial 
behaviour. From the rest of Social Survey 2, we had data from those same 
player 1s about their perceptions of norms concerning social cheating. The 
questions Kari asked to probe perceived norms were about three domains 
of real-world antisocial behaviour: cheating on benefits, cheating on taxes, 
and cheating on public transport fares. We asked both about injunctive 
norms or acceptability (to what extent is it acceptable to cheat in this 
way?) and descriptive norms or prevalence (how much do people in this 
neighbourhood actually cheat in this way?). These norms ratings were on an 
effectively arbitrary continuous scale. The spreading of disorder principle 
predicts that the greater player 1’s perception of the prevalence of cheating 
in the neighbourhood, the more she will steal from player 2. It does not 
predict any association between the amount player 1 steals and her rating of 
the acceptability of social cheating, though common sense would make this 
prediction. So many findings in the social sciences are intuitively obvious: it 
is nice in this case to have a theoretical prediction that does not completely 
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coincide with intuition. Unreflective intuition would say that people who 
think social cheating is less acceptable will steal less, whereas the spreading 
of disorder principle suggests that people who think others around them are 
cheating less will steal less. These are not mutually exclusive of course, but it 
was interesting to investigate which one panned out. 
Let us look at the results for the player 1s (Figure 4.3; I have plotted these 
in a different way from Kari’s more sophisticated analysis in Schroeder, 
Pepper, and Nettle [2014]). First, player 1s behaved differently in the two 
neighbourhoods. The top left panel of Figure 4.3 is what is called a violin 
plot. It shows how the data (the amounts stolen) are distributed across 
their possible range of £0 to £10. Where the violin is wide, there are many 
observations, and where it is narrow, there are few. As you can see, in 
Neighbourhood A the violin is wide at £0. This means that most people 
stole £0; this is reinforced by the fact that the median amount stolen (black 
dot) is £0. There is a very thin neck in the middle of the range, meaning 
very few people stole an amount like £5, and a little bulge at the top, 
representing a small number of people who stole everything. The violin for 
Neighbourhood B is quite different. The bulge at zero is not so pronounced; 
there were many fewer people who stole nothing. There are more marked 
bulges in the middle and at the top, meaning that many more people stole 
half or everything. This is reinforced by the fact that the median theft 
for Neighbourhood B was £5. In other words, the middle person of the 
people we sampled in A took nothing from player 2; the middle person 
of the people we sampled in B took half of what there was to take. The 
neighbourhood difference was robust to controlling for the subjective value 
of a few pounds, as well as obvious covariates such as age and sex. 
The upper right panel of Figure 4.3 shows how rated acceptability 
and prevalence of social cheating compare across the neighbourhoods. 
There is no real neighbourhood difference in the ratings of acceptability. 
Respondents from both places thought that social cheating was pretty 
unacceptable. There was, however, a huge difference in the perceived 
prevalence: respondents from B thought that social cheating was much more 
common in their neighbourhood. This matters, because of what the lower 
two panels of Figure 4.3 show. There was no relationship between how 
much player 1s took in the game and how acceptable they regarded social 
cheating as being (lower left panel). This is very striking and, as mentioned 
above, unintuitive: people who a few minutes later went on to take all £10 
rated social cheating as just as unacceptable as people who went on to take 
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nothing. By contrast, there was a relationship between perceived prevalence 
of social cheating and amount taken: the more common you regard social 
cheating as being in your neighbourhood, the more you take from poor 
old player 2. The neighbourhood difference in the perceived prevalence of 
social cheating, it turns out, largely explains the neighbourhood difference 
in how much of the £10 player 1 took. 
Figure 4.3  Upper left: Violin plot of amount taken by player 1s in the Theft Game by 
neighbourhood. The black points are the medians. The curved shape represents the 
distribution of the data symmetrically on an arbitrary horizontal scale; where the shape is 
wide, there are many observations, whilst where it is narrow there are few. Upper right: 
Mean ratings of acceptability of social cheating, and prevalence of social cheating, by 
neighbourhood. Error bars represent one standard error. Bottom left: Scatterplot of the 
relationship between acceptability of social cheating and amount taken in the game. Bottom 
right: Scatterplot of the relationship between perceived prevalence of social cheating in the 
neighbourhood and amount taken in the game. Image © Daniel Nettle, CC BY.
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These results resonate with our expectations. For one thing, they support 
the general claim, backed up by much empirical research, that normative 
influence is very important (Cialdini, Reno, & Kallgren, 1990). Under a 
range of circumstances, people are prone to doing as much or as little as 
they perceive others in the surrounding population to be doing. Normative 
influences are often much stronger than people realize; respondents protest 
that such influences are unimportant and that they base their decisions 
on more elaborate and independent criteria, such as values or extensive 
reasoning. The behavioural evidence tends to suggest otherwise (Nolan, 
Schultz, Cialdini, Goldstein, & Griskevicius, 2008). The results also confirm 
the more specific prediction of the spreading of disorder principle: the 
more the participants felt they saw evidence of cheating going on around 
them, the more they stole. This is really just the importance of normative 
influence applied to antisocial behaviour in particular. 
We now turn to player 3. What is she doing in all this? Recall that we 
predicted people in Neighbourhood A might be more willing than those in 
B to sanction antisocial behaviours, even when they were not the injured 
party. This did indeed turn out to be the case (Figure 4.4). The figure shows 
the proportion of player 3s from each neighbourhood saying that they 
would impose the fine, for each of the possible amounts that player 1 might 
steal from player 2. In both neighbourhoods, there was a sense of graduated 
sanction. That is, most people would let pass a small theft of a pound or 
two, but as the theft became bigger, more and more of them said that they 
would intercede. The proportion opting to sanction never approached 1 in 
either neighbourhood; there were plenty of people who were simply not 
going to get involved. However, the proportion not willing to get involved 
was much higher in Neighbourhood B than A, and as a consequence, the 
probability of getting fined increased less as the amount player 1 stole got 
larger. In Neighbourhood B, even a player 1 who stole the whole £10 was 
more likely to get away with it than not.
What explains the greater willingness to sanction in Neighbourhood A 
than B? People in Neighbourhood A reported greater trust and did not rate 
so highly the value of the £2 the fine cost them. Both trust and the subjective 
value of £2 were important in predicting people’s willingness to sanction 
(specifically, willingness to sanction was greater where the subjective value 
of £2 was low, and amongst those for whom the subjective value of £2 was 
low, willingness to sanction increased with trust of the neighbours).
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Figure 4.4  The proportion of player 3 respondents in each neighbourhood opting to 
sanction each possible amount stolen by player 1. Image © Daniel Nettle, CC BY.
The combination of variation in the subjective value of £2 and variation in 
trust was sufficient to explain the neighbourhood variation in sanctioning 
behaviour. These results suggest that people will intercede on behalf of 
third parties when it is not too costly for them to do so, and when they trust 
that they are part of a viable prosocial network. Interceding is after all a 
kind of prosociality, and so, like other kinds of prosociality, we are more 
willing to embark on it when we have confidence in the social entity within 
which it will occur. 
An experiment with information
The data from Kari’s study that I have presented so far shows a clear 
association between willingness to behave antisocially and the perception 
that others behave antisocially (that is, the perceived descriptive norm). 
However, the claim we wanted to make was stronger than just an 
association: we wanted to argue that perceived descriptive norms play a 
causal role in maintaining greater antisocial behaviour in Neighbourhood 
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B than A. Demonstrating causality is a challenge. Surveys are informative, 
but the general consensus is that only experiments (randomised control 
trials, if you prefer) can really tell you anything very firm about cause 
and effect. An experiment in this context would mean a study where 
participants were randomly assigned to experience different descriptive 
norms about cheating in their neighbourhoods. If the association is causal, 
their antisocial behaviour should then vary according to the norm they were 
assigned to. Of course, it is rather difficult without vast resources to think 
of a way of experimentally assigning different participants to experience 
different descriptive norms in their neighbourhoods. Nonetheless, Kari 
came up with an ingenious plan that went at least part of the way towards 
a true experiment. 
The experiment was done using the player 2s from the Theft Game 
described in the preceding section. Recall that the unfortunate player 2 had 
no active decision to make in the game; he or she was the potential victim of 
player 1’s theft. However, we did ask player 2s whether or not they expected 
player 3 to come to their aid and punish player 1 in the event that player 1 
stole £5 from them. Expecting player 3 to come to your aid is not the same 
thing as stealing, of course, but it is related to it. Presumably if people in 
a neighbourhood began to expect more sanctioning by third parties, their 
willingness to commit antisocial behaviour would be reduced. Thus, we 
in effect used the player 2 expectations about sanctioning as a marker for 
the perceived extent to which antisocial behaviour could be got away with.
Now, how could we experimentally manipulate people’s experience 
of descriptive norms in the neighbourhood? Other studies have done 
this by, for example, deliberately littering in some areas or on some 
days (Cialdini et al., 1990). However, this was difficult to do for a study 
on a whole-neighbourhood scale taking place over several months. 
Instead what we did is a really rather subtle manipulation of the social 
information available to the participants. We acquire our beliefs about 
descriptive norms at least partly through social communication; we are 
influenced by what others say the norms are. So we decided to present 
some player 2s in B with information that implied other residents thought 
the neighbourhood descriptive norms were not as bad as they really were; 
we also presented some participants in A with information implying that 
other residents thought the neighbourhood descriptive norms were worse 
than they actually were. We called this the norms treatment: in the norms 
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treatment groups, you got information implying that your neighbours 
thought your neighbourhood was more like the other neighbourhood 
was in reality. These participants were to be compared to two control 
groups who received no information at all about what other residents 
thought about the local descriptive norms. The clear prediction was that 
perceptions of the probability of player 3 sanctioning would be shifted: 
in A, the norms treatment should reduce the perceived probability of 
sanctioning, whilst in B, the norms treatment should increase it. 
The details of how to implement the norms treatment were quite involved. 
As mentioned in chapter 2, for ethical reasons, Kari did not want to give 
people false information, but she did have to manipulate their informational 
state. She thus decided on the following solution: in the norms treatment, 
instead of the questions asking for ratings of the prevalence of cheating 
on taxes, benefits, and public transport fares in the neighbourhood, player 
2s would see a statement informing them that we had asked ten of their 
neighbours what they thought about these issues, and showing the average 
results. We really had asked ten people in each neighbourhood, of course, 
so what the participants saw were real data. In fact, we had asked many 
more than ten. The experimental manipulation consisted in the fact that the 
ten we chose to present were unrepresentative: ten of the most favourable 
for Neighbourhood B, and ten of the least favourable for Neighbourhood A. 
We hoped that receiving this biased social information would cause people 
to shift their own representations of what the descriptive norms concerning 
cheating were in the neighbourhood. 
The results from the norms manipulation are shown in Figure 4.5. In 
the control conditions, respondents from B were slightly less likely than 
those from A to expect player 3 to intercede on their behalf. This difference 
does have a basis in reality, since player 3s from B really were less likely 
to intercede. However, in the norms condition for Neighbourhood B, the 
expectation of player 3 sanctioning was strikingly higher—around 60% 
as opposed to around 30% for the controls. One of our predictions was 
thus fulfilled. The other prediction was that the proportion expecting 
sanctioning should be reduced by the norms treatment in Neighbourhood 
A. There was no evidence for this. In fact, the proportion of respondents 
expecting sanctioning was slightly higher in the norms condition than the 
control for Neighbourhood A. 
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Figure 4.5  The percentage of player 2 participants expecting that player 3 would sanction 
player 1 if player 1 stole £5, by neighbourhood and experimental treatment. The norms 
treatment is described in the text. Image © Daniel Nettle, CC BY.
These results are really very striking. For Neighbourhood B at any rate, they 
confirm the causal importance of perceived norms in cognition concerning 
prosocial and antisocial behaviour. They also show how strong the social 
transmission of these perceived norms is. Just by telling people that their 
neighbours thought that the neighbourhood was a slightly less antisocial 
place than the behavioural evidence suggests it is, you could effectively and 
instantly double people’s expectations that a stranger would intercede to 
sanction antisocial behaviour. And if residents’ expectations that antisocial 
behaviour would get sanctioned could be doubled, you would instantly 
provide a massive deterrent effect against antisocial behaviour itself. Thus, 
our experiment suggested that the apparently entrenched antisocial culture 
of Neighbourhood B might actually be quite labile: you just needed to 
persuade everyone in B that everyone else in B was motivated to be prosocial 
and not antisocial. It would become a self-fulfilling prophecy. 
This finding relates to the issue discussed at the outset of the chapter 
about how the spreading of disorder principle means that antisocial 
cultures can be self-sustaining. Once people start to believe that others in 
the surrounding community are on the lookout for themselves and not 
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doing their bit for the common good, they will behave accordingly. Their 
behavioural output becomes perceptual input to their fellow community 
members, and so the loop is hermetically closed. The cultural tradition 
can persist even if whatever perturbation initially gave rise to it has been 
removed. Our Neighbourhood B results suggest that perhaps quite small 
and simple things might break the loop quite quickly: getting neighbours to 
talk to each other positively about the places where they live; volunteer days 
where people could see each other doing prosocial acts; deep community 
clean-up to remove the visible cues of disorder. Other experimental work 
with manipulations of perceived norms suggests that the effects of such 
interventions could be quite powerful (Cialdini et al., 1990; Keizer et al., 
2008, 2013). 
Before we conclude that our results show that community regeneration 
is going to be straightforward and require only superficial nudges, some 
caveats are in order. First, the shift in expectations of sanctioning that we 
achieved in Neighbourhood B in this experiment may well have been quite 
fleeting. We have no idea if there would still be an effect if we had asked 
respondents a week or even a day later. I suspect not; the thing about real-
world experience is that it is happening all the time. One particular set of 
cues might be influential in the short term, but it will soon be overwritten 
by others. The second is a more general point. The chances are that 
what maintains the relatively antisocial culture of B is not just the social 
transmission effect whereby everyone does what they think everyone else 
is doing. There are also more people who are materially desperate, as I 
made clear in the discussion of the edge principle in chapter 3. People at or 
over an edge will sometimes do antisocial things regardless of what they 
perceive the local descriptive norm to be. Thus, breaking the cycle of social 
transmission might well ameliorate the neighbourhood difference in the 
short term, but it is always going to be in danger of breaking out again if the 
underlying socioeconomic issues are not addressed. I return to this issue in 
chapter 7.
The strange case of the norms effect that didn’t happen
There is an aspect of the results of Kari’s norms experiment that I have 
glossed over thus far: the complete failure of the norms treatment to 
produce the predicted result in Neighbourhood A. Being given information 
suggesting that the neighbours thought A was less prosocial than it actually 
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is did not reduce the expectation of sanctioning. That expectation was if 
anything slightly higher in the norms treatment than in the control. In 
addition, a curious and unpredicted thing happened. Participants from A 
who received the norms treatment did not seem to want our money. Six of 
them spontaneously opted out of receiving the payment from the game: 
three suggested we donate it to charity, two told us to keep it for university 
funds, and one just said he did not want to receive it. Only one person in 
the Neighbourhood A control condition deflected payment in this way, so 
it seems like something may be going on.
One interpretation of these findings is as follows. People in 
Neighbourhood A know that it is a nice and prosocial place. They are not 
under any uncertainty about that, and so their beliefs are relatively immune 
from moment-to-moment influence. Strictly speaking, in information 
theory, the amount of information carried by a signal depends on the extent 
of the uncertainty in the receiver (Shannon, 1948). Our Neighbourhood A 
respondents were not uncertain, and so the cues we provided were not 
informative and did not lead to them updating their expectations. All 
the Neighbourhood A respondents did was to signal to us that we were 
wrong, demonstrating what a prosocial bunch the residents of A are by 
spontaneously transforming our economic game into an opportunity for 
charitable giving. Not only did they not heed the social information we 
provided in the norms treatment; six of them sought to actively counter it 
by a well-chosen prosocial gesture. 
The corollary interpretation for Neighbourhood B is that people 
there are in considerable uncertainty about the state of the social world. 
Thus, even the rather subtle cue that we fed them carried considerable 
information, and their running representations shifted markedly. This 
relates to the finding reported in chapter 3 that residents of B feel they 
know their neighbours less well, even though they demonstrably interact 
with them more frequently, than residents of A do. That finding showed 
that residents of B feel that they need more information about their social 
world; the current one suggests that they are responsive to it when it 
comes. I suggested in chapter 3 that the difference in information-hunger is 
to do with people’s behaviour being more variable over time in B than A, 
and the same claim works for the information-reactivity we see here. When 
behaviour is variable, more data are more useful. Moreover, you need 
to give a strong weight to the most recent data, since that is what is most 
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diagnostic about the current state of affairs. In an unchanging environment, 
you can give a lot of weight to your historical experience, but in a volatile 
environment, historical experience means little; it is the most recent data 
that are going to be of some help. Thus, residents of B may be the most 
tuned for any news or evidence going around of how social behaviour in 
the neighbourhoods is shifting. Interestingly, this suggests that it may be 
in disordered or deprived neighbourhoods where you could have the most 
dramatic short-term effects from interventions like clearing up litter or 
mending broken windows. 

5. From cradle to grave
A child is born with no state of mind, 
Blind to the ways of mankind.
Introduction
Chapters 3 and 4 showed that adults’ social lives are very obviously 
different in Neighbourhood B than in Neighbourhood A. Residents of 
Neighbourhood B interact more with their neighbours, but trust them 
less. A question we can ask is how these neighbourhood differences are 
patterned across the life course. For example, is the social behaviour of 
children initially the same across neighbourhoods, with differences only 
becoming apparent once people have grown up? Or is the social world 
of young children different in different neighbourhoods from the earliest 
age at which we can measure it? How different are children’s experiences 
in the different neighbourhoods, and how does this relate to adults’ 
lives? These questions are the subject of this chapter. First, we will go 
back to the Observational Datasets and look specifically at the behaviour 
of the children on the streets, trying to understand how that differs by 
neighbourhood, and how the differences in child social behaviour relate 
to the corresponding differences in the adults. The next part of the chapter 
will be devoted to understanding how trust—which as we have already 
seen is a key indicator of social capital and prosocial motivation—varies 
with age. Finally, we will look at the behaviour of older people through the 
Street Ages Dataset. 
© Daniel Nettle, CC BY http://dx.doi.org/10.11647/OBP.0084.05
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Children’s use of the streets
Using Observational Dataset 1, we can ask for children the same question 
that we asked in chapter 3 for adults: how do they use the streets across 
the day? Figure 5.1 shows the numbers of children (i.e. people judged 
to be of compulsory school age—16 or younger) observed in main and 
residential streets by time of day. Children are generally more in evidence 
in Neighbourhood B than A. This is particularly true in the residential 
streets in the evening. You can see the clear spike in numbers of children 
as the school days end around 15:00. In Neighbourhood A, they continue 
to be around in some numbers until 18:00, whereupon they presumably go 
in for their dinners. Thereafter very few are seen. In Neighbourhood B by 
contrast, children come to play out in the evening and in large numbers. Of 
course, they could be playing outside in Neighbourhood A too, just within 
the confines of their larger gardens, but it is not my impression that this is 
the case. Playing out on the streets is certainly a rarity in Neighbourhood A 
relative to B. An important point here is that playing out is playing social: 
of the 290 groups containing a child observed on the streets after 18:00 in 
B, 59% contained more than one child, and 33% contained more than two.
Figure 5.1  Total numbers of children on the streets by time of day in Observational 
Dataset 1. Image © Daniel Nettle, CC BY.
The pattern for the adults was that individuals in Neighbourhood B were 
less likely to be on their own than individuals in Neighbourhood A. Does 
this also hold for the children? Figure 5.2 shows the proportion of groups 
containing children in which there is just one child, two children, or more 
than two children. One-child groups are indeed relatively less common 
in B than A, two-child groups are also fractionally less common, and the 
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more-than-two category is overrepresented. The groups in this category 
were sometimes large, containing up to 12 or 15 children. They use the 
streets to play traditional children’s games, or cards, or football, or they 
stand around and talk. Given UK patterns of family size, few of these large 
groups can consist only of siblings. Instead, the data suggest that children 
in B use the public space for greater social interaction with other children 
from other households.
Figure 5.2  The proportion of groups containing children with different numbers of 
children, by neighbourhood, from Observational Dataset 1. Image © Daniel Nettle, CC BY.
What adults are accompanying these groups? The left panel of Figure 
5.3 shows the number of adults found in the social groups containing 
children, by neighbourhood. Two things are striking about this graph. 
First, children are much more likely to be unaccompanied by any adult in 
Neighbourhood B. This relates to the greater frequency of playing out in 
B, since playing out is something usually done by children on their own; 
of the 290 evening residential-street children’s groups in Neighbourhood 
B, 175 were adult-free. The second striking feature is that mixed adult/
children groups in Neighbourhood B are more likely to have multiple 
adults in them than equivalent groups in A. Children going about 
Neighbourhood A are most likely to be with exactly one adult; children 
going about Neighbourhood B are about equally likely to be with no 
adult, one adult, or more than one adult. 
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Figure 5.3  For each neighbourhood in Observational Dataset 1: (left) the distribution of 
the number of adults found in social groups containing children; (right) the proportion 
of mixed adult/children groups constituted by different configurations of adults. Image 
© Daniel Nettle, CC BY.
We can drill down further into the configurations of adults accompanying 
children. The right panel of Figure 5.3 only examines groups which contain 
at least one adult and at least one child, and divides them up according to 
the configuration of adults present. As you can see, a large proportion of 
all adult/children groups in both neighbourhoods have one female as the 
sole adult. However, the predominance of this group type is substantially 
lessened in Neighbourhood B compared to A. The difference is not made 
up by an increase in lone male-headed groups, or ‘mum and dad’ groups. 
Instead, in B, there are proportionally more groups with two adult women, 
and more groups belonging to the ‘other’ category. This category represents 
all kinds of constellations of multiple men and women; there were 47 
groups with 3 adults in Neighbourhood B (as against 9 in A), and 29 groups 
with 4 or more (as against 7 in A). 
How do we interpret these patterns? First, children are more socially 
autonomous in Neighbourhood B than A, as their greater propensity to be 
without adults and to be playing out demonstrates. Depending on your 
views you could see this as a danger: lack of parental supervision is the 
pathway to delinquency. On the other hand, you could see it is a positive: 
young people in Neighbourhood B have earlier opportunities to become 
independent social actors in the neighbourhood and create their own social 
networks. And they do. Children in B are less likely to be the lone child in a 
group and—we can reasonably infer—more likely to be on the streets with 
children from other households. Second, whereas children’s social behaviour 
in A is largely organized through the nuclear grouping of one woman and 
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her one or two children, the groupings are more varied and larger in B. 
They will more often contain a pair of women and their multiple children, 
or some more complex set of adults and children. In short, the data suggest 
that children in B, as well as having more interaction with other children 
across household boundaries, are also having more interaction with the 
adults from other households too, via multi-family social aggregations. The 
adult Neighbourhood B pattern of greater social interaction on the streets 
therefore shapes, and is reproduced in, the social experience of children. 
Social trust through childhood
In the adult data, there is a paradox: the greater social interaction across 
household boundaries in the deprived Neighbourhood B does not lead to 
higher social trust, as common sense would predict it should, but actually 
goes hand in hand with lower social trust. We have seen that children are 
involved in greater social interaction in Neighbourhood B; do they also 
trust less?
We can’t exactly answer this question, since we don’t have data on 
children’s trust from Neighbourhoods A and B. However, we do have data 
on social trust from the School Survey. To recall, this survey was from around 
1000 school students from 8 Tyneside neighbourhoods other than A and B. 
On the deprivation continuum, the most deprived was not quite as deprived 
as B, the least deprived about the same as A, and there were a few in between. 
Thus, having social trust data from these neighbourhoods is an interesting 
potential corroboration of the association between deprivation and low trust, 
and may also tell us something about trust patterns in childhood.
Social trust was measured in the School Survey with a standard question 
and a response on a 1 (not at all) to 100 (completely) scale. To display the data, 
I have split the responses by age group, and also by the Index of Multiple 
Deprivation of the neighbourhood (Figure 5.4). Note that a higher Index of 
Multiple Deprivation represents greater deprivation. As you can see, in all 
three age groups there is a social gradient in trust, with average trust lower 
as the neighbourhoods become more deprived. It is also apparent that the 
gradient is substantially steeper for the older children. In the most affluent 
neighbourhood, trust is actually higher amongst the oldest children than 
it is for the youngest. In the most deprived two neighbourhoods, trust is 
dramatically lower amongst the oldest as opposed to the youngest children. 
This is not true longitudinal data, so inferences about change with age 
have to be made cautiously. However, a developmental pattern consistent 
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with the data would be the following: children everywhere start out about 
equally trusting. As they get older, they obtain more and more experience 
from the wider environment. For children in affluent neighbourhoods, this 
experience maintains their trust. In more deprived neighbourhoods, the 
experiences they have corrode trust, so that the older they are, the less they 
trust. The greater the deprivation, the greater the rate of corrosion. 
Figure 5.4  Mean trust by neighbourhood deprivation and age group, from the schools 
survey. Lines represent best fits from regression models. Note that one neighbourhood 
has no data from the middle age group. Image © Daniel Nettle, CC BY.
The combination of the observational data and the School Survey data 
suggest, then, that our paradoxical findings regarding social interactions 
and trust hold true for the lives of young people too. In deprived Tyneside 
neighbourhoods, it seems that young people have greater social autonomy 
and greater interaction with neighbours beyond the household, both with 
members of their own generation and the one above. However, they also 
feel less able to trust in others, and as they gain more experience of their 
social world through childhood and into adolescence, the gulf in social 
trust across the deprivation spectrum continues to get larger. 
Social trust through adulthood
The finding from the Schools Survey that, in deprived neighbourhoods, 
trust is lower in older age groups prompted me to go back to Social Survey 
1 to ask the same question of adults. Do the oldest adults trust the least? If 
social experience under conditions of deprivation cumulatively corrodes 
trust, then you might imagine that the older you got under such conditions, 
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the less you would trust (think of Edgar at the end of King Lear: ‘The oldest 
hath borne most…’). On the other hand, trust may have reached its long-
term equilibrium level by early adulthood, which would produce a flat line 
of trust against age amongst adults. 
Figure 5.5 shows the relationship of trust to age by neighbourhood from 
Social Survey 1. Far from trust being higher in the youngest and lower in the 
oldest age groups, it is at its highest amongst the over-70s. Trust is positively 
associated with age in both neighbourhoods, but, as you can see, the slope 
of the relationship is much steeper in B. It can’t be very steep in A because 
there is nowhere for it to go: even amongst the 20-somethings in A, trust is 
around 6 on a 7-point scale. By contrast, there is room for an increase with 
age in B, because many of the men and women in their 20s give trust its 
lowest possible rating of 1. The pattern of trust against age in Social Survey 
2 is much the same. You can also control for how long the respondent has 
lived in the neighbourhood. Not only is there no relationship between trust 
and number of years in the neighbourhood, but controlling for duration of 
residence does not abolish the age pattern. 
Figure 5.5  Trust of people in the neighbourhood against age of respondent, by 
neighbourhood, from Social Survey 1. Image © Daniel Nettle, CC BY.
Here we hit the frustration of having only cross-sectional rather than 
longitudinal data, for there are two different mechanisms that could lie 
behind the pattern in Figure 5.5 (or it could represent a combination of 
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them). First, there could be a generational difference. Respondents aged 60 
and above probably made their way in the world when Neighbourhood B 
was a less economically uncertain place than it is now, so perhaps the relative 
security they enjoyed then helped them set up solid social networks and a 
trusting worldview. The 50–something generation in B shows slightly lower 
trust: they were making their way 30 years ago, when deindustrialisation 
was at its height. The group with the lowest trust of all, the 20-somethings, 
have come into adulthood with industry long gone, opportunities uncertain, 
dilapidation evident, and demolitions going on all around them. It would be 
no surprise to find that they are the most socially alienated generation. 
This generational hypothesis suggests that the current 20-somethings will 
carry their low trust with them as they grow older. The alternative hypothesis 
is a developmental one: perhaps a person’s trust changes as they age. Trust 
has previously been found to increase with age between the ages of 20 and 
90 (Twenge, Campbell, & Carter, 2014), whilst studies of related measures of 
social wellbeing have found U-shaped curves, with levels highest in youth 
and again in retirement, but with a long dip in the middle (Blanchflower & 
Oswald, 2008). Perhaps we are seeing something similar here. As children, we 
are buffered to some extent from negative social interactions, and so our trust 
tends to be high. We move into the difficult phase of becoming established as 
independent householders, our worries mount and our trust dips, and then 
we come through to the autumn of life having found our social place, with our 
greatest dangers and trials behind us, and so we can relax and trust more. If 
we attached the high-deprivation neighbourhood data points for 9-11, 12-13, 
and 14-15 from figure 5.4 to the left-hand end of the Neighbourhood B data 
points from figure 5.5, we would indeed see a very nice inverted U-shape, 
with trust very high at the starting age of 9, corroding by age 15, spectacularly 
low in the 20s, and gradually recovering to be high again by 70. 
Whichever mechanism—generational difference or individual change—
is driving the pattern in Figure 5.5, there is one thing that seems to be the 
case: deprivation matters. If there is a generational decline in trust, it has been 
much worse in the deprived Neighbourhood B and is scarcely perceptible in 
Neighbourhood A. If there is an individual U-shape curve, then Figures 5.4 
and 5.5 suggest that in affluent neighbourhoods the nadir of the U is really 
not very low: the U is a shallow saucer. In the deprived neighbourhoods, 
the U looks like a glacial valley, with dramatic social alienation its floor. So 
whatever the general dynamics, deprivation dramatically exacerbates them. 
This echoes our findings from chapters 3 and 4 that the social differences 
between Neighbourhoods A and B are large and basically negative, despite 
the greater level of social interaction going on there. 
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No country for old men
What happens to older people in our two neighbourhoods? The Street Ages 
Dataset gives us some insight into differences in their activities. As you may 
recall from chapter 2, for this dataset Rebecca and Agathe walked transects of 
the streets during the school holidays and estimated the ages of all the people 
they encountered. In Figure 5.6, I have grouped their estimated ages into 
four categories, under 19, 20-39, 40-59, and 60+, and plotted the percentage of 
observations from each neighbourhood that falls into each group. 
There are a number of things you can do with Figure 5.6. The first 
is to compare the age distribution of people on the streets from each 
neighbourhood. What you see is a big excess of the young—under 19 and 
20-39—in Neighbourhood B relative to A, and a big deficit in the over-40s 
and especially the over-60s. The over-60s is the striking one; you only see 
about half as many in B as in A. It could be that the researchers were not 
equally good at estimating ages in the two neighbourhoods, but if anything 
you might expect people in B to age more prematurely, and thus for more 
people there to be classified as over 60 regardless of actual age. This bias 
would therefore work in the opposite direction to the pattern we see in 
the figure. Thus, relative to A, the streets of B are places with an excess of 
children and young adults, and few visible old people. 
Figure 5.6  The percentage of observations in each neighbourhood by age group, from 
the Street Ages Dataset. The T-bars connect the observed percentage to the percentage 
that ought to have been expected given the actual age distribution of residents in the 
2001 census. Data described in detail in Nettle, Colléony, and Coyne (2012). Image © 
Daniel Nettle, CC BY.
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The second thing we can do is compare the observed age distribution 
with what we ought to see given who lives there. We have the actual age 
distribution of residents from the 2001 census. This was some years earlier 
than our data collection, but let us assume that the age structure has not 
changed substantially. We can therefore work out a baseline expectation of 
what we ought to see on the assumption that all age groups have the same 
tendency to use the streets. This is what is shown by the T-bars on Figure 
5.6: each T-bar connects the observed percentage of that age group to the 
percentage we ought to have expected to see, given the census data. 
Children and young people are, perhaps rather surprisingly, under-
represented compared to what they should be in both neighbourhoods. 
The pattern I want to draw attention to, though, is at the other end of 
the age spectrum. In Neighbourhood A, we should have expected that 
about 18% of our observations would be 60+. In fact, 21% were. The older 
people of Neighbourhood A are out in force. In Neighbourhood B, we 
should have expected 20% to be 60+. In fact, 13% were. The older people of 
Neighbourhood B have gone missing. 
Why is this pattern significant? There are several reasons. For one 
thing it reminds us that Neighbourhood B is a place where growing older 
goes badly. Deprived neighbourhoods in England have a slightly lower 
life expectancy than affluent ones, but the gap in expectation of healthy life 
is vastly greater, amounting to well over a decade (Bajekal, 2005; Nettle, 
2010a). In deprived areas, people’s health declines more rapidly with 
age, and they spend more of their adult years prior to death in a state of 
disability. What we see in the Street Ages Dataset is at least in part the 
social consequence of this fact. The senior citizens of Neighbourhood A are 
in good health and use their time to be out and about on the streets. Many 
of the senior citizens of B are—presumably—indoors, restricted by their 
health. 
The other reason that the pattern is interesting concerns not so much the 
senior citizens themselves, but the effect of their absence on everyone else. 
We saw earlier in the that the most trusting social group, with the possible 
exception of very young children, is the over-60s. This is particularly true 
in Neighbourhood B. Along with trust go prosocial attitudes, willingness to 
uphold norms, and so on. This group is over-represented in the street life of 
A and under-represented in street life of B. In B, their place is taken by an 
over-representation of the 20-39s in particular. But that group, we can see 
from Figure 5.5, is the least trusting and, we presume, most suspicious and 
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least prosocial of all the groups we have studied. More generally, crime, 
antisocial behaviour, and violence are specialities of the young.
This is bound to have an effect on the social ethos of the two places. 
What would happen if someone collapsed on the streets? If there were 
misdemeanours or misadventures going on? The answer presumably 
depends on who was passing by; in A, you’ve got a much better chance that 
person will be a trusting 65 year-old lady, and in B, a much better chance 
she will be an alienated 25 year-old. The very visible absence of the most 
prosocial age groups may thus contribute, through a number of pathways, 
to the relative dearth of prosocial behaviour and the relative prevalence 
of antisocial behaviour in Neighbourhood B. Those pathways include 
the direct (the lack of the social sanctioning behaviour of older citizens 
contributes to a failure to inhibit the spread of disorder in public spaces) 
and the more psychological (the observation that there are mainly young 
adults on the streets contributes to a feeling of unease and menace). This is 
another loop with the potential to be self-sustaining: the more threatening 
the environment feels, the more senior citizens will not want to be out in it, 
and, with fewer senior citizens, the more threatening it then feels. 
The lack of senior citizens on the streets is a source of information 
in a much more general sense too. When we are young, we are under 
uncertainty about what kind of future we might have. We can use the older 
people we see around us in the community—their numbers as well as their 
state—as a source of information about what the probability distribution 
of that future might be. On the streets of Neighbourhood A, you see about 
71 over-60s for every one hundred people aged 20-39. Most of them look 
great, too: expensively dressed, vigorous, and moderately likely to be 
carrying a tennis racket. Simplistically, you might imagine an unconscious 
mental computation in a 25 year-old that takes input from the surrounding 
population and says: it looks like if I have made it this far, there is a 71% 
chance of making it to a good old age in good health. I have lots of time 
ahead and lots to look forward to. 
On the streets of Neighbourhood B, for every one hundred 20-39 year-
olds, there are only about 37 over-60s. The same unconscious algorithm 
would produce a very different output: looking around me, I probably 
don’t have much time. It is less than an even bet that I will be active at 60. 
The future looks neither bright nor very long. 
I have no direct evidence that these particular unconscious mental 
algorithms exist, but it is a plausible idea. The idea connects the Street Ages 
Dataset to another aspect of the School Survey. In that survey we asked our 
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young respondents to estimate how long they thought they would live, and 
also to rate on a scale of 1-100 how optimistic they felt about their futures. 
The neighbourhood averages by level of deprivation are shown in Figure 
5.7. As you can see, the more deprived the neighbourhood, the shorter 
respondents felt they would live, and the less optimistic about their futures 
they were. Sadly, they were correct: having been born in more deprived 
areas, they will live less long, and their futures will be less rosy in myriad 
other ways too. Their dim perceptions of their futures will in turn help 
perpetuate the social malaise of the deprived neighbourhoods. A wealth 
of research shows that a sense of the future as short and unpromising is a 
key psychological driver of nihilistic behaviours such as self-neglect, taking 
risks, breaking laws, aggression, and unwillingness to cooperate with 
others (Brezina, 2009; Caldwell, Wiebe, & Cleveland, 2006; McDade et al., 
2011). What interests me is not just the consequences of people perceiving 
that their lives will be shorter and harder, but also the causes. The (at least 
partly veridical) idea that life will be relatively short and hard must have 
got into the minds of the young people in the deprived neighbourhoods 
somehow. But how? Some of them were only 9 years old. This brings into 
focus the key issue of psychological mechanisms: how do people turn the 
psychological inputs they receive (through their life experiences in their 
communities) into internal representations of how they ought to behave? 
The next chapter draws together what we have learned about this question. 
Figure 5.7  Neighbourhood means of subjective life expectancy (years, left panel) and 
optimism about the future (scale of 1-100, right panel) by Index of Multiple Deprivation. 
Lines represent best fits from linear regression models. Data from the School Survey. 
Image © Daniel Nettle, CC BY.
6. Being there
The places you play and where you stay, 
Looks like one great big alleyway.
Introduction
As I mentioned in chapter 1, the Tyneside Neighbourhoods Project was not 
just about how behaviour varies from neighbourhood to neighbourhood, 
but also about the psychological mechanisms underlying this variation. 
I hope you will grant me, from all the data presented so far, that social 
behaviour differs profoundly from Neighbourhood A to B. I hope you 
will also grant me that a plausible explanation for this is that living in 
Neighbourhood A affects people in specific ways that are different from 
the ways living in Neighbourhood B affects the people who live there. 
That is, I assume that the behavioural differences between A and B are to a 
considerable extent consequences of living in those places, rather than being 
due some other exogenous factor, such as differential migration of people 
with certain personalities to certain neighbourhoods.
This raises a fundamental question: how does your psychology come 
to be affected by the community you live in? The classic anthropological 
answer invokes acculturation, as if no further elaboration was required: 
in the words of Herder quoted by Morin (2015), people just absorb their 
culture like ‘a wet sponge that has long been soaking on a wet floor’. The 
more you examine this metaphor, the more you realise that invoking 
acculturation without further unpacking does not explain anything. Things 
outside the mind (acts, artefacts, etc.) cannot literally move inside the mind 
© Daniel Nettle, CC BY http://dx.doi.org/10.11647/OBP.0084.06
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as the water can move into the sponge. The most that can happen is that 
the mind can construct certain kinds of internal representations (beliefs, 
memories, attitudes) in a way that is driven by cues in its environment. 
These cues might—or might not—be there in the local environment because 
of the behaviour of other members of the community, behaviour that might 
in turn be driven by the beliefs, memories, and attitudes that they hold. 
Thus, when we say that you can acquire attitude x from others in your 
community through acculturation, what we mean is that: (1) the attitude x 
held by others causes them to emit certain classes of environmental cues, 
(2) these cues can be detected, and (3) these cues increase the probability 
of your mind constructing x rather than some alternative attitude. This 
immediately raises more fascinating and more tractable questions. What 
are the cues? How do we detect them? What timescale do they operate on?
Scholarly discussions of acculturation also tend to overstate the 
importance of simple imitation, as if cultural traditions were reducible to 
people copying the acts of others in their surrounding communities. The 
problem with this is that it does not account for the open-endedness of 
behaviour; people can come up with appropriate and socially-patterned 
decisions for situations they have never faced before, and never seen 
anyone else face either. For example, when participants were asked to play 
Kari Britt Schroeder’s Theft Game (chapter 4), they had never played that 
game or even been in a closely similar situation before. Thus, there is no 
way they could have been following a rule of the kind ‘behave in this game 
as I have seen others from my community behave in this game on previous 
occasions’. Yet they came up with coherent patterns of responses that were 
systematically different across Neighbourhoods A and B. 
Instead, we must assume that they first parsed Kari’s game into 
components that did have analogues in daily life: the concept of 
opportunistically taking something from someone else; the concept of 
prosocially standing up for someone else, and so on. Then, to decide on 
a course of action given these components, they would need to consult a 
whole set of what are known in the jargon as internal regulatory variables 
(Tooby, Cosmides, Sell, Lieberman, & Sznycer, 2008). Internal regulatory 
variables are running mental meters of some aspect of the environment or 
your own state. For example, social trust is an internal regulatory variable 
that tells me to what extent the behaviour of others is likely to be benign 
and reliable. When a stranger asks me for help in some complex way, I 
evaluate his demand with reference to my level of social trust. If my level of 
social trust is high, then I am prepared to believe his story and risk helping 
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him; if past experiences have made my level of social trust low, then I will 
be more sceptical and disinclined to help.
Viewed in this light, the question of how acculturation happens 
becomes partly the question of how, through our experiences, the levels 
of our internal regulatory variables are set. They will no doubt be affected 
by personal interactions (every experience of betrayal, for example, 
probably brings trust down a notch). They will also be affected by the 
stories recounted to us by others about their experiences. However, there is 
also an important role for immediate perceptual input, and it is this role I 
particularly wish to explore in this chapter. 
Perceptual experience and context sensitivity
Every time you go out of your house, you are exposed to a barrage of 
perceptions: where people are, what they are doing, how they look, the 
state of their houses, the state of public structures, and so forth. Even if you 
have no interaction of any consequence with these people and structures, 
they constitute a rich source of information about what might happen if 
you were suddenly called upon to interact with them. Even the simplest 
act of visual perception, like recognizing that an object is a teacup, is 
more than a question of passively receiving photons. It is a process of 
active inference from the patterns of photons received, in which the mind 
reconstructs aspects not directly present in the signal, such as the shapes of 
obscured parts of the objects. I suggest that these inferential processes go 
well beyond just deciding what kinds of objects are out there, and calibrate 
the internal regulatory variables governing our social attitudes too. That 
house has barbed wire on its gate (perception); the people living in it feel at 
risk from intrusion (inference); I should be careful living in this community 
(updating of internal regulatory variable). Such updating could happen 
without any explicit verbal instruction, and without my needing to actually 
be a victim of violent intrusion myself. 
This view of acculturation as involving the setting of internal regulatory 
variables through perceptually-based inference leads us to ask how long 
it needs to take. A classical view would be that acculturation takes (and 
lasts) a lifetime: children are socialized in particular ways, the effects of 
socialization are gradual and cumulative, and the result is a pattern that, 
by adulthood, is largely set in stone. There are certainly data that support 
this view, such as the classic findings that young men socialized in the US 
Southern states behaved differently from those socialized in the North even 
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when both groups were currently living in the same city and attending 
the same university (Cohen, Nisbett, Bowdle, & Schwarz, 1996). However, 
it is unlikely that all internal regulatory variables have to be set in stone. 
At least some of them remain flexible through life and are constantly 
being notched up and down by the flow of perception. We can imagine a 
continuum of cases. At one end would be cases where by adulthood, the 
amount by which the variable could move up and down from hour to hour 
with further perceptual experience was very limited. Most of the variation 
in the variable would therefore be between people with different long-term 
cultural backgrounds, and the variation within people over time would be 
negligible. We will call variables at this end of the continuum trait-like. The 
variation in these trait-like variables would still be environmental rather 
than genetic in origin, but once people were adults there would be little 
scope for further fluctuation. 
At the other end of the continuum would be cases where the variable 
still had a lot of room to vary in response to changes in the ongoing stream 
of experience. Put the person in one situation, the variable goes straight 
up; move them to another situation, it comes straight down. We will call 
variables at this end of the continuum contextually sensitive. Here, most of 
the variation would be relatable to the person’s current situation rather 
than their longer-term history. This raises the question of whether the 
psychological differences underlying the different behavioural outcomes 
between Neighbourhoods A and B are more trait-like or more contextually 
sensitive. (In Sampson’s [2012] terminology, this equates to the question of 
whether we are dealing with developmental or situational neighbourhood 
effects.) This question really matters because of its implications for social 
interventions. If the differences are mainly trait-like, then moving adults 
from Neighbourhood B to Neighbourhood A would not make them any 
more trusting; as the saying goes, you can take the woman out of the West 
End, but not the West End out of the woman. On the other hand, if the 
differences are mostly contextually sensitive, then moving adults from B 
to A, or perhaps more relevantly improving the physical environment of 
B, could have marked real-time effects on trust and other social outcomes. 
There is evidence suggesting that many of the internal regulatory 
variables underlying social behaviour are particularly context-sensitive. 
Perhaps the strongest comes from Keizer, Lindenberg, and Steg’s (2008) 
experiments. To recall, in their experimental conditions, they sowed 
the environment with small cues as simple as graffiti on a wall, bicycles 
parked in violation of a rule or supermarket shopping carts that had not 
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been returned to the proper place. These cues were purely perceptual; they 
had no direct consequence for the participant. They were also very subtle, 
but they all suggested in some way or other that people around here were 
routinely failing to be prosocial. The consequences of the experimental 
treatments were that the participants started to behave antisocially in lots 
of other ways, some of them more serious, such as stealing €5. Thus, the 
participants were not just copying the behaviour implied by the cues, but 
were using the cues to recalibrate some internal regulatory variable that 
then affected their decisions in other social domains. Most importantly for 
current purposes, the effects were dramatic: in real time, through perceptual 
means alone, the experimenters made the normally prosocial Dutch into a 
rather antisocial community. 
We therefore want to ask whether the differences in social behaviour 
between the residents of Neighbourhoods A and B reflect context-sensitive 
responses to immediate experience, or whether they are more trait-like. 
Some evidence for context-sensitivity comes from the results of Kari’s 
norms experiment in Neighbourhood B, as described in chapter 5. We 
also carried out another ambitious experiment to try to probe for context-
sensitivity, and this is described in the next section. 
An experiment with minibuses
An ideal experiment to investigate context-sensitivity would involve 
taking a group of residents from Neighbourhood A and moving them to 
Neighbourhood B, directing another group in the opposite direction, and 
having two control groups that stay where they are. We could then track key 
psychological variables such as trust over time: to the extent to which trust is 
context-sensitive, the two moving groups should come to resemble their new 
neighbours rather than their old ones. How fast the change happened would 
tell you something about just how labile the context-sensitive variables were. 
Something slightly akin to this experiment was performed by one of the most 
ambitious US federal housing programs ever, Moving to Opportunity, which 
provided some poor families with vouchers allowing them to move to more 
affluent neighbourhoods, whilst some went to other poor neighbourhoods 
and some stayed where they were. The consequences for the participants’ 
health and behaviour were complex, but, overall, they provide some of the 
strongest causal evidence we have for the importance of neighbourhood 
effects (Kessler et al., 2014; Ludwig et al., 2012; Sciandra et al., 2013).
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We discussed such an experiment at length within the Tyneside 
Neighbourhoods Project, and concluded that we did not have a workable 
way of doing it. However, we did come up with a design for a study that 
shared some interesting features with such an experiment, but in a much 
smaller way. This was the work of Gillian Pepper, Kari, and myself, ably 
assisted by Ruth Jobling and students Bobbie-Jay Hasselby and Anna 
Wilson. What if, instead of transplanting people from A to B and vice 
versa, we recruited a third group of adults, residents of neither A or B, 
and randomly assigned them to spend some time in the environment 
of one or the other neighbourhood? Let us call these two experimental 
groups A-visitors and B-visitors. We could then measure some important 
variables such as trust in both groups. The null hypothesis would be that 
there should be no systematic differences between them. After all, the two 
groups were formed by random assignment. If, on the other hand, people 
are sensitive to neighbourhood context, then the A-visitors should be more 
highly trusting than the B-visitors, just as residents of A are more trusting 
than residents of B. The more similar the psychological measures were in 
A-visitors to A residents, and B-visitors to B residents, the more we would 
feel it plausible that the differences between residents of A and B were the 
outcome of immediate responses to context. Of course, we would still be 
well short of proving that if you moved people from B to A they would 
soon begin trusting like the other residents of A, but it would nonetheless 
be an intriguing result. 
Two things became clear about this experiment. The first was that we did 
not want our participants to know about the hypothesis, or even the nature 
of the study design. It would be too easy for them to offer us the obvious 
stereotypes about different parts of the city if they knew that was what we 
were asking about. So the experiment had to be somewhat surreptitious; 
we had to get our participants into the neighbourhoods on some plausible 
ulterior motive and then slip our measures in. The second thing that became 
clear is that our experiment would have to be audaciously short. You can’t 
make people go and spend three weeks in a neighbourhood without really 
telling them why. It was going to have to be not much more than a quick 
walk around. This seemed to stack the odds against our finding anything. 
Our participants’ experiences of the neighbourhoods they were assigned to 
were going to be so small and fleeting that it was hard to believe we would 
see any measurable effect. However, there is some precedent for very fast-
acting effects of exposure to a cultural context. It is well established that, in 
viewing scenes, Westerners tend to focus most on foreground objects, and 
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Japanese more on the background and relationships between objects in the 
scene. What is less well known is that just making American participants 
view 95 images of Japanese street scenes causes their perceptual style 
to shift substantially towards a Japanese one, whilst making Japanese 
participants view images of the US shifts them towards the American 
style (Miyamoto, Nisbett, & Masuda, 2006). The streets of the USA and 
Japan just look different. Thus, part of the difference between Americans 
and Japanese is not so much a matter of long socialization but the way the 
perceptual system is being driven by its immediate inputs. 
For our experimental design, what we settled on in the end was a case 
of killing two birds with one stone. We were always needing to deliver 
questionnaires to addresses in Neighbourhoods A and B, as part of the 
ongoing social surveying. We decided to recruit research volunteers who 
would help with these deliveries for an hour or two. This involved them 
showing up at a meeting point in the university, and being randomly shown 
into one of two minibuses. One minibus would go to Neighbourhood A 
and one to Neighbourhood B. Each participant would be given a list of 
addresses, a personalised street map, and a packet of questionnaires. The 
minibus would wait at a central point and the participant would return to 
it when they had finished (the 52 participants we recruited ended up taking 
10–48 minutes to make their deliveries). As soon as they were back at the 
minibus, we would measure the psychological variables we were interested 
in. I found this delivery paradigm promising. When you are trying to find 
an address to deliver a questionnaire, you really look around you. You see 
the different streets and types and conditions of housing as you search for 
the required address; you get lost and have to back up; sometimes you ask 
a local. In other words, you are for that period alert and richly immersed 
in and attentive to all the cues about social life that the neighbourhood’s 
streets have to offer.
As for the measures, the idea was to measure in the minibus riders some 
of the very same things we had responses on from the residents of the two 
neighbourhoods. We had measures of social trust and personal trust from 
Social Survey 2 (see chapter 3), so we measured these on the same scale 
in the minibus riders. We also decided to measure paranoia, the feeling 
that others intend to do us harm, using a standard questionnaire scale. To 
get some resident data on paranoia, we recruited an extra 65 householders 
who got a new Social Survey containing paranoia as well as social and 
personal trust; it was—with pleasing neatness—these questionnaires that 
our minibus riders were tasked with delivering.
102  Tyneside Neighbourhoods
The results from the minibus study are summarised in Figure 6.1. Each 
panel represents a different psychological measure. Within each panel, 
the first pair of bars represents the scores for the residents of the two 
neighbourhoods, and the second, the scores for the visitors (the resident 
paranoia scores have been adjusted for age, sex and non-local origin, all 
factors known to affect paranoia). Taking social trust first, amongst the 
residents there is the expected neighbourhood difference, with social trust 
much higher in A than B. What is much more surprising is that difference is 
mirrored almost perfectly in the minibus riders: visitors to Neighbourhood 
A rated their social trust higher than those who had visited Neighbourhood 
B. Moreover, the trust ratings of visitors to Neighbourhood A were not 
significantly different from those of Neighbourhood A residents, but were 
significantly different from those of Neighbourhood B residents, whilst 
the ratings of visitors to Neighbourhood B were not significantly different 
from those of Neighbourhood B residents, but were significantly different 
from those of Neighbourhood A residents. In other words, minibus riders 
who had been in neighbourhoods for 10-48 minutes looked exactly like 
long-term residents of those neighbourhoods. It is important to stress that 
we did not ask them to imagine how much they thought they would trust 
if they were a resident of this neighbourhood, or to guess how much the 
people they had delivered surveys to trusted, or to think about trust right 
now in particular. We asked them how much they, as a matter of fact, 
trusted people they met for the first time. 
Figure 6.1  Mean social trust (left panel), paranoia (centre panel), and personal trust 
(right panel) for residents of and visitors to each neighbourhood. Error bars represent 
one standard error. Data described more fully in Nettle, Pepper, Jobling, and Schroeder 
(2014). Image © Daniel Nettle, CC BY.
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The results for paranoia (centre panel) are rather similar to those for 
social trust. There is the expected neighbourhood difference amongst the 
residents, with paranoia higher in Neighbourhood B than A. This pattern 
is reflected in the minibus riders: visitors to B are more paranoid than 
visitors to A, and the paranoia scores of visitors to a neighbourhood are 
statistically indistinguishable from the paranoia scores of the people who 
live there. Again, the paranoia questionnaire did not ask participants about 
paranoid thoughts at this moment in particular, or the paranoia they would 
hypothetically feel if they lived here, but their own self-assessment of their 
thoughts concerning whether others in general were out to do them harm.
The third trait, personal trust (the trust of people you know well), did 
not show the same pattern. As already mentioned in chapter 3, there was 
a neighbourhood difference amongst the residents on this variable. There 
was no significant difference between the two visitor groups. In a way, 
though, this is the exception that proves the rule. By putting people into 
the general social environment of one or other neighbourhood, we had 
manipulated the informational inputs to regulatory variables concerning 
what to do in interactions with people they did not know. We had not 
manipulated any information about the people they did know well, and 
so we should not have expected effects on internal regulatory variables 
concerning interactions with known others. 
What the results for social trust and paranoia suggest is that key 
psychological variables that differ between Neighbourhoods A and 
B are highly sensitive to context, and are notched up and down by 
recent perceptual experiences of the social environment. Therefore, the 
results imply, all you have to do to make someone think and feel like a 
Neighbourhood B resident is make them walk about a mile in the shoes 
of a Neighbourhood B resident around the streets that a Neighbourhood 
B resident would see every day. This was for me a stunning finding: I 
imagined that the low trust and higher paranoia of B residents was the 
cumulative effect of many years (generations perhaps) of acculturation 
into a world of economic and social uncertainty. The idea that you could 
reproduce essentially the whole of the Neighbourhood A/B trust difference 
in a group of experimental volunteers within one hour without doing 
anything in particular to them, just by having them be there, made me 
consider the neighbourhood differences in a whole new light. Of course, 
I am not claiming that all of acculturation is a simple matter of immediate 
context-sensitivity, or that all neighbourhood effects are contextual rather 
than developmental ones. That is clearly not the case; if I send you to the 
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Arctic for an hour, you certainly will not become Inuit. However, perhaps 
the psychological differences we observe between human groups are 
more a result of sensitivity to immediate perceptual context than we have 
previously imagined. 
The results of this experiment should be relatively encouraging. If the 
differences between people from deprived neighbourhoods and people 
from affluent ones were mostly trait-like, then there would be no easy 
social interventions. Making the West End look cleaner, safer, and better 
cared for would not be expected to produce immediate gains in terms of 
greater trust and prosociality: any such gains might be a generation in 
coming. The experiments by Keizer and colleagues (2008) already suggest 
that this is not right, and our minibus study seems, in a different way, 
to confirm the picture. Simply changing the way the environment looks 
might have substantial impacts on people’s internal regulatory variables, 
and hence, perhaps, their social behaviour. We will return to the potential 
for such interventions in chapter 7. However, you would not be able to get 
very far in designing them until you had explored a follow-up question: 
what is it that people see in Neighbourhood B that lowers their trust and 
raises their paranoia?
The social diet
Our results, and those of Miyamoto and colleagues (2006) on Japanese-
American differences, bring to mind so-called visual diet effects in the 
perception literature (Rhodes, Jeffery, Watson, Clifford, & Nakayama, 2003; 
Webster, Kaping, Mizokami, & Duhamel, 2004). Visual diet experiments 
have shown that you can rapidly alter people’s assessment of reality 
through manipulating their exposure to visual inputs. For example, if you 
show people a series of slightly angry faces, their view of what a normal 
neutral face looks like becomes, in a very few minutes, re-centred towards 
the angry end of the spectrum. Moreover, non-angry faces start to look 
odd to them. These visual diet effects are found for basic parameters such 
as size, shape, and proportions as well as socially-laden ones such as facial 
expression. 
Visual diet effects are very strong and very reliable. What is odd about 
them is that they should exist at all: participants in these experiments have 
had many years of life experience of what facial expressions normally 
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look like. It is hard to understand why the brain’s perceptual mechanisms 
should be designed to devalue all of that accumulated information about 
the world and give so much weight to just a few dozen recent exemplars. 
For whatever reason, though, this is how it seems to work. Internal social 
regulatory variables such as trust might work in a similar way, and here 
it is perhaps easier to see why an extreme sensitivity to the most recent 
inputs might be a good design. People presumably have always moved 
frequently from social grouping to social grouping. The right level of trust 
has thus not been something that could be set once and for all, but rather 
something that constantly needed notching up and down every time to 
the social context changed. Thus, perceptual mechanisms that scoured the 
current environment for cues to the right current level would always have 
been useful. 
If basic perceptual regulatory variables like expectations about the 
shapes of faces are set by the visual diet—the set of recent facial exemplars 
offered by the environment—then the analogous concept for social 
regulatory variables like trust is the social diet. The social diet is the set 
of perceptually-available cues about how people in the current context 
approach social behaviour. Let us think about how the social diet available 
in Neighbourhood B might differ from that in Neighbourhood A. There 
are actually a lot of ways in which it will be similar: they are both urban 
contexts, with buildings of similar vintage, similar numbers of people 
around, similar vehicles and advertising, similar street signs. However, 
there are some differences that our data allow us to clearly identify. 
A first difference is that the environment of Neighbourhood B contains 
more cues of prior antisocial behaviour by others, the most striking being 
litter. In Observational Dataset 1 (chapter 3), we saw someone drop litter 
every 30 minutes in B as against every 3 hours in A. That is absolutely 
nothing compared to the difference in litter on the ground. My experience 
of Neighbourhood B is that litter stays on the ground for many weeks or 
months, exacerbated by the fact that the system of rubbish collections is 
not used properly, with many receptacles filled with the wrong materials 
or at the wrong times, broken, or spilling over. Litter is not the only cue 
of prior antisocial behaviour, although I believe it to be possibly the 
most important single one. The iconic broken windows are very much in 
evidence in Neighbourhood B (Figure 6.2), along with broken bus shelters 
and other broken structures. It is not uncommon to see evidence of recent 
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fires, presumably deliberately set. These cues say not only ‘people round 
here are prone to behave antisocially’, but also, equally importantly, 
‘no-one round here has been prosocial enough to clear this up’, both 
powerful messages. 
Figure 6.2  Empty house in Neighbourhood B. This house sports both broken 
windows and social defensive measures such as razor wire and steel shutters.  
Image © Daniel Nettle, CC BY.
A second difference is that Neighbourhood B contains many more cues of 
social defensive measures (Figure 6.2). Many yard walls in B are topped with 
razor wire or, particularly brutal looking, broken glass set into concrete. 
Windows and doors are sometimes protected with thick metal bars. A 
doctor’s surgery on the boundary of B is literally fortified, with anti-climb 
razors and steel armour on the windows (Figure 6.3). This is almost exactly 
how police posts looked in Northern Ireland at the height of the Troubles. 
The irony of these defensive measures is that they are no doubt undertaken 
with the intention of providing a sense of security. Their effects, however, 
could be contrary to the intention. Seeing the lengths people round here 
feel they need to go to to protect themselves powerfully communicates that 
round here is not a very safe place. Thus, the defensive measures could 
have the aggregate effect of people in the community ending up feeling, or 
even perhaps being, less safe than they otherwise would be. 
 6. Being there  107
Figure 6.3  Doctor’s surgery on the boundary of Neighbourhood B. Defensive measures 
include a 2m spiked fence, spiked anti-climb rollers, and armoured doors and windows. 
Image © Daniel Nettle, CC BY.
A third difference in the social diet of the two neighbourhoods concerns 
police presence and formal law enforcement. The local police, like many 
police forces, are highly aware of the spatial distribution of incidents 
requiring their attention, and also concerned with being seen to provide 
community safety. They patrol Neighbourhood B at a much higher rate than 
Neighbourhood A. During the gathering of Observational Dataset 1, I was 
passed by 23 police patrols (mostly in cars; Figure 6.4) in B and 4 patrols in 
A. Coupled to the patrolling is use of surveillance: much of the West End of 
Newcastle is fitted with street camera installations (Figure 6.5). The already 
brutal looking camera towers themselves have to be defended with metal 
spikes or barbed wire (presumably since, to slightly misuse a bit of Juvenal, 
nobody is watching the watchmen). No doubt the motivation of the patrols 
and surveillance is to make people feel safer: if something bad happens to 
you, we will see it. However, these measures too could have paradoxical 
effects: if the police have to put that much resource into fighting crime and 
disorder here, the unconscious inference could go, it must be a really bad 
environment. So it is an open question whether the presence of cues to law-
enforcement effort is overall reassuring or alarming. 
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Figure 6.4  Street scene with police car, Neighbourhood B. Image © Daniel Nettle, CC BY.
Figure 6.5  Surveillance installation amongst houses, Neighbourhood B.  
Image © Daniel Nettle, CC BY.
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The fourth difference in the social diets between the two neighbourhoods 
is that already discussed at the end of chapter 5: the relative abundance 
of older people on the streets of A and their relative scarcity in B. Young 
adults (especially male ones) are the most dangerous category of human, 
and moreover the lack of older people might lead to the inference either 
than this is not a place where life is long, or that this is not a place the frail 
dare being in the public space. Neither of these inferences would be likely 
to promote trust or reduce paranoia. 
Jessica Hill ran a project to begin to investigate the impact of social diet 
cues (Hill, Pollet, & Nettle, 2014). She was interested in understanding 
the effects of two types of cue in particular, cues of disorder and cues of 
police presence, and also how these two types of cue might interact. By 
disorder she meant litter, broken windows, neglected buildings and so on. 
The prior literature was fairly unanimous that people notice and respond 
to cues of disorder, but very mixed on the subject of visible policing. 
Some studies had found that it increased feelings of safety, others that it 
exacerbated the perception of crime risk, and several others that people did 
not really notice police presence at all. Jessica created three experiments in 
which participants were exposed to a virtual neighbourhood. In the first 
experiment the neighbourhood was described verbally, and in the other 
two it was made using a slide show of real pictures of Neighbourhoods A 
and B. Each experiment had a factorial design with four conditions. In the 
first, the virtual neighbourhood featured high disorder and visible police; 
the second, high disorder and no police; the third, low disorder and visible 
police; and the fourth, low disorder and no police. Having experienced their 
virtual neighbourhood, participants were asked to rate it firstly how safe 
they thought that environment was, and secondly what the social capital 
of the people who lived there might be (through a series of questions such 
as whether the people in this neighbourhood could be trusted and whether 
they were willing to help one another). 
The results of the three experiments were remarkably consistent. 
People responded strongly to cues of disorder, feeling much less safe and 
perceiving much lower social capital where these cues were present. This 
is compatible with a wealth of social science research, described above and 
in earlier chapters, showing that even minor disorder is infectious and 
prone to undermining social capital and trust. Cues of police presence, 
by contrast, had no impact whatever in any of the studies. People did not 
seem to notice them at all. I suppose this has positive implications for the 
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police in that their greatly increased presence in high-crime areas does not 
seem to exacerbate the fear of crime in those areas. However, it is hardly 
encouraging if they expected that their visible presence alone would suffice 
to reduce the fear of crime or bolster the feeling of community trust. 
Jessica’s study is only a first step, and this part of the Tyneside 
Neighbourhoods Project represents unfinished business. The kinds of 
social diet cues we respond to and the kinds of inferences we make from 
them are topics eminently amenable to experimental investigation. As well 
as simple slide shows, there are more sophisticated approaches we could 
use by employing video, eye-tracking, or even immersive virtual reality. 
These kinds of investigations, as well as being interesting for fundamental 
reasons, are surely of applied importance, since local governments and 
agencies have to decide how to allocate their fixed budgets. Surely one of 
the considerations in such decision-making should be the likely impact of 
different allocations on citizens’ internal regulatory variables such as trust, 
and hence, on their social behaviour. 
7. Conclusions and reflections
But now your eyes sing the sad, sad song, 
Of how you lived so fast and died so young. 
Introduction
We’ve now finished the data chapters of this book, and some conclusions 
are in order. In this chapter, I summarise what strike me as the main things 
we have learned, and suggest what their implications might be. I then 
devote a more extended discussion to the issue of causes of patterns of social 
behaviour, and how our data might bear on it. From this follows a brief 
consideration of what kinds of interventions we might consider undertaking 
to try to improve people’s wellbeing in deprived neighbourhoods. I end 
with some further reflection on the ethical difficulties posed by conducting 
and writing up this research, leading to a modest defence of its value. 
Summary and implications of findings
We selected two Tyneside neighbourhoods that were similar in many 
respects, but fell at opposite ends of the spectrum of socioeconomic 
deprivation. We used multiple, at times improvised, quantitative methods 
to try to characterize as best we could the patterns of social behaviour in 
these two neighbourhoods, and the psychological variables such as trust 
that underlay them. I set out our enquiries within the framework of two 
broad narratives: the Kropotkinian view, that harshness and deprivation 
bring social cooperation to the fore, and the Mountain People view, that 
© Daniel Nettle, CC BY http://dx.doi.org/10.11647/OBP.0084.07
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harshness and deprivation corrode cooperation and promote antisocial 
behaviour. 
There was some evidence for greater sociality in the deprived 
Neighbourhood B: people there socialized more on the streets; were less 
likely to be alone; greeted one another more as they moved around the 
neighbourhood; and their children were more likely to be found in multi-
household groups. These behavioural observations bring to mind Young 
and Willmott’s (1957) portrayal of working-class community life in East 
London, and are readily viewed through a Kropotkinian lens. However, 
most of the other findings, including all of those based on private responses 
to surveys, suggest the opposite view. When we gave people the opportunity 
to cooperate with another resident in a monetary game, residents of 
Neighbourhood B were averse to doing so, even if they could choose 
the beneficiary themselves. Moreover, when we gave them the chance to 
steal from other residents, they did so to a much greater extent than the 
residents of Neighbourhood A. In the same game, they were also less likely 
to come to the aid of an innocent victim of theft. We observed more littering 
in Neighbourhood B than A, and letters lost in Neighbourhood B were 
much less likely to find their way home. Crime and antisocial behaviour 
was much more frequent, despite vastly greater police effort. All in all, it is 
hard not to see the bulk of the neighbourhood differences as supporting the 
view that deprivation corrodes the basis of prosociality and is a fomenting 
ground for antisocial behaviour. 
Underlying the differences in behaviour between the two 
neighbourhoods lay marked differences in the psychological variables that 
regulate expectations in social interactions. Residents of Neighbourhood B 
trusted each other much less than those of A; this included both strangers 
and people they knew well. The low trust was particularly striking in 
young adults. Respondents from Neighbourhood B also reported greater 
feelings of paranoia. They perceived social cheating by others in their 
neighbourhood to be much more widespread than respondents in A did. 
Data from children in other parts of Tyneside showed that the association 
of deprivation and low trust is not restricted to Neighbourhoods A and B, 
and suggested that as children grow up, trust declines steeply if they live in 
a deprived neighbourhood, but remains high if they live in an affluent one. 
It is hard not to see an echo of Turnbull’s (1972) claim that under severe 
deprivation, mistrust and fear become the predominant interpersonal 
attitudes. These attitudes matter for behaviour: our data suggest that 
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unwillingness to cooperate with others was strongly related to lack of trust, 
and propensity to take from others was associated with the perception that 
others in the neighbourhood were cheating anyway. In other words, a 
kind of golden rule drove people’s social decisions: don’t cooperate if you 
don’t think others can be trusted to also do so, and get away with as much 
cheating as you can if you think others are doing likewise. 
It would be tempting to explain our findings in terms of the folk-
sociological idea that working-class communities based on heavy industries 
traditionally had high social capital and cohesiveness, and the loss of these 
industries in the last forty years or so led to the social fragmentation we 
see today. However, the truth is that we simply don’t have the historical 
data you would need to establish that the golden age was ever really very 
golden. We have already seen that the suspicion of romanticisation hangs 
over some past accounts of working-class life. Thus, the best we can say 
is that social capital is low and social disorder high in our more deprived 
study site today. We must remain somewhat agnostic about whether this 
situation is a product solely of deindustrialisation or in fact represents 
continuity with earlier historical periods; economic conditions were hardly 
benign for working-class people in pre-deindustrialisation Newcastle, after 
all. 
We tried to address the question of whether the differences in social 
attitudes between the two neighbourhoods were set in stone by years of 
acculturation, or represented a more immediate response to context. Our 
minibus experiment (chapter 6) suggested that low trust and high paranoia 
might represent an immediate response to being in an environment full 
of visual cues of disorder. This is consistent with recent work on the 
spreading of disorder, and the ‘broken windows’ theory of crime. The 
minibus findings are perhaps the most intriguing and potentially useful 
of the whole project, not least since they suggest avenues for intervention, 
such as a thorough neighbourhood clean-up, that could be relatively quick 
wins. 
It feels odd to end an ethnographic study by talking about possible 
interventions to ‘improve’ the social life of my study site. As a social 
researcher, I naturally start from the principle that social life is neither better 
nor worse in either of my study populations, just differently organized. 
To problematize Neighbourhood B as somewhere that needs fixing strikes 
against this neutral stance, and, as I will argue later in the chapter, presents 
an ethical risk. However, there are times when the strongest professional 
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imperative is to come off the fence, and this is one of them: social life is, in 
some important senses, worse for the residents of Neighbourhood B than 
for those of A. I think we can agree that is worse to feel paranoid than to 
feel secure, and it is worse to feel you have insufficient social support than 
to feel you have it in abundance. 
What is my justification for these evaluative statements? First and 
foremost, it is what our participants tell us. In Social Survey 1, we asked 
respondents how much they liked the neighbourhood. The data are plotted 
in Figure 7.1. As you can see, almost everyone from Neighbourhood A 
rated their neighbourhood as a 6 or 7 on a scale where 7 was the maximum. 
(To be precise, 77% of participants gave it a 7, and exactly one person gave 
it a score lower than 6.) By contrast, in Neighbourhood B, there is a much 
greater spread of opinions, and many more low ratings. The median is still 
5, which is above the mid-point of the scale, but the difference from the 
distribution of ratings in Neighbourhood A is very marked. Moreover, the 
less the individual trusted others in the neighbourhood, the less they liked 
the neighbourhood. Thus, the residents themselves are telling us that there 
are things they would prefer to be different. 
Figure 7.1  Violin plot of respondent ratings of how much they like their neighbourhood, 
on a scale of 1-7. The black dot shows the median for each neighbourhood. The curved 
shape represents the distribution of the data on an arbitrary horizontal scale; where the 
shape is wide, there are many observations, and where it is narrow, there are few. Data 
from Social Survey 1. Image © Daniel Nettle, CC BY.
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A related point is that Neighbourhood B is not a healthy place. At the 2001 
census, only 57% of people there described themselves as being in good 
health, and fully a third of adults of working age reported that they had a 
limiting long-standing illness. Expectancy of healthy life is a good decade 
shorter than in affluent areas, and we saw in chapter 5 how there is a dearth 
of active senior citizens on the streets. We haven’t measured it directly, but 
if Neighbourhood B is like other deprived areas of the UK, then there will 
be an excess of depression, anxiety, and stress-related illness (Stansfeld & 
Head, 1998). I can’t demonstrate that the poor health in Neighbourhood 
B is caused by the low trust and low social capital; the causality could 
be the other way around, or both could be separate consequences of 
something else. However, there are plenty of suggestions in the literature 
that social capital affects health (Kawachi, Kennedy, & Glass, 1999), and it 
would be hard to argue that the low social capital and low social trust in 
Neighbourhood B have any positive benefits. Thus, it does seem justified to 
ask: how might social wellbeing be made—by the residents’ own lights—
better in the deprived parts of Tyneside?
The economic grit and the cultural pearl
The issue of possible solutions is inexorably bound up with the issue of 
causes, which is why it always strikes me as odd when applied researchers 
display indifference to fundamental explanatory theories; in general 
terms, how you think you might change a situation should follow from 
your theoretical understanding of the factors that brought it about. We 
could privilege economic factors in our account of the causes of the social 
woes of Neighbourhood B and places like it. The economic deprivation 
and uncertainty of life in that neighbourhood drive people to short-term 
self-preservation choices; low social capital and antisocial behaviour must 
follow. This recalls the Marxist view that the economic base determines 
the social superstructure, and it also foregrounds the agentic aspect of 
human nature: people respond to their environments with shifts in their 
social decisions. On the other hand, we could privilege cultural processes 
in our account: low social trust and antisocial behaviour are traditions that 
exist in communities like B. They are passed from person to person through 
acculturation and have their own replicatory dynamic that is at least 
somewhat self-sustaining. This account foregrounds the cultural aspect of 
human nature. In this section, I will try to sketch a view of the probable 
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causes of the social problems of Neighbourhood B that gives weight to 
both economic and cultural factors. Hence, by implication, I am trying to 
do justice to both the agentic and cultural aspects of human nature in an 
integrative explanation of the causes of variation in social behaviour. 
Perhaps the most diagnostic difference between economic and cultural 
accounts of causes concerns the mapping between material situations and 
social results. Under a strong economic determinism, if you put twenty 
different human populations into the same set of economic circumstances, 
you would always get the same result. Economic circumstances X should 
always produce behaviour pattern Y, and in comparative work, the 
associations between economic factors and social consequences should be 
highly consistent. Under the strongest cultural approach, you could put 
twenty different populations into the same economic situation, and you 
could get completely different social results each time. What happened 
would depend on the cultural repertoire that each group started with, 
and would have plenty of scope to drift off in a different direction each 
time through the intrinsic dynamics of cultural replication. In the case of 
deprivation and social behaviour, a strongly economic approach would 
expect consistent effects of deprivation across multiple populations, 
whereas a strongly cultural approach would expect that the consequences 
of deprivation would be different in every case. 
The Tyneside Neighbourhoods Project is poorly designed to adjudicate 
this question, because it did not have twenty different populations all 
subjected to economic deprivation. It really had only one. Thus, we can’t 
say, on the basis of our data alone, that deprivation always has the effects 
of lowering trust and raising paranoia. Low trust and high paranoia could 
be an idiosyncratic cultural trait of Neighbourhood B that would not be 
replicated in other deprived communities. However, there are many 
reasons for thinking this is not the case. First, we did have some data 
from other Tyneside neighbourhoods, via the School Survey, and these 
data suggested that greater deprivation is reliably associated with lower 
trust across the conurbation. Second, I am impressed by Haushofer’s 
(2013) findings, which use the World Values Survey and demonstrate 
that, across 43 countries, every step down the income scale is associated 
with a measurable diminution of trust. There were no countries where 
the gradient ran in the other direction. Third, our findings of greater petty 
crime, increased interpersonal conflict, and greater squalor in the public 
space, can be found time and time again in ethnographic descriptions 
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of communities facing severe economic hardship, from many different 
countries, and many different historical periods. 
Fourth, and perhaps most importantly, there is the occasional natural 
experiment we can turn to. My favourite comes from eleven counties of 
North Carolina, USA (Costello, Compton, Keller, & Angold, 2003). In these 
counties, antisocial behaviour (basically aggression, violence, and minor 
law-breaking) was markedly more common amongst children from poor 
families than those from middle-class families. Many of the poor families 
were Native Americans. Halfway through the study period, a casino 
opened on the reservation belonging to the Cherokee. Native American 
reservations are outside of state laws and so able to host lucrative gambling 
facilities. As part of the agreement to host the casino, every Cherokee 
family started to receive a 6-monthly share of the profits, lifting them out 
of poverty. Within four years of the casino opening, the rates of antisocial 
behaviour in the previously poor Cherokee families looked exactly the 
same as the rates in families that had always been middle-class. It did not 
take generations of slow, gradual evolution for the antisocial culture of 
these families to disappear: it happened in near-real time as soon as their 
material difficulties were alleviated. Poor families that did not receive a 
casino income retained their high levels of antisocial behaviour. This argues 
for a repeatable and direct causal nexus linking economic factors-poverty 
and deprivation-to antisocial behaviour.
Let us put this together with the edge principle I adumbrated in chapter 
3. There I argued that when people are at the very edge of desperation, 
they are liable to flip into a short-termist state where they can allocate little 
or no energy to the social needs of others, and are prepared to risk doing 
others harm if it furthers their immediate interest to do so. I proposed this 
as a universal reaction underlain, presumably, by specific psychological 
mechanisms whose function is to provide some chance of getting through 
a situation of existential crisis. I did not claim that all of the residents of 
Neighbourhood B were in this state all of time. Probably the vast majority 
of them are in it none of the time, and the remainder only very occasionally. 
However, the probability of such a state being entered is increased by every 
increment you move down the scale of relative poverty and deprivation. 
This alone would be sufficient to account, for example, for the results of the 
Cherokee casino study. 
So far, this is a strongly economic account. However, it is not yet 
complete. What we observed in Neighbourhood B was not just the odd 
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desperate individual performing the odd rash act, but generally low levels 
of prosociality in the economic games. Here’s where cultural processes 
come in. Cultural processes are, broadly speaking, processes by which 
people influence other people. They act as spreaders and amplifiers of 
individual poverty-driven decisions. For example, imagine that someone 
in a neighbourhood performs one violent and desperate act. Those that 
witness it notch down their trust as a result. With lower trust, those people 
are less inclined to participate in keeping the streets around their houses 
clean. Others see this and lower their trust too. There start to be small signs 
of disorder in the neighbourhood. People see this and internalize it as 
normative. They feel like they can get away with small vandalisms or thefts. 
These acts in turn leave signs in the environment to which others respond, 
and so on. The initial isolated antisocial act leads to cycles of sociocultural 
ramification that end up with the whole neighbourhood having a very 
different social equilibrium than it would have done without that act. 
Social mistrust and social cheating are particularly potent raw materials for 
cultural processes. This is because each has the potential for feed-forward 
loops: when one person starts to do it, it produces cues that cause others 
also to do it more, and this in turn can feed back to the originating person. 
Thus, cultural forces can take small and sporadic behavioural differences 
between two neighbourhoods, and turn them into a persistently and 
pervasively different social ethos. 
An apposite metaphor here is that of the grit and the pearl. Pearls start 
out when a small external irritant enters the shell of a mollusc. Processes 
intrinsic to the mollusc—repeated secretion of layers of calcium carbonate 
and conchiolin—then work to build up this stimulus into a much larger 
pearl. A pearl is much more substantial than the grit it started from, and 
its detailed shape would not be predictable from the shape of its gritty 
centre. (Its value and beauty are also greater, but that is irrelevant to 
the way I am using the metaphor here.) On the other hand, pearls don’t 
get going without the introgression of some grit. I feel much the same 
about socioeconomic deprivation and antisocial behaviour. If people are 
materially in a sufficiently bad situation, there will be a high enough rate 
of desperate incidents to kick-start the cultural evolution process that will 
very often spiral towards a low-trust, disordered community equilibrium. 
On the other hand, if people can feel secure that their material needs are 
dealt with, then the desperate incidents will tend to be so rare that the 
cultural pearl is relatively unlikely to get going. I am enough of a materialist 
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to assign a causal primacy to the economic base: it is the grit at the heart 
of the pearl. On the other hand, I would not diminish the role of cultural 
transmission in amplifying and perpetuating the grit’s effects. 
Structural change versus nudges
The distinction between the economic grit and the cultural pearl leads us 
to a distinction between different policy approaches to social problems. On 
the one hand, you might feel that any attempt to improve the social lot of 
neighbourhood B needs to be structural: it needs to address the fundamental 
issue that the residents there face poor and uncertain economic prospects. 
This corresponds to the view that the economic issues are the primary ones. 
Set against this, there has been a lot of recent interest in purely behavioural 
or nudge interventions (Dolan et al., 2012; Thaler & Sunstein, 2008). The idea 
of these nudge interventions is that you can have a big effect on outcomes 
by making small tweaks to the psychological inputs people receive. You 
can, for example, get people to reduce their electricity consumption by 
telling them on their bill how much more than neighbouring households 
they have used. In the domain of social behaviour, many of the possible 
nudges relate to the cultural amplifying forces discussed in the previous 
section. You might find ways for residents to communicate to one another 
all the things they liked about the neighbourhood. A bit more ambitiously, 
you might clean up all the litter and repair all the broken windows. By thus 
changing residents’ social diets, you would potentially interrupt the self-
perpetuating transmission cycle of low trust and opportunistic antisociality.
There is plenty of evidence that nudge-style interventions can work, at 
least in some populations for some kinds of problem. Findings concerning 
the spreading of disorder, including our own minibus study described 
in chapter 6, suggest that the payoffs to simple visible improvements in 
the social environment of Neighbourhood B could be rapid and quite 
large. Whilst I can see the value of this, I remain uneasy about the nudge 
approach as a general solution. It has proved popular with politicians, 
because it is ostensibly apolitical and hard for anyone to object to. It does 
not call for any major reform of how our economic system works. We 
have to ask, though, if the fundamental structural issues are not solved, 
how long will the gains last? How long before someone who is materially 
desperate and close to the edge breaks a few windows and the whole 
cycle starts again? Whilst it may be desirable to arrest the processes that 
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turn grit into pearls, if there is constant stream of new grit, you risk failing 
to get to the heart of the problem.
The West End of Newcastle has seen a whole series of well-intentioned 
superficial regeneration schemes. They look nice for a while—and do seem 
to have medium-term effects on wellbeing (Blackman, Harvey, Lawrence, 
& Simon, 2001)—but they eventually deteriorate, and as we have seen, 
the residents of those regenerated areas are still relatively mistrustful 
and paranoid. By contrast, areas like Neighbourhood A don’t receive any 
expensive makeover schemes and don’t need them: those more prosperous 
communities manage to create and maintain the social ethos they want 
without any nudging or other anti-entropic external input. And we have 
already seen the evidence from the Cherokee casino study suggesting that 
if you can—somehow—fix the structural economic issues, the downstream 
social problems simply sort themselves out. I find this very striking.
The response I get from my colleagues in the behavioural sciences at 
this point goes something like this: you need to do both. The nudges may 
not be a panacea, but they are certainly a help, and they are also something 
we can get on with doing immediately whilst figuring out how to address 
the much more knotty long-term structural issues like low incomes, low 
human capital and insecurity of employment. This is a reasonable position, 
but there are two possible problems with it. First, when you focus on the 
easy stuff first, you tend not to ever get around to addressing the hard stuff 
at all. The hard stuff gets political, reasonable people can disagree over it, 
and it may require change to our current institutions. Devoting effort to 
non-structural interventions effectively puts the structural issues out in the 
long grass.
The second problem is that resources are finite. Money spent on 
nudges and similar schemes is taken from something else. What might the 
something else be that would make a greater difference to the social life 
of poor communities? This question takes us far beyond the data of the 
present study. However, let me mention a personal view that we should not 
underestimate the importance of just raising poor people’s incomes. There 
seems to be a widespread perception that the social problems of chaotic 
lives, public disorder, and antisocial behaviour are somehow not economic: 
they are not caused by lack of money, and hence more money alone is 
not the solution to them. We do not actually know that this perception is 
right. The admittedly limited evidence suggests that raising poor people’s 
incomes improves social and psychological outcomes quite a lot, especially 
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if people can thereby have greater control and security in their lives (in 
my terms, stop coming or fearing coming close to the edge). There is the 
Cherokee casino study I have already mentioned, and there are various 
experiments with minimum incomes policies or negative income taxes 
(Forget, 2011). These policies appear to have substantial positive impacts on 
a wide range of fronts. This means that the relevant cost-benefit calculation 
for any social policy scheme is not: does it have a positive impact? Rather, 
the question is: does it have a greater long-term positive impact than using 
the same money to raise the guaranteed incomes of people in the most 
deprived communities? 
Just as I tend to accord somewhat of a primacy to the economic grit 
over the cultural pearl, I would accord rather greater priority to tackling 
the structural economic issues than to other ways of addressing the social 
problems of deprived Tyneside neighbourhoods. The elephant in the room 
is the vast gulf in economic prospects for the kinds of people who live in 
Neighbourhood B compared to the kinds who live in Neighbourhood A. 
The concern to tackle the elephant head-on, having become unfashionable 
for a while, is being discussed by more and more people as the scale and 
social costs of current levels of economic inequality become clearer. It is not, 
or should not be, the exclusive preserve of the political left. People of all 
political persuasions should be able to agree that there is currently a problem. 
How you propose to tackle the problem will obviously depend on your 
predelictions. What is clear is that our present mix of institutions—state and 
private-sector—is not doing a good job for localities like Neighbourhood 
B. Inequality is increasing, and the gulf in social, health, and economic 
outcomes is widening. We need different institutions, institutions that give 
ordinary people greater security and control over their lives. 
The ethics of representation and  
the value of ethnography
The interests of deprived localities are not well represented in national 
discourse: people in those localities are subjected to derision, alarmism, or 
romanticisation rather than being recognized as normal citizens who have 
heterogeneous but particular experiences. This leads me to the issue of the 
ethics of representation, which I foreshadowed briefly in chapter 2. One of 
the central ideas in this book is to do with the cultural self-perpetuation 
of social problems. The perception that others are not trusting and do not 
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help spreads from person to person through the cues they leave in the 
environment. Those cues are not just in the broken windows and litter on 
the streets. They are also in media articles, television programmes, and, if 
anybody reads them, academic books. The way I have described social life 
in Neighbourhood B here may be justified by the data, but it nonetheless 
risks contributing to the perpetuation of a negative social reputation, 
and hence of the very outcomes it represents. This has been a source of 
considerable personal struggle for me, as a committed citizen of the West 
End of Newcastle, as well as, I hope, an ethical professional researcher. The 
West End has had enough adversity and bad press; the last thing it needs, 
it would seem, is to be negatively represented by me. 
There is a temptation to allow what one wants to be the case to drive the 
way one describes what is in fact the case. We saw in Kari’s perceived norms 
experiment (chapter 4) that manipulating the information residents got 
about what other people thought of their neighbourhood seemed to have 
an immediate positive impact on their social expectations. If I had carefully 
and selectively written my book so as to accentuate the positive, it could 
perhaps itself have become a kind of experimental intervention along those 
lines, and could have made a small contribution to improving the social 
ethos of Neighbourhood B. However, my considered judgement is that this 
would have been an even greater wrong. The primary ethical imperative for 
an ethnographer is to bear witness to what is the case, without obfuscation. 
Bearing true witness—and contributing to the understanding of human 
nature—is likely to do my fellow citizens and their communities more 
good in the very long term than parochial advocacy or romanticisation. 
What I present here is information to be fed into the machines of human 
knowledge and of civil society, with results I cannot entirely predict. I 
fervently hope that it might eventually do some good. I can only apologise 
to our participants that it hasn’t led to anything concretely or immediately 
beneficial, which, in all honesty, it hasn’t. 
If the findings of the Tyneside Neighbourhoods Project make 
uncomfortable reading at times, I consider this a judgement not on the 
residents of Neighbourhood B, but on a political and economic system 
that continues to make the lives of the poorer half of society uncertain and 
insecure, despite historically unprecedented material abundance. In Selina 
Todd’s words: ‘We don’t need working-class people to be revolutionary 
heroes or helpful neighbours in order to make the point that inequality is 
damaging and wrong’ (Todd, 2014). I would go further. If people in the 
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most deprived communities are not helpful neighbours, that can be taken 
as evidence for the proposition that inequality is damaging and wrong. If 
we continue to make the prosperity and security gap between the favoured 
few and the rest of society widen as it has done in recent decades, then 
there will be lower trust, greater paranoia, less help, and more harm 
for more and more people. That is an issue we all have to think about: 
political decisions, not laws of nature, determine levels of inequality. And 
in case you feel after reading this that people from deprived communities 
are somehow ‘other’, then you should not. My hunch is that the only 
important thing differentiating people from Neighbourhood B from people 
from Neighbourhood A is that they live in Neighbourhood B and face the 
material problems that Neighbourhood B faces, whereas the people from 
Neighbourhood A don’t. It is only a short bike ride from one to the other. 
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